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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Choice of jurisdiction is an important strategic issue in international litigation 
and the source of countless commercial disputes on preliminary matters, 
which may, at times, frustrate proceedings on the merits of claims. Its 
determination is of particular significance in the context of transnational 
contracts of carriage by sea for a number of reasons. 
 
Firstly, contracts of carriage by sea often take the form of negotiable 
bills of lading, which not only act as receipt for the goods and evidence of 
the contract, but also serve as documents of title. These transport 
documents, which often involve multiple jurisdictions, may be transferred, 
sometimes more than once, to third party cargo interests, who usually inherit 
all legal rights and obligations flowing from the agreement upon receipt of 
the goods, even if they are not privy to its terms when negotiating the 
contract for the sale of goods. Secondly, carrier liability is limited by ship 
tonnage, and varies significantly depending on whether the jurisdiction 
seized with the maritime dispute is party to the 1957 Limitation Convention1 
or the 1972 Limitation Convention,2 the latter of which offers higher limits of 
liability and renders the tonnage limitation system virtually “unbreakable.”3 
Thirdly, in certain jurisdictions, a vessel̶the typical defendant̶may be 
arrested in rem and/or in personam, not only as a means of guaranteeing 
security for cargo claims, but also to found jurisdiction before courts that 
would not otherwise be authorized to hear the dispute. Fourthly, cargo 
                                            
1 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of 
Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships, 1957. 
2 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976. 
3 J Hare ‘Shopping for the best admiralty bargain’ in M Davies (ed) Jurisdiction and forum 














claims are generally subject to mandatory rules,4 which provide minimum 
standards of ‘responsibilities, obligations and liabilities of the carrier’,5 and 
include stipulations on such matters as prescription, seaworthiness, and per 
package or unit limitation, all of which will differ depending on the particular 
maritime regime adopted by a seafaring nation through its domestic 
legislation. Fifthly, as a consequence of globalization, a certain number of 
shipowners worldwide register their ships under “flags of convenience,” even 
though the link between the ship’s registration and ownership is tenuous, so 
as to keep up with other shipowners by reducing registration fees, lowering 
taxes, and employing cheap labour. Many of these national registries of 
convenience also have low safety and training standards, which may have a 
bearing on the outcome of claims. Sixthly, whether lawyers represent carrier 
or cargo interests, shopping around for the best forum to bring suit and 
enforce claims is fairly common and generally encouraged in maritime 
industry. For these and other reasons, choice of jurisdiction takes on a 
particular significance in the context of maritime litigation.  
 
When carriers agree to move cargo under contracts of carriage, they 
often make use of standard form bills of lading,6 which typically include 
jurisdiction or arbitration clauses specifying choice of venue for litigation or 
arbitration in their boilerplate terms on the reverse side.7 Briggs defines a 
                                            
4 A Von Ziegler ‘Jurisdiction and forum selection clauses in a modern law on carriage of 
goods by sea’ in M Davies (ed) Jurisdiction and forum selection in international maritime 
law: essays in honor of Robert Force (2005) 94: ‘[T]he Hague and Hamburg Rules is framed 
in language that makes the scheme of the Convention mandatory for the parties.’ 
5 Ibid. 
6 They may also be found in other forms of maritime agreements, such as marine insurance 
policies, towing contracts and charterparty agreements. 
7 A study of the regulation and enforcement of arbitration agreements and other 
jurisdictional issues, such as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, lies 














jurisdiction clause8 as ‘a contractual term, which restricts or purports to 
restrict the procedural freedom of a party to sue in a court which would 
otherwise have had jurisdiction....’9 In admiralty, these clauses are seldom 
negotiated between commercial parties to the carriage agreement and rarely 
sighted by third or fourth parties to the contract before they take possession 
of the goods and become bound by the bill’s terms. Consequently, some 
argue̶mostly for historical reasons̶ that cargo interests have weaker 
bargaining power and require special legislative protection against carriers in 
the form of mandatory rules on jurisdiction to protect them against the 
purported one-sided effects of jurisdiction clauses.  
 
But until relatively recently, no maritime Convention prescribed rules 
to standardize the treatment of jurisdiction clauses in contracts of carriage by 
sea. Instead, it was left entirely to national jurisdictions to regulate and 
enforce. As a result, the treatment of these clauses has varied̶at times 
significantly̶from one seafaring nation to the next. This incongruity has 
induced commercial parties to engage in offensive forum shopping tactics 
and commence parallel proceedings leading to conflicts of jurisdiction 
problems, which can hardly be said to uphold main objectives of maritime 
law (and indeed international law in general), namely promoting 
predictability, consistency, coherency and fairness in the law.  
 
Meanwhile, through its regional initiative, the European Community 
has achieved some degree of success in harmonizing rules on jurisdiction 
clauses and avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction problems with the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation, which applies to civil and commercial matters alike, 
                                            
8 A jurisdiction clause is also commonly referred to as a “forum selection” clause/agreement, 
a “choice of court” clause/agreement, a “choice of forum” clause/agreement, and a “forum” 
clause/agreement. 














including contracts for the carriage of goods. Under this Regulation, freedom 
of contract is encouraged, and jurisdiction clauses are generally permissible. 
 
At the international level, the Hamburg Rules provide the first attempt 
at a harmonized response to the forum selection problem under maritime 
law. But this Convention has not enjoyed wide ratification as it strongly 
favours cargo interests, and is simply too drastic to be acceptable to major 
shipping nations. And yet, it has inspired a number of national jurisdictions to 
incorporate similar jurisdiction rules into their own legislation, and has served 
as a starting point for rules on jurisdiction contained in the newest maritime 
convention; therefore, it merits consideration in this study. 
 
The most recent convention attempting to standardize rules on 
jurisdiction clauses under maritime law are the Rotterdam Rules, which, as 
of the date of submission of this dissertation, have yet to enter into force. 
This latest international initiative, much like the EC Jurisdiction Regulation at 
the regional level, recognizes commercial parties’ freedom to contract as 
they see fit, under particular circumstances. It also introduces a ‘wide 
contractual freedom for shippers and carriers to negotiate shipping contracts 
outside the Convention.’10 However, its chapter on jurisdiction ̶Chapter 
14̶ is not mandatory unless nations “opt in” to it. Given the divergent 
national views vis-à-vis the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses, and rules on 
jurisdiction in general, it seems improbable that Chapter 14 of the Rotterdam 
Rules will truly contribute towards the greater harmonization and unification 
of international trade law; rather, it will most likely persuade most seafaring 
nations to maintain the status quo. And so, it would appear that nothing has 
changed.  
                                            














But perhaps the truth of the matter is that nations are all 
“conventioned out” and there are other more efficient ways of achieving 
harmonization of rules on jurisdiction to govern all contracts of carriage alike, 
and promote predictability, consistency, coherency and fairness in the law. 
 
This dissertation aims to engage in an historical and multi-
jurisdictional study of forum selection clauses in the context of international 
maritime carriage contracts by: 
 
1. Describing the historical situation which led to the inclusion of 
jurisdiction clauses in maritime contracts in the first place, providing 
background information on their regulation, construction and validity 
under the law, and touching upon other important preliminary 
considerations (Chapter 2); 
 
2. Providing a multijurisdictional analysis of the national regulation and 
enforcement of jurisdiction clauses contained in carriage agreements 
(Chapter 3); 
 
3. Providing an overview of the European regulation and enforcement of 
jurisdiction clauses contained in carriage agreements (Chapter 4); 
 
4. Providing an overview of the regulation and enforcement of 
jurisdiction clauses under the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules 
(Chapter 5); and 
 
5. Offering suggestions for achieving greater harmonization of rules on 














CHAPTER 2: JURISDICTION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME CARRIAGE CONTRACTS   IN A NUTSHELL 
Before engaging in a multi-jurisdictional analysis of the regulation and 
enforcement of jurisdiction clauses contained in international contracts for 
the carriage of goods by sea, it may be useful to describe the historical 
context which led to the inclusion of these boilerplate clauses in maritime 
carriage contracts in the first place, provide background information on their 
regulation, construction and validity under the law, and touch upon other 
important preliminary considerations. 
2.1 Histor ical  Reasons for  the Inc lusion of  Jur isdict ion 
Clauses 
During the course of the seventeenth century, the English courts of common 
law, ‘jealous of [the Admiralty Court’s] burgeoning jurisdiction’,11 began to 
issue writs of prohibition and interpret statutes conferring Admiralty 
jurisdiction narrowly in an effort to restrict the Admiralty Court’s jurisdiction 
and business.12 As a result, the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court was 
severely restricted over the next two hundred years,13 while that of the 
common law courts was broadened to include maritime litigation.14 It was 
during this time that the common law courts began to impose strict liability 
upon maritime carriers, as common carriers,15 for any loss or damage to 
                                            
11 G Hofmeyr Admiralty jurisdiction law and practice in South Africa (2006) 3. 
12 Ibid. 
13 W Tetley Maritime liens and claims 2ed (1998) 33; Hofmeyr ibid: 
The nineteenth century saw a dramatic increase in the business of the [Admiralty] 
court. Lord Stowell served as [an] admiralty judge from 1798 to 1827 and he gave 
the court a status it had not hitherto enjoyed. He was, moreover, careful to avoid 
prohibition and he gained the respect of the common law lawyers. Dr Lushington 
succeeded Lord Stowell and campaigned for the restoration to the court of its 
erstwhile jurisdiction. The result was the passing of the Admiralty Court Acts of 1840 
and 1861 which restored to the court much of its previous jurisdiction. 
14 L Gorton The concept of the common carrier in Anglo-American law (1971) 94.  
15 According to T J Schoenbaum Admiralty and maritime law 4ed (2004) 514-15:  
The essence of a common carrier is that he holds himself out to the general public 














cargo, which occurred in the course of a voyage, in breach of the bailment 
relationship,16 subject only to a limited list of exemptions.17 English courts 
relied upon public policy to support their legal reasoning and justify the 
imposition of a strict liability regime:  
[A]t common law it was believed that a cargo owner who shipped his goods 
by a marine carrier should be afforded special protection; he was 
prevented, by geographic remoteness, from closely supervising the 
passage of his goods and he was particularly susceptible to collusion 
between dishonest carriers and thieves.18  
Naturally, carriers were displeased with the broad liability and 
allocation of risk imposed upon them, and so they began to contract out of it, 
even in cases where loss or damage to cargo occurred as a result of their 
own negligence.19 Hare explains that ‘“[a]t shippers risk” became the order of 
the day, and remained so until the turn of the 19th century.’20 To make 
                                                                                                                           
general ship which carries different shipments of cargo for independent shippers.… 
The common carrier was chargeable as an insurer of the goods, accountable for any 
damage or loss happening in the course of the conveyance. There were only narrow 
exceptions to this liability: acts of God, acts of the public enemy, and inherent vices 
or faults of the shipper [emphasis added].  
See generally V Rochester The lone carrier (2005) LLM Dissertation, University of Cape 
Town 2-4; see also V Rochester Nautical fault: a historical and multi-jurisdictional study of 
the exemption for errors relating to navigation and management of the vessel in modern 
carriage law (2008) PHD Dissertation, University of Cape Town 13-17. Rochester explains 
in Nautical fault ibid at 15 that ‘[the] level of strict liability imposed on the carrier was not 
unique to England; rather this approach was adopted both in common law nations, including 
the United States, and in civilian nations.’ 
16 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 LdRaym 909 cited in J Hare Shipping law and admiralty 
jurisdiction in South Africa 2ed (2009) at 483 footnote 45; Rochester Nautical fault ibid at 14. 
17 Schoenbaum supra note 15; M Sturley ‘The history of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ 
(1991) 22 JMLC 1 at 4; Hare Shipping law and admiralty ibid at 483-84. Rochester explains 
in Nautical fault ibid at 14 that if the carrier or one of its servants contributed to the loss or 
damage through its/his/her own negligence, then it is unable to benefit from the exemption 
and avoid liability. She adds at footnote 68 that there exists conflicting legal opinion as to 
whether it is the cargo owner or the carrier which bares the burden of proving such fault or 
the absence thereof. 
18 M Sturley et al Benedict on Admiralty 6ed Vol 2a (1990) 2-1. 
19 Sturley ‘The history of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ supra note 17 at 5; A W Knauth The 
American law of ocean bills of lading 4ed (1953) 120: Clauses contained in bills of lading not 
only excused carriers from liability for negligence, but also ‘imposed a lien on the cargo for 
any indebtedness of the cargo owner, whether connected with the particular shipment or 
wholly unrelated thereto.’ 














matters worse for cargo owners, the English legislature of the day, 
influenced by powerful shipowners, enacted George II’s “Fire Statute” in 
1734,21 which not only exonerated a carrier from liability for loss or damage 
resulting from fire on board ship, but also limited its liability based on ship 
tonnage.22 Thus, as a result of shrewdly drafted contracts and pro-carrier 
legislation effectively exculpating carriers from any liability whatsoever, the 
pendulum of liability swung in favour of the shipowner,23 now free to carry 
shipments ‘when he liked, as he liked, and wherever he liked.’24 This carrier 
domination was further strengthened by the British courts, which 
systematically deferred to the commercial parties’ freedom to contract as 
they saw fit; strict liability became the default position, ‘in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary.’25 However the laissez-faire carrier-centric 
attitude of the British courts did not receive universal support. 
 
At the end of the Napoleonic era, Great Britain was acknowledged as 
the world leader of the shipping industry. But its dominance was 
challenged,26 especially by the United States, the Empire’s most ambitious 
                                            
21 Act of 7 George II, c 15. Later replaced by s 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 
which was thereafter replaced by s 18 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1979. 
22 Hare Shipping law and admiralty supra note 16 at 485. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Knauth supra note 19 at 116.  
25 Sturley states in ‘The history of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ supra note 17 at 5 that 
‘[m]ost European and Commonwealth countries eventually followed the British example.’ 
According to Hare in Shipping law and admiralty supra note 16 at 486, one of the 
inequitable consequences of the public support for the carrier’s freedom to contract out of 
liability was the effect it had on the rights of innocent third parties: third party consignees or 
transferees who were not parties to the original contract evidenced by the bill of lading 
would most likely not be privy to any contractual exclusion of liability, the existence of which 
arguably diminished the commercial negotiability of the instrument. See Section 2.5.2.2. 
26 According to E Gold Maritime transport: the evolution of international marine policy and 
shipping law (1981) 111-112,  
[B]y the end of the nineteenth century, international competition at sea had become 
exceedingly keen …. In particular, there were now more players in the game. The 
Scandinavians, particularly the Norwegians, had perfected tramp shipping…. The 
Greeks were often able to undercut British trade in the Mediterranean by using 














and effective competitor.27 From 1810 to 1840, the US shipbuilding industry 
thrived and its merchant fleet grew in strength and importance. The 
discovery of gold in California (at a time when the railroad had not yet been 
built), the American tea trade between China and New York and between 
Boston and London (after the British Navigation Acts had been repealed), 
and the creation of the cheaper, larger and faster softwood hulled California 
Clippers (more efficient than the British hardwood hulls of the day) all 
contributed to the success of the shipping industry in America.28 Indeed, this 
period has been hailed as ‘the most glorious period in American maritime 
history’.29 However, its glory days were numbered. For various reasons, the 
tonnage of the American fleet declined significantly.30 By 1890, the United 
States merchant fleet was reduced to less than 1 million gross tons, and its 
numbers continued to trail behind that of the Europeans at the turn of the 
century.  
 
Yet, despite its shrinking fleet, the American economy was 
flourishing.31 To keep pace with international trade, US commercial interests 
began to rely on foreign shipping to carry their exports and imports, as they 
‘saw no reason to expend their special energies on a shipping industry that 
                                                                                                                           
United States had all focused or refocused on their shipping industries ... in the hope 
of making inroads on the British monopolies in this area of the shipping industry…. 
Competition became truly aggressive. 
27 Gold supra note 26 at 83-84. 
28 Ibid at 89. 
29 C McDowell and H Gibbs Ocean transportation (1954) 21. 
30 According to Gold supra note 26 at 90-91, these reasons include the American Civil war, 
which resulted in the transfer of over half a million United States hulls to the British fleet, the 
development of the American West and Midwest, which meant less investment in the United 
States shipping industry, and the ground-breaking innovation by the British of ‘iron-hulled, 
double-bottomed, screw propelled, steam-powered’ (McDowell and Gibbs ibid at 27) ships, 
which eventually replaced the slower sail-powered wooden ones. 
31 According to Gold ibid at 142, by 1914, ‘the great bastion of free-enterprise commerce’ 














was adequately supported by other maritime states….’32 Cargo owners and 
shippers now dominated the United States maritime industry. It therefore 
comes as little surprise that American judges of the late nineteenth century 
restricted commercial parties’ freedom of contract by invalidating clauses in 
bills of lading that altogether exempted shipowners from liability for 
negligence or failure to provide a seaworthy ship, as they deemed these 
blanket stipulations to be unreasonable and against public policy.33 
According to Knauth: 
The views of the English, Continental and American judges as to the nature 
of the carrier’s obligations and the propriety of contracts exonerating 
carriers from their common-law liabilities soon came into head-on collision. 
In the English and European courts, contracts of exoneration were valid. In 
the American federal courts, they were invalid; some of the American state 
courts followed the federal courts; a few̶notably those of New York̶
followed the British courts. A chaotic legal situation developed with great 
suddenness.34 
 And so it came to pass that carriers’ exculpatory clauses were 
enforced by courts on one side of the Atlantic, where British shipowners’ 
interests dominated the shipping industry,35 but rejected on the other, where 
American cargo interests prevailed. British carriers reacted to the American 
courts’ invalidation by inserting exclusive forum selection clauses and choice 
of law clauses in bills of lading, naming London as the sole jurisdiction to 
hear claims a d English law as the applicable law.36 For their part, United 
States cargo owners and shippers retaliated against carriers’ strong-arm 
                                            
32 Ibid. 
33 Hare Shipping law and admiralty supra note 16 at 486; J C Sweeney ‘Happy birthday, 
Harter: a reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th anniversary’ (1993) 24 JMLC 1 at 8: ‘We 
can … speculate that the Supreme Court may have been well aware of the decline of the 
American merchant marine, the US reliance on the British merchant fleet to carry its foreign 
trade, and the need for American courts to protect American shippers.’ 
34 Supra note 19 at 119. 
35 Hare explains in Shipping law and admiralty supra note 16 at 486, that in the late 19th 
century, British liners not only controlled the bulk of the Transatlantic trade, but also set the 
freight rates. 
36 Sweeney supra note 33 at 8. See Sturley ‘The history of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ 














tactics by lobbying US Congress and demanding that action be taken to 
protect cargo interests.37 Congress responded with a bill, which ultimately 
became the Harter Act of 1893.38 This bill was ‘originally conceived as an 
instrument of international trade war’,39 designed ‘to protect US public 
policy’40 and ‘bring British shipping to heel in relation to contracting out of 
liability.’41 But it ultimately emerged as ‘a compromise or package deal 
between conflicting economic interests.’42 In terms of jurisdiction clauses, the 
                                            
37 See generally The Delaware 161 US 459 (1896) (US Supreme Ct); see also Sweeney ibid 
at 8 footnote 39: ‘Discussion on the floor of the House… cited choice of forum and choice of 
law clauses favoring England as a reason for the proposed bill.’ 
38 Title 46 United States Code §§190-96. According to Sweeney ibid at 1 and 9, this Act, 
named after Congressman Michael D Harter, applies to US domestic and international 
ocean voyages. It has never been repealed or amended, and therefore remains in force 
today. W Tetley in Marine cargo claims 4ed (2008) refers to the Harter Act as one of the first 
consumer protection acts. 
39 A Yiannopolous Negligence clauses in ocean bills of lading (1962) 46. 
40 Sweeney supra note 33 at 8. 
41 Hare Shipping law and admiralty supra note 16 at 486. 
42 Sweeney supra note 33 at 9. H Karan The carrier’s liability under international maritime 
conventions: the Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) 19: ‘It was the first 
national statute which established a compromise between carriers’ and shippers’ interests 
by mitigating the strict nature of the common law, limiting the long list of exemption clauses, 
and nullifying unreasonable clauses in the list’. According to Rochester in Nautical fault 
supra note 15 at 26, the original version of the Harter Act, which ‘strongly favoured cargo 
interests’, was amended because there were ‘concern[s] … that the objective of the bill 
would impede the ability of United States shipowners to compete with the English carriers.’ 
The compromise reached: in exchange for liability, albeit limited, carriers were given certain 
exemptions from liability, such as for nautical fault and fire. Also, the carrier’s absolute 
guarantee of seaworthiness was reduced to an obligation to exercise due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy. Sturley ‘The history of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ supra note 17 
at 15: ‘Although the United States stood alone with the Harter Act for a decade, eventually 
other nations with strong cargo interests followed the US lead.’ Rochester states in Nautical 
fault ibid at 27-28, that this ground-breaking legislation has served as a model for similar 
legislation adopted by other nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Morocco and 
Fiji, although most of these nations adopted legislation that rendered the carrier’s 
obligations more onerous. She also notes that ‘[o]ther nations such as Denmark, Finland, 
France, Iceland, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain and Sweden, had all 
contemplated introducing legislation modeled after the Harter Act.’ F Sparka explains in 
Jurisdiction and arbitration clauses in maritime transport documents: a comparative analysis 
(2010) 22 that ‘[a]s a result of the enactment of [the US] COGSA, the application of the 
Harter Act has now been limited to domestic trade and foreign trade up to the point where 















Act remained silent, leaving the determination of their validity and 
enforcement entirely at the courts’ discretion. 
2.2 Regulat ion of  Jur isdict ion Clauses at  Mar i t ime Law: 
Internat ional  Disharmony 
2.2.1  National Regulation of Jurisdiction Clauses  
As is the case under the US Harter Act, the Hague Rules of 192443 and the 
Hague/Visby Rules44 do not tackle issues relating to jurisdiction of cargo 
claims;45 indeed, neither maritime Convention prescribes rules standardizing 
the treatment of foreign jurisdiction clauses in international contracts of 
carriage by sea. Instead, it is left to national jurisdictions to regulate and 
enforce.46 Bursanescu states that ‘[t]his approach is c nsistent with the 
                                            
43 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of 
Lading, Hague 25 August 1924 (hereafter the “Hague Rules”). Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 
89: ‘[T]he Hague Rules were the international answer to the Harter Act and, therefore, had a 
primary, if not a sole, focus on issues of liability of the carrier.’ 
44 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, 23 February 1968; Protocol amending the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 
August 1924, as amended by the Protocol of 23 February 1968, Brussels 21 December 
1979 (hereafter the “Hague/Visby Rules”). M Sturley ‘Jurisdiction under the Rotterdam 
Rules’ Colloquium of th  Rotterdam Rules 2009, De Doelen, Rotterdam, 21 September 
2009 at 3-4. Available at http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php?page=text-
speakers-rotterdam-rules-2009 at 3-4 [Accessed on 1 February 2011]:  
During the negotiations that produced the Visby Protocol, jurisdiction was on the 
agenda …. In the end… the sub-committee… concluded that the liability regime 
should instead focus on the substantive rules governing the liability of the parties. 
The delegates felt that a liability regime was ‘hardly the ideal vehicle for a special 
provision about conflicts of law laying down what jurisdiction is acceptable [footnote 
omitted]’. 
45 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1912. 
46 Von Ziegler explains supra note 4 at 89 that 
[T]he Hague Rules do not deal with jurisdiction. Having embodied the principles of 
liability, which were at debate after the conflict between the Harter Act and the 
English general maritime law, the international delegates to the Hague conference 
were justifiably confident that they had done the job. For a long time, jurisdictional 
issues were not that important, as the application of the Hague Rules was quite 
uniform. With the great disparity that ensued, in particular relating to the monetary 

















philosophy of the rules, which aimed to unify “certain” rules of law relating to 
bills of lading, while leaving the rest to be governed by national law.’47  
But, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, in the absence of harmonized rules 
regulating jurisdiction, maritime nations do not treat foreign jurisdiction 
clauses in a uniform manner: whereas some nations restrict commercial 
parties’ freedom of contract by laying down strict criteria to govern the 
validity and enforcement of forum clauses contained in contracts of carriage, 
or by providing plaintiffs with the option to choose to litigate in their 
jurisdiction notwithstanding contracts requiring that claims be heard 
elsewhere, others outright prohibit the use of these so-called ousters of local 
jurisdiction.48 Still others deem these clauses to be presumptively valid, only 
                                                                                                                          
W E Astle The Hamburg Rules (1981) 157:  
The Hague Rules are silent on the matter of jurisdiction clauses. However, some 
countries, in giving effect to the Rules, have included provisions concerning 
jurisdiction. [B]ut the courts of those countries having no jurisdiction provisions may 
invoke Article III paragraph 8 of the Rules at their discretion. [According to] this rule 
… the jurisdiction clause is invalid if the court should consider that the change might 
have the effect of reducing the rights of the cargo owner [emphasis added]. 
A Mandaraka-Sheppard Modern maritime law and risk management 2ed (2007) 
186-87:  
[J]urisdiction clauses will not be upheld if the HVR apply to the bill of lading contract 
by force of law, and the foreign law chosen by the foreign jurisdiction clauses 
confers less liability upon the carrier than the liability under the HVR ‒ unless the 
defendant undertook to take no advantage of the lower limit. If not, then the foreign 
jurisdiction will be null and void by virtue of Art [III paragraph] 8 of the HVR 
[emphasis added].  
Concur Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1965. Tetley provides the example of 
The Morviken [1983] 1 Lloyds Rep 1, where the applicable law was English law and the 
English enactment of the Hague/Visby Rules (that is, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1971), and the bill of lading provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the court of Amsterdam; 
had the clause been enforced, it would have resulted in the Hague Rules 1924 applying, 
along with its lower package limitation, which arguably would have been in violation of art III 
(8) of the UK COGSA as it would have lessened the carrier’s liability.  
47 S Bursanescu Reform of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in the United States: between 
COGSA 99 and UNCITRAL’s draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by 
sea]  (2007) Master’s Research Project, McGill University at 66.  
48 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1915-20 and 2007. Jurisdiction clauses are 
so-called ousters of jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of a court can never actually be 
ousted; rather a court, at its discretion, has the power to decide not to exercise its 
















to be set aside if proven unreasonable. The resulting “conflict of laws” 49 and 
inconsistent judicial interference with commercial parties’ freedom to contract 
as they see fit continue to be a source of significant controversy and litigation 
on accessorial matters.50 Tetley advises that ‘just as it is imperative that 
maritime law be uniform and international and that choice of law rules be 
similar throughout the world, so is it essential that choice of jurisdiction rules 






                                                                                                                           
E Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements: purity and pragmatism in the conflict of laws’ 
1998 LMCLQ 182 at 188:  
The fiction lies in the proposition that, as an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts, a foreign jurisdiction agreement is automatically void.... Courts possess 
jurisdiction by the operation of law. One of the powers which jurisdiction confers is 
the power to decide whether or not to exercise their jurisdiction by hearing a case…. 
49 Tetley ibid at 1909: 
Choice of jurisdiction is one of the three major branches of conflict of laws [the other 
two branches being choice of law and recognition of foreign judgments], and is of 
major importance in maritime law, because of the mobility of ships (the usual 
defendant) and the fact that carriage by sea very often involves more than one 
jurisdiction.  
The study of the other two branches of conflict of laws lies beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. For more on these two other branches, see generally A Briggs The conflict of 
laws 2ed (2008) 53-117 and 153-203; Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 
140-42 and 423-71; G Born International arbitration and forum selection agreements: 
drafting and enforcing 2ed (2006) 102 and 119-26; DC Jackson Enforcement of maritime 
claims 4ed (2005) 691-94; Tetley ibid at 1990 (choice of law in the international maritime law 
context); T Kruger Civil jurisdiction rules of the EU and their impact on third states (2008) 
241-44 (choice of law issues in European law context). See Section 2.3.1 re choice of law 
as it pertains to assessing validity of jurisdiction clauses. 
50 H Honka ‘Jurisdiction and EC law: loss of or damage to goods’ in M Davies (ed) 
Jurisdiction and forum selection in international maritime law: essays in honor of Robert 
Force (2005) 265.  
51 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1909-10. See generally W Tetley 
‘International maritime law: uniformity of international private maritime law̶the pros, cons, 
and alternatives to international conventions̶how to adopt an international convention’ 














2.2.2  European Regulation of Jurisdiction Clauses 
Meanwhile, the situation in the European Community is quite different, as will 
be elucidated in Chapter 4: ‘market integration … has led to a great number 
of harmonized rules, including those concerning jurisdiction of courts.’52  
The general jurisdiction rule under the Brussels I Regulation, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001(“EC Jurisdiction Regulation”),53 which governs 
both civil and commercial matters,54 is that ‘persons domiciled in a Member 
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member 
State.’55 There are, however, important exceptions to this general rule, 
including the recognition of party autonomy in situations where parties have 
concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement consenting to litigate in a 
court of a Member State.56  
 
Article 23 provides that where at le st one of the parties to the 
jurisdiction agreement is domiciled in an EC Member State, the court or 
courts chosen shall have exclusive jurisdiction, but only if the agreement 
satisfies certain formalities stipulated under the rule. On the other hand, 
where neither party is domiciled in an EC Member State, but they agree to 
litigate in a court of a Member State, then ‘the courts of other Member States 
shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts 
chosen have declined jurisdiction.’57 Baatz explains that ‘[i]n this situation the 
                                            
52 Honka supra note 50 at 265. 
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, (at times 
referred to as the Brussels I Regulation). In force in all 27 Member States of the European 
Union and recently, also Denmark (one of the “Lugano States”). Replaces the Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters of 27 September 1968.  
54 Article 1 EC Jurisdiction Regulation. 
55 Article 2 EC Jurisdiction Regulation. 
56 Y Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ in Institute of Maritime Law Southampton on shipping law 
(2008) at 4-8. 














court chosen may apply its own national law to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction and may decline jurisdiction.’58  
 
Thus, where at least one party to the agreement is domiciled in a 
Member State, there is ‘no discretion to override a valid jurisdiction 
agreement’;59 however, where neither party to the agreement is domiciled in 
a Member State, but have agreed to litigate in the court of a particular 
Member State, then the agreement may be overridden, but only if the 
nominated court, in the exercise of its discretion, has first declined 
jurisdiction.60  
 
Despite achieving a remarkable milestone by harmonizing rules on 
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters throughout the European 
Community, Honka cautions that the EC Jurisdiction Regulation has 
important limitations, and provides as an example the fact that the 
Regulation does not apply, even in a Member State, where the defendant 
does not have proper domicile.61 He cautions that ‘[u]nless the gap is 
supplemented with internationally applicable jurisdiction rules, the mosaic of 
national law will prevail, a state of affairs nobody wants.’62  
2.2.3  International Conventions Regulating Jurisdiction Clauses 
The Hamburg Rules63 provide the first international attempt at a harmonized 
response to the forum selection problem under maritime law.64 In particular, 
                                            
58 Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 6. 
59 Briggs Conflict of laws supra note 49 at 72. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Supra note 50 at 280-81. 
62 Ibid at 281. 
63 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg, 31 March 1978 
(“Hamburg Rules”). In force 1 November 1992. 
64 For further discussion regarding regulation of jurisdiction clauses under the Hamburg 














‘Article 21 lays down mandatory rules as to the court or courts where the 
cargo claimants may, at their option, bring legal proceedings to enforce their 
claim’.65  
 
As per paragraph 1 of Article 21, the plaintiff has the option to sue the 
defendant in a court which, according to the law of the State where the court 
is situated, is competent, provided that the court in question is located in any 
one of a list of reasonable forums, all of which have ‘a significant connection 
with the transaction or the carrier.’66 Paragraph 2 of Article 21 provides that 
when a ship or sistership is arrested in a port state subject to the Hamburg 
Rules, an action may be instituted in this location, notwithstanding the fact 
that it is not one of the places enumerated at paragraph 1 of the rule. 
However, a defendant may petition to have the action removed from this 
jurisdiction, and so long as sufficient security is provided, the claimant must 
relocate the proceedings to one of the places enumerated at paragraph 1. 
No judicial proceedings relating to the carriage of goods under the 
Convention may be instituted in a place other than one of the forums 
specified under paragraphs 1 and 2.67 Notwithstanding these provisions 
above, once a claim has arisen, parties are free to choose the place of suit 
by agreement; in other words, any jurisdiction clause agreed upon after a 
cargo claim has materialized is effective.68  
 
                                            
65 Fairplay International The Hamburg Rules: an appreciation of the cause and effect of the 
amendments to the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules (1981) 138-41. 
66 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction Under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 4. Note that some 
jurisdictions, such as Canada, have incorporated the Hamburg Rules notion of optional 
jurisdictions for cargo claimants into their own national laws (sometimes with certain national 
qualifications), though the Convention itself does not have force of law in their countries 
(Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1914 and 1919-20). 
67 Article 21(3) Hamburg Rules. 














Thus, the overall effect of Article 21 is to limit the right of contracting 
parties to agree to litigate in foreign jurisdictions by giving cargo claimants 
the option to override such an agreement by choosing instead to bring suit in 
one of the above-mentioned places, with the proviso that where an 
agreement is reached after a claim has arisen, it will be legally binding on all 
parties.69 Truth of the matter is, however, that ‘[t]he Hamburg Rules … are 
not particularly important for international shipping due to lack of real 
support.’70  
 
The latest international convention attempting to unify rules on 
jurisdiction under maritime law is the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
otherwise known as the Rotterdam Rules.71  
                                            
69 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1913. 
70 Honka supra note 50 at 278. M Remond-Gouilloud ‘Jurisdiction and arbitration: articles 21 
and 22 of the Hamburg Rules’ in European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law The 
Hamburg Rules: a choice for the EEC? (1994) 117 at 119:  
On the dark side, the Hamburg Rules … result in lessened freedom for the carrier. 
In that respect Articles 21 and 22, especially as regards jurisdiction and arbitration 
clauses, are symbolic for the whole Hamburg Rules system. Whereas the carrier is 
no longer free to choose the appropriate forum, that freedom is granted to the 
shipper, with the risk of forum shopping. This explains the strong reservations of 
sea-faring nations about the rules. The text was prepared under the aegis of the 
United Nations, the goals of which were not precisely shipping-minded. The 1978 
situation was, in a way, similar to that existing in 1924 when the Hague Rules were 
adopted intending to see the law modified in their favour. However, in 1978 there 
was no Harter-Act and no shipper country pressing for change such as the United 
States. Actually, the countries parties to the Hamburg Rules up to date account for 
little in the world tonnage.  
Hare in Shipping law and admiralty jurisdiction supra note 16 at 490 says that the Hamburg 
Rules swing the pendulum of liability ‘squarely back onto the shoulders of the carrier’, a shift 
in risk allocation considered too drastic to be acceptable to major shipping nations. As of the 
date of submission of this dissertation, the Hamburg Rules only have 28 signatories and 34 
parties. See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-D-
3&chapter=11&lang=en [Accessed on 1 February 2011]. 
71 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 11 December 2008 under 
Resolution A/RES/63/122. The Rotterdam Rules opened for signature on 23 September 
2009, in Rotterdam (The Netherlands), and as of the date of submission of this paper, 23 
nations have signed them. See 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-D-














The provisions on jurisdiction are contained in Chapter 14 of these Rules.72 
The general rule regarding choice of jurisdiction, which is similar to the 
                                                                                                                           
adoption, accession or approval of these Rules by 20 states is required before they can 
become law. A/CN9/572 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the 
work of its fourteenth session at paras 111-13. Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Transport.html [Accessed 1 
February 2011]:  
In general, the [Working Group] supported the inclusion of a chapter relating to 
jurisdiction. Some views were expressed that the question of jurisdiction should be 
left entirely to the choice of the parties to the contract of carriage. In addition, it was 
feared that negotiations in this complex subject area could ultimately result in a 
failure to reach consensus on the provisions … or that jurisdiction provisions along 
the lines of the Hamburg Rules as currently in the draft instrument could create 
barriers to States wishing to ratify the instrument .… After discussion, the [Working 
Group] agreed to include … a chapter on jurisdiction.  
P Delebeque ‘The new Convention on International Contract of Carriage of Goods Wholly or 
Partly by Sea: a civil law perspective’ in Comité Maritime International CMI Yearbook 2007-
2008 Part 2, Documents for the Athens Conference, Antwerpen, Belgium 264 at 276:  
‘[The] UNCITRAL Convention is neither in favour of the owners nor in favour of the shippers 
… [it] does not seek to protect any socio-professional category. It aims to realise a balance 
between both interests.’ Therefore, it would seem that the Rotterdam Rules swing the 
pendulum of liability back towards the centre, to use Hare’s terminology. T Fujita 
‘Introduction’ in Comité Maritime International CMI Yearbook 2007-2008 Part 2, Documents 
for the Athens Conference, Antwerpen, Belgium at 277:   
“Balance of risk” was the most frequently used and sometimes abused phrase 
during the UNCITRAL Working Group III’s deliberations of the new Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea. Although 
all Working Group delegations unanimously favored a “fair balance of risk” between 
carrier and cargo interests, they never reached consensus about what constitutes 
optimal “balance” under a specific article or in a specific situation. As a result, 
although the basic formula for the basis of liability and the list of exonerations were 
decided relatively early on, other elements of the liability regime such as the 
treatment of delay or limitation levels were left open until the very last stage. How 
does the new Convention finally strike the balance of risk? … As is often the case, 
the question is easier to ask than answer….  
For further discussion regarding regulation of jurisdiction clauses under the Rotterdam 
Rules, see the second part of Chapter 5.  
72 The Transport Law Working Group’s decision to include this chapter in the Draft Rules, 
and more notably to render exclusive jurisdiction clauses permissible under certain 
circumstances, was not without controversy (see A/CN9/572 Report of the UNCITRAL 
Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session at paras 110-13; 
A/CN9/576 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its 
fifteenth session at paras 156-68; A/CN9/591 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III 
(Transport Law) on the work of its sixteenth session at paras 19-40.) M Sturley ‘The 
UNCITRAL Carriage of Goods Convention: changes to existing law’ in Comité Maritime 
International CMI Yearbook 2007-2008 Part 2, Documents for the Athens Conference, 
Antwerpen, Belgium, 254 at 258:  
[Whereas] some … members of Working Group III felt strongly about the need to 
address jurisdiction… other members felt strongly about preserving inconsistent 














general rule under the Hamburg Rules, is as follows: the plaintiff̶whether 
shipper, consignee, other cargo interest̶has the option to institute judicial 
proceedings against the defendant in a court of competent jurisdiction73 
located in any one of a finite list of courts ‘with a reasonable connection to 
the transaction’.74 Alternatively, the plaintiff may choose to bring suit against 
the defendant in a competent court or courts designated by agreement 
between the parties.75 
 
However, where the contract of carriage is a volume contract76 and 
contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause,77 then the agreement overrides the 
plaintiff’s right to opt for a court situated in one of the places listed at Article 
                                                                                                                           
Commission, which has the exclusive competence to negotiate on this issue for the 
nations of the European Union. In the end, it was possible to reach a compromise 
solution. 
73 “Competent court” is defined at Article 1 paragraph 30 of the Rotterdam Rules as ‘a court 
in a Contracting State that, according to the rules on the internal allocation of jurisdiction 
among the courts of that State, may exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.’ 
74 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction Under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 9. See Chapter 5 for the 
differences between the Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules on jurisdiction. 
75 Article 66(b) Rotterdam Rules (equivalent to Article 21(1)(d) of the Hamburg Rules). Note 
that the agreement must comply with the form requirements of Article 3 Rotterdam Rules to 
be valid. 
76 Defined in Article 1.2 of the Rotterdam Rules as a ‘contract of carriage that provides for 
the carriage of a specified quantity of goods in a series of shipments during an agreed 
period of time. The specification of the quantity may include a minimum, a maximum or a 
certain range’. For more on volume contracts, see Chapter 5. 
77 In order for the jurisdiction agreement to be considered exclusive (versus non-exclusive), 
it must fulfil the requirements stipulated at article 67 (1), which will be explored in Chapter 5. 
According to the Transport Canada International Marine Policy in UNCITRAL Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea: information paper 
February 2009, available at http://www.cmla.org (reports & papers link) [accessed on 1 
February 2011] at 2, a unique feature of the Rotterdam Rules is the introduction of ‘wide 
contractual freedom for shippers and carriers to negotiate shipping contracts outside the 
Convention.’ That said, they may not derogate from two important obligations: the carrier’s 
continued obligation to exercise due diligence in making the ship seaworthy, and the 
shipper’s obligation to provide complete instructions and documentation on carriage of 
goods. See generally Transport Canada International Marine Policy UNCITRAL Convention 














66.78 Note too that third parties, such as consignees and transferee bill of 
lading holders, are also bound by exclusive jurisdiction agreements, but 
again, only if certain strict conditions are met.79  
 
In addition, as per Article 21(5) of the Hamburg Rules, any choice of 
court agreement, whether oral or written, implicit (through conduct) or 
explicit,80 agreed upon after a dispute has arisen81 is enforceable, so long as 
the selected court is competent in accordance with Article 1(30) of the 
Rotterdam Rules. Furthermore, ‘[n]othing in the provisions of the Rotterdam 
Rules affects jurisdiction with regard to provisional or protective measures, 
including arrest in rem under the Arrest Convention.’82  
 
But there is an important caveat to Chapter 14: Article 74 (the “opt in” 
clause) states that ‘[t]he provisions of this chapter shall bind only Contracting 
States that declare in accordance with article 91 that they will be bound by 
them.’ In other words, ratifying states may opt not to be bound by the chapter 
on jurisdiction, and instead leave the question of jurisdiction to be 
                                            
78 Though there are similarities between s 23 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation and s 67 of 
the Rotterdam Rules, according to Y Baatz in ‘Jurisdiction and arbitration’ in Rhidian 
Thomas (ed) A new convention for the carriage of goods by sea ‒ the Rotterdam Rules 
(2009) 258 at 276, the Rotterdam rule on jurisdiction clauses has a ‘more restrictive and 
complex’ application in view of the safeguards/formalities stipulated at Article 67(1) of the 
Rules. 
79 The conditions to be met are stipulated at Article 67(2) Rotterdam Rules and will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Note too that the agreement must respect the form requirements of 
Article 3 of the Rules. The aim of the drafters in imposing certain conditions was to protect 
third parties from suffering hardship. There was much debate as to whether or not exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses contained in volume contracts should apply to third parties. In the end, it 
was decided that they should. See A/CN9/576 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III 
(Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session at paras 164-168. 
80 A/CN9/591 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its 
sixteenth session at para 62.  
81 “After a dispute has arisen” has been described by the Transport Law Working Group in 
A/CN9/591 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its 
sixteenth session at para 63 as ‘the period following a voyage when the damage ha[s] 
already occurred, but a court ha[s] not yet been seized with the claim.’ 














determined by their national law or otherwise.83 Thus, whereas some 
Contracting nations may choose to declare themselves bound by these 
provisions, others may choose to ignore them.84  
 
This raises the question, which will be explored further in Chapter 6: 
will this new optional chapter on jurisdiction truly contribute towards the 
‘progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law, in 
reducing or removing legal obstacles to the flow of international trade, 
significantly contribut[ing] to universal economic cooperation among all 
States’,85 or will it merely encourage the majority of seafaring nations to 
                                            
83 A/CN9/616 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its 
eighteenth session at para 246:  
[It was proposed that,] given the range of divergent views that were expressed 
during [the Working Group’s] sixteenth session with respect to the treatment and 
enforcement of choice of court clauses in the jurisdiction chapter of the draft 
convention, the Working Group should consider the adoption of [either a reservation 
or an “opt in” clause]. The view was expressed that this approach would make it 
more likely that the draft convention would be widely accepted by Contracting 
States, and that a broader consensus on the chapter on jurisdiction could be 
reached.… There was strong support for allowing for a reservation or ‘opt in’ clause 
to be provided for Contracting States in the draft convention with respect to the 
entire chapter on jurisdiction. A number of delegations that had originally expressed 
an interest during the sixteenth session in deleting the entire chapter on jurisdiction 
expressed their satisfaction with respect to this proposal and for the flexibility that it 
would grant to Contracting States.  
According to Bursanescu supra note 47 at 72, ‘[t]his is hardly an acceptable disposition, as it 
essentially overrides all the work that was put in balancing the different interests under 
Chapter [14].’  
84 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 8-9:  
A nation choosing to be bound must make a formal declaration to that effect under 
article 91. A nation that simply ratifies the Convention without taking any further 
action, therefore, will not be bound by the chapter. A court in that nation will instead 
address these issues under the law that it would otherwise apply, which might be its 
own national law, the proper law of the contract, another international instrument, or 
even some combination of those sources. 
 
Most nations making declarations under article 74 will presumably do so at the time 
they ratify the Convention, but article 91(1) permits the declaration to be made “at 
any time” and article 91(5) similarly permits a nation to withdraw its declaration “at 
any time”. Thus a nation could ratify the Convention immediately while postponing 
its decision on the jurisdiction chapter. Moreover, it may revisit its decision at any 
time, either accepting rules that it had previously rejected or withdrawing from the 
coverage that it had previously elected [emphasis added]. 














maintain the status quo, as was the case with the Hamburg Rules, by 
looking impressive in theory but not in practice?  
2.3 The Contractual  Val id i ty  and Interpretat ion of  Jur isdict ion 
Clauses in Contracts of  Carr iage by Sea86  
When a party seeks to enforce a jurisdiction agreement87 and persuade a 
court to exercise its discretion to dismiss or stay proceedings brought in a 
non-selected forum in breach of the agreement,88 or to grant an anti-suit 
injunction to restrain parties from bringing or continuing foreign proceedings 
in breach of an agreement,89 the applicant must be prepared to demonstrate 
that, in accordance with the law governing the agreement, the clause is valid 
and covers the scope of the dispute at issue, and the plaintiff’s attempt to 
avoid the exclusive agreement constitutes a breach of contract.90  
 
 
                                            
86 For a comprehensive analysis on the interpretation and drafting of jurisdiction clauses, 
see generally Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at Chapters 4 and 5. See also 
Born supra note 49 at Chapter 2. See examples of jurisdiction clauses at Annexure A. 
87 It is assumed for the purposes of this present section that foreign jurisdiction clauses are 
generally enforceable, but as previously mentioned and as will be discussed further in the 
multijurisdictional analysis at Chapter 3, some jurisdictions continue to refuse to enforce 
these clauses. 
88 See Section 2.4.1. 
89 See Section 2.4.3. 
90 Briggs The conflicts of laws supra note 49 at 103. However, Briggs reminds his readers in 
Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at para 4.10, that:  
[P]arties do not have an unfettered right to confer jurisdiction on a court, and a 
contractual agreement on jurisdiction, taken by itself, cannot do so. Nor do the 
parties have a right to abrogate a court’s jurisdiction, and an agreement on 
jurisdiction, taken by itself, does not do so. But such a term establishes that it would 
be a breach of their contract for one of the parties to bring proceedings in another 
court; and this paves the way for the counterparty to take further steps in response 
to the breach.  
It is assumed for the purposes of this present section that the court or courts selected by the 














2.3.1  Law Governing Interpretation and Enforceabil i ty of 
Jurisdiction Clauses91  
Since substantive, procedural and conflict of law rules typically vary from one 
nation to the next, it is important to establish what body of law will govern the 
validity and enforceability of a foreign jurisdiction agreement contained in an 
international contract of carriage.92 A number of options present themselves, 
namely ‘(1) the law of the seized forum (lex fori), even though that forum is 
not the forum designated in the FSA [Forum Selection Agreement]; (2) the 
law governing the underlying contract according to a choice of law clause 
contained therein; (3) the law governing the contract absent a choice of law 
clause; (4) the law of the designated forum.’93  
 
To be sure, in the context of the international carriage of goods, this 
determination is ‘not without controversy’.94 To make matters worse, 
                                            
91 An in-depth study of choice of law in maritime commercial context and its bearing on 
jurisdiction clauses lies beyond the scope of this paper. For more on this topic, see 
generally Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 140-42 and 423-71; Briggs The 
conflict of laws supra note 49 at 153-203; Born supra note 49 at 102 and 119-26; Jackson 
supra note 49 at 691-94. See also Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1990; 
Kruger supra note 49 at 241-44. 
92 Born ibid at 102. See also Kruger ibid at 241.  
93 J W Yackee ‘Choice of law considerations in the validity and enforcement of international 
forum selection agreements: whose law applies?’ (2004) 9 UCLA J Int’l L & Foreign Affairs 
43 at 63. See Born ibid at 102, where the author explains that if one characterizes the 
choice of forum as a procedural issue, then the lex fori is the law applicable; but if one 
characterizes the choice of forum as a question of substantive law, then the law governing 
the parties’ underlying contract is instead the law applicable. See generally J M Carruthers 
‘Substance and procedure in the conflict of laws’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 693. Depending on the 
circumstances, different laws may apply to the same foreign jurisdiction clause (eg law of 
forum to govern the effect and law of contract to govern the validity of the clause). According 
to Tetley in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1990, ‘a court, in deciding whether a 
jurisdiction clause should be given effect, must apply the system of law with which the 
transaction has its closest and most real connection.’ 
94 Peel supra note 48 at 187. For instance (re scope of a choice of law clause): does a 
choice of law stipulation merely provide for the ‘indoor management of a contract’, or does it 
extend to dispute resolution? Briggs in Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 141-42, 
believes that ‘[a]n agreement on choice of law should be seen as a choice of the law which, 
as the parties agree, is to be applied by a judge to resolve their disputes, and not just their 














‘different national courts may reach different conclusions as to the law 
governing the same forum selection clause in parallel proceedings in the 
same dispute.’95 To avoid any ambiguity and reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding the interpretation and enforceability of jurisdiction clauses, 
parties may choose to continue jurisdiction clauses with a clear choice of 
law, expressly designating which law will apply to this particular clause.96 
2.3.2  Validity: Form and Substance of Jurisdiction Clauses97 
A jurisdiction clause must be valid under the applicable national law in order 
to take effect. A forum clause will be valid if it satisfies both formal and 
substantive conditions of validity.98 According to Yackee:  
Formal conditions are specific, tangible manifestations of consent to a FSA, 
in the absence of which the seized court will refuse enforcement. In most 
instances, conditions of formal validity will concern the necessity, form, 
content, or location of a “writing” containing or evidencing the FSA…. [They] 
serve primarily to assure the reality of party consent to a FSA [emphasis 
added.]99  
In other words, the form provides proof positive of the parties’ consent to the 
jurisdiction agreement. This entails scrutinizing written evidence and/or other 
proof (such as trade usage or practice) that confirms the parties’ intention to 
be bound by the jurisdiction clause.100 The substantive conditions of validity, 
on the other hand, require establishing the absence of elements such as 
                                                                                                                           
many other choice-of-law issues are far from clear-cut or settled. Ultimately, a court must 
endeavour to give effect to the parties’ intention under the contract. 
95 Born supra note 49 at 102. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See generally Sparka supra note 42 at 99-105. 
98 Yackee supra note 93 at 47-56. 
99 Ibid at 50. At 50-53, the author explains that these conditions may or may not be made 
explicit under the law (compare position of US law, which rarely imposes explicit formal 
conditions, to that of European law under Article 23 of the EC Regulation, which establishes 
four “forms” that must be met in order for the clause to be valid. See also Kruger supra note 
49 at 221-26 (re requirements for validity of the clause under European law). An example of 
a jurisdiction clause that does not meet the formal requirements of validity might be where a 
jurisdiction clause contained on the back of a bill of lading is deemed illegible (P Bonassies 
and C Scapel Droit maritime 2ed (2010) 797). 














fraud, mistake, duress, misrepresentation, undue influence, 
unconscionability, incapacity or illegality̶all issues relating to the reality, 
quality or content of consent according to Yackee.101  
2.3.3  Judicial Interpretation: Exclusivity102 and Scope103of 
Jurisdiction Clauses 
Whether the jurisdiction clause is exclusive and mandatory and 
encompasses the particular dispute at issue or not will depend on a court’s 
interpretation of the construction of the agreement, a matter to be settled in 
accordance with the proper law of the clause, which more often than not 
tends to be the law governing the contract.104  
                                            
101 Ibid at 56. See also Kruger supra note 49 at 223. Arguably, a third party consignee 
subject to a jurisdiction clause contained in a charterparty agreement and incorporated by 
reference into a bill of lading has not actually consented to the stipulation limiting jurisdiction 
yet is bound by it, and therefore some argue that it should be deemed invalid. 
Notwithstanding this argument, jurisdiction clauses incorporated by reference have been 
found to be valid in the US, in cases where the parties receive actual or constructive notice 
of the charterparty including its terms, and in the UK, in cases where the bill of lading 
expressly stipulates that the particular forum selection clause has been incorporated. See R 
Force and M Davies ‘Forum selection clauses in international maritime contracts’ in M 
Davies (ed) Jurisdiction and forum selection in international maritime law: essays in honor of 
Robert Force (2005) 1 at 30-40. According to Tetley in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 
1992-93, whether the jurisdiction clause is stipulated in concreto in the bill of lading or is 
incorporated by reference into the bill of lading, a third party must be ‘apprised of or consent 
to the jurisdiction clause’ in order for it to be valid and enforceable. Note also that in order to 
ensure that the validity of a jurisdiction clause itself is not dependent on the validity of the 
underlying contract of carriage, which can be problematic in cases where the contract as a 
whole is deemed invalid for reasons of mistake or incapacity for example, Briggs in 
Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 79-85 and 150 recommends ‘mak[ing] it clear in 
the drafting that the validity of the agreement on jurisdiction will not be jeopardized by the 
validity of the contract in which it is contained.’ See also Born supra note 49 at 100; Sparka 
supra note 42 at 81-87 and 93-98; Kruger ibid at 222 (re Europe’s position on the 
severability of jurisdiction clauses from underlying contracts.) For more on forum selection 
clauses and their impact on third parties, see section 2.5.2.2. 
102 See generally Force and Davies ibid at 40-42; Briggs ibid at 110-21; Born ibid at 17-23; 
Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 182-85; J Fawcett ‘Non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements in private international law’ 2001 LMCLQ 234; Sparka ibid at 63-68; 
Kruger ibid at 226-30. 
103 See generally Force and Davies ibid at 42-44; Briggs ibid at 125-34; Born ibid at 24-27; 
Sparka ibid at 69. 















A jurisdiction clause may be described as either exclusive 
(mandatory) or non-exclusive (permissive). A jurisdiction clause is exclusive 
when it requires parties to the contract to litigate in a particular jurisdiction, to 
the exclusion of all others. ‘[T]he parties are agreeing on trial in the chosen 
forum …. [and] implicitly agree[ing] not to object to the jurisdiction of that 
forum’105 or to invoke another forum, failing which they will be in breach of 
their agreement.106 Conversely, a jurisdiction clause is non-exclusive when it 
does not impose an obligation on parties to sue in the nominated forum, but 
rather acknowledges the jurisdiction as an option amongst others, which 
parties may later choose as the forum to resolve their dispute or disputes.107  
It is trite to say that judicial interpretation has a significant bearing on legal 
rights and remedies arising under the jurisdiction agreement.108 For 
example, if a cargo claimant brings suit in the non-selected forum, defence 
                                            
105 Fawcett ibid at 234. 
106 Ibid. Note that according to article 23(1) of the EU Jurisdiction Regulation, a jurisdiction 
clause is presumed exclusive unless the parties expressly agree otherwise.  
107 Note, however, that this definition is generic and does not encompass all nuances. For 
instance, as discussed by Briggs in Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 115, 
consider the hybrid scenario of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause that entitles a contracting 
party to decide later that the court chosen is to have exclusive jurisdiction (otherwise known 
as a floating or deferred choice of court). European Union Preparatory Acts, Commission 
staff working document, accompanying the proposal for a Council Decision on the signing 
by the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, Impact 
Assessment COM (2008) 538 final OE SEC (2008) 2390 (accessed on Westlaw 
International):  
Non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses are very commonly used in international trade 
and finance. The use of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause reflects a legitimate 
choice by parties where they wish the chosen forum to have jurisdiction but to retain 
the flexibility to bring proceedings before any other court of component jurisdiction. 
Such clauses respond to a genuine commercial need and would not be used in 
business-to-business contracts if this were not the case. Failure to include such 
clauses will seriously reduce the advantages of an international convention for 
international trade and finance [emphasis added]. 
108 See generally Fawcett ‘Non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 102 at 241-57. 
According to G D Sesser in ‘Choice of law, forum selection, and arbitration clauses in 
international contracts: the promise and the reality, a US view’ (1992) 20 Intl Bus Law 397 at 
398, the technicality or ‘fine linguistic distinction’ of interpreting jurisdiction clauses as non-
exclusive/permissive and therefore not enforceable is sometimes used by the courts of 















counsel will either argue breach of contract or forum non conveniens, 
depending on whether the clause is construed by the courts as exclusive or 
not.109 As always, problems of interpretation usually occur when an 
agreement is poorly drafted or ambiguous.110 According to Briggs, ‘the 
material question should not be what do these words mean but what did the 
parties intend by the use of this form of words.’111 On balance, parties are 
                                            
109 Fawcett ibid at 237: ‘The burden of proving that a clause is an exclusive one rests on the 
party who relies on it.’ For more on the distinction between remedies of forum non 
conveniens and breach of jurisdiction agreement see Section 2.4.2. For more on the 
controversial issue of claiming damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement, see 
generally Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 9-10 and 541-42; D Tan et al 
‘Breaking promises to litigate in a particular forum: are damages an appropriate remedy?’ 
2003 LMCLQ 435 [for position pro recovery of contractual damages]; compare to LC Ho 
‘Anti-suit injunctions in cross-boarder insolvency: a restatement’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 697. See 
also CH Tham ‘Damages for breach of English jurisdiction clauses: more than meets the 
eye’ 2004 LMCLQ 46; Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 2005-06; Peel ‘Exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 224-26; Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 
at 31-32 [for position in Europe]. Common sense would dictate that damages for breach of 
contract are not available where a clause is characterized as non-exclusive, since the 
clause is merely permissive and therefore not enforceable. However, if a jurisdiction clause 
is construed as exclusive, and is subject to common law rules, it may be possible for a 
defendant carrier to recover damages when suit is brought in breach of the choice of forum 
agreement, even in cases where proceedings are permitted to continue in the non-selected 
forum (although, as Peel explains ibid at 224, it may be problematic for the court to decline 
the stay and then agree that it was a breach of contract sanctioned by the court entitling the 
defendant to damages). According to Briggs ibid at 9-10 and 541-42:  
Nothing is more fundamental to the common law than the fact that breach of 
contract gives rise to a right to damages: that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to 
be performed, and that damages for breach are a matter of right and entitlement.... 
Though the implications are still to be fully worked out, breach of the terms of an 
agreement for the resolution of disputes should lead to damages.  
In Europe, in cases where the EC Jurisdiction Regulation applies, defendants must seek to 
recover from the court first seized (where damages are possible under the law of that 
nation). The damages recoverable according to Tetley ibid at 2006 are ‘legal fees and 
related costs incurred by the defendant in investigating and defending the claims in the 
foreign proceedings instituted by the plaintiff in breach of the exclusive forum selection 
clause.’ 
110 According to Briggs in The conflict of laws supra note 49 at 103-104, uncertain or 
ambiguous wording makes the jurisdiction clause harder to construe with confidence, which 
ironically defeats its purpose in making the dispute resolution process more predictable. 
111 Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 112. At 121, the author goes on to explain 
that:  
[T]hough it may be sensible to describe certain agreements as ‘exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements’, it may be seriously misleading to describe others as ‘non-exclusive’: if 
it is not an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, it may be one of a variety of otherwise-














better served by clearly stipulating that a jurisdiction agreement is 
exclusive,112 as it ‘reduces the risk of litigation in undesirable or 
unanticipated fora.’113 However, it is important to keep in mind that ‘for the 
parties to tie their hands to litigation in a court which may become 
unattractive in the period between the making of the contract and the dispute 
arising is not always sensible.’114 In such instances, non-exclusive or 
deferred jurisdiction clauses may in fact be a better option.  
 
A jurisdiction clause may also be described as either broad or narrow, 
depending on whether the particular claim at issue falls within the material 
scope of the agreement or not. Whereas broadly drafted clauses encompass 
all forms of claims, narrow ones have limited application.115 Where the 
clause is ambiguous, it becomes difficult to determine which disputes are 
specifically targeted by the agreement, especially when claims are extra-
contractual in nature.116 Again, what matters is the parties’ intention, which 
                                                                                                                           
defined by what they are not, and not by what they are. The true enquiry is always 
as to the precise nature of the rights and duties, powers and liabilities, intended by 
the parties and created by the words of their agreement. That is a matter of 
contractual construction to which no special rules, or labels, need to be applied. It is 
probably also something which does not allow shortcuts to be taken. 
112 Briggs in The conflict of laws supra note 49 at 103-104, says that ‘they do not need to 
have used the word ‘exclusive’, but it certainly helps if they do.’ 
113 Born supra note 49 at 19. According to Tetley in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 
2006: ‘Virtually all standard-form bills of lading in contemporary maritime commerce require 
disputes to be resolved in a stipulated court or by an arbitral tribunal, according to a 
specified national law or international carriage by sea convention [emphasis added].’  
114 Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 114-15. 
115 If a defendant makes an application to the court to stay proceedings in breach of an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the party acquiesces that the wording of the clause is 
broad enough to encompass the plaintiff’s claim. Alternatively, the defendant may argue that 
the plaintiff’s particular claim is excluded from the narrowly construed clause. 
116 According to Briggs in Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 126, ‘[t]he problem 
stems from the fact that though the jurisdiction or arbitration clause will usually be contained 
in a contract, the legal relationship(s) between the parties may not be exclusively 
contractual.’ The author cites the following examples of claims, which may be excluded from 
the scope of application of the jurisdiction clause: claims in tort, claims to assert ownership 
in property, claims for breach of fiduciary/statutory duty, claims for equitable compensation, 














courts will attempt to determine in accordance with general principles of 
contractual interpretation under the applicable law.117 Born advocates the 
use of broad clauses as it ‘reduces the risk of time-consuming preliminary 
litigation over questions of jurisdiction’, and he encourages parties to engage 
in dispute settlement ‘in a single, consolidated proceeding in a contractual 
forum, thus avoiding inconsistent results and multiple legal expenses’, 
unless of course parties have a particular motive for choosing multiple 
proceedings.118 
2 .4 Judic ia l  Discret ion to Enforce Exclusive Jur isdict ion 
Clauses 
2.4.1  To Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Breach of Foreign 
Jurisdiction Clauses 
When a claim is brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, which 
is valid in both form and substance, broad enough to encompass the claim, 
and enforceable under the applicable national law, then upon application, 
the non-selected forum court may exercise its discretion (depending on the 
nation) to give effect to the clause and refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.119 
                                            
117 Born supra note 49 at 25. 
118 Ibid. Examples of legal disputes over scope of jurisdiction clauses contained in maritime 
contracts as cited by Force and Davies supra note 101 at 43:  
Where a time charterer signed the bill of lading ‘as carrier’ and there was no 
indication that it signed ‘for the master,’ the charter could invoke the forum selection 
clause in the bill of lading despite a definitions clause in the bill of lading that defined 
the term ‘carrier’ as meaning the ‘owner’ or ‘demise charterer’. The Court refused to 
extend the forum selection clause to the owner (Union Steel America Co v M/V 
Sanko Spruce 14 F Supp 2d 682 (DNJ 1998).  
 
Where an insurer seeks contribution from a co-insurer, the claim is not one for 
subrogation and so a forum selection clause in the contract between the insured and 
the co-insurer is not applicable (Adams v Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurita 364 F 3d 
646 (5th Cir 2004). 
119 Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 227. Tetley in Marine cargo 
claims supra note 38 at 1991-94 indicates that ‘there is no general rule as to whether a court 
will honour a jurisdiction clause’, but says that there are 6 criteria that a court will generally 
base itself on when deciding whether or not to enforce the agreement: (In all cases) is 
clause clear and precise? Is the clause legible? Is the clause fundamentally unfair, 














That is to say, the court may either commence proceedings brought in 
                                                                                                                           
incorporated by reference) is jurisdiction clause that is referenced in another document 
detailed and precise? (Where the clause has impact on third party) is a third party to the 
contract apprised of clause, or has he/she consented to it? (Where there is more than one 
defendant) do the circumstances of the case forbid dividing the action? According to J 
Fawcett in ‘Trial in England or abroad: the underlying policy considerations’ (1989) 9(2) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 205, the following underlying policy considerations are at 
work when a court seized with a jurisdiction dispute exercises its discretion in deciding 
whether a trial should take place in its forum or abroad: 1. satisfaction of the parties' 
interests in an economical trial; 2. protection of the parties (both defendant and plaintiff); 3. 
public interest in protecting other persons affected by trial; 4. maintenance of harmonious 
relations with other states; 5. ensuring minimum standards of justice are available in the 
other forum; 6. advancement of the forum’s interest in local trial; 7. Interest in giving effect to 
plaintiff’s choice of forum; 8. maintenance of the efficient administration of justice; and 9. 
upholding agreements on jurisdiction. D A Laurent explains in ‘Foreign jurisdiction and 
arbitration clauses in the New Zealand maritime context’ (2007) 21 A & NZ Mar LJ 121 at 
153 that ‘[t]he main issue with discretion is that it does not lend itself well to uniformity; a 
discretionary power is just that, and the consideration of the surrounding circumstances will 
differ between courts and members of the judiciary.’ According to Briggs in Agreements on 
jurisdiction supra note 9 at 239, in Europe ‘no judicial discretion is permitted to modify the 
statutory mechanisms for enforcement or non-enforcement of jurisdiction agreements.’ In 
other words, as Tetley explains ibid at 1924, if one of the parties is domiciled in a Member 
State of the European Union, and the form requirements stipulated at Article 23 of the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation are met, then the jurisdiction clause must be given effect. However, 
as per A Briggs in ‘Forum non conveniens and ideal Europeans’ 2005 LMCLQ 378 at 380, 
‘[w]hen used as the template for the law on jurisdiction clauses for non-Member States, Art 
23 is not being used to confer or impose jurisdiction on the courts of a non-Member State: 
nothing in the Judgments Regulation can do that.’ In other words, it would seem that the 
courts of non-Member States retain their discretion. See also E Peel ‘Forum non conveniens 
and European ideals’ 2005 LMCLQ 363 at 374-77. Note too that according to Tetley ibid at 
1930 and 1977-82, in most civilian jurisdictions (including France, Germany and Latin 
American nations), judges do not have the discretion to stay or dismiss claims that fall within 
their subject-matter jurisdiction; a civilian court either has “competence” (jurisdiction) or not, 
depending on its interpretation of codified law. Valid foreign jurisdiction clauses, which have 
been agreed upon by commercial parties and are clearly designated in contracts, are 
recognized and a court must declare itself “incompétente” (without jurisdiction) in situations 
where it chooses to uphold/give effect to these agreements. D Figueroa ‘Conflicts of 
jurisdiction between the United States and Latin America in the context of forum non 
conveniens dismissals’ (2005) 37(1) The University of Miami Inter-American LR 119 at 151: 
‘[In Latin American nations] a court either has or does not have jurisdiction to hear a case. 
Once jurisdiction is established, the court is not allowed to refuse to hear a case on grounds 
not permitted by the constitution or legislation.’ G Andrieux ‘Declining jurisdiction in a future 
international convention on jurisdiction and judgments̶how can we benefit from past 
experiences in conciliating the two doctrines of forum non conveniens and lis pendens?’ 
(2005) 27 Loyola LA Int’l & Comp LR 323:  
Judicial discretion is defended in common law systems for its propensity to reach 
fair outcomes but feared in civil law countries for the unpredictability it generates. 
…Therefore, this notion is the cornerstone of numerous conflicts between common 
law and civil law systems. 














breach of the foreign jurisdiction clause, or exercise its discretion and order a 
stay or dismissal of proceedings.120  
 
According to Mandaraka-Sheppard, there exist two competing schools 
of thought at common law insofar as the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
enforcement of jurisdiction clauses is concerned: the broad and the 
narrow.121 Proponents of the broad point of view contend that the judiciary 
should be empowered ‘to consider which would be the appropriate forum for 
the ends of justice and the interests of parties, which is almost identical to 
the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.’122 This broad exercise of discretion 
would have the effect of impeding legal certainty, but would arguably do so 
in the name of procedural fairness.123 In contrast, the narrow point of view 
strongly advocates respecting the parties’ contractual choice of jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes.124 To wit, in many admir lty courts where jurisdiction 
clauses are as a rule upheld in the name of privity of contract and 
                                            
120 Tetley ibid at 1996-98:  
In the United States, courts frequently dismiss suits instituted in breach of valid 
foreign jurisdiction or foreign arbitration clauses. There is no unanimity among 
American courts, however, as to the precise legal basis for such unconditional 
dismissals…. In England and Commonwealth countries, by contrast, forum selection 
clauses and foreign arbitration clauses are typically enforced not by dismissals, but 
rather by stays of proceedings, whereby the courts seized of the motion to enforce 
the clause does not deny its own jurisdiction, but merely declines to exercise it… In 
foreign forum selection clause cases too, stays would seem preferable to 
unconditional dismissals, particularly as a stay would permit the U.S. court to re-
assume jurisdiction in situations were US COGSA applies and the foreign court 
reduced the rights of cargo claimants below the minimum guaranteed by US 
COGSA. Very often, judgments staying suit will be conditional on the defendant 
agreeing to appear and appearing in the new jurisdiction, on the time for suit 
defence being waived and on appropriate security being filed. This is an intelligent 
and proper approach [emphasis added].  
Concur M Davies ‘Forum selection clauses in maritime cases’ (2003) 27 Tul Mar LJ 367 at 
382.  
121 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 181. 
122 Ibid. According to Peel in ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 220, ‘some 
of the cases in which the courts have declined to stay their proceedings have gone to the 
“verge of the law” in order to protect cargo owners who are vulnerable to jurisdiction clauses 
to which they have been given no real opportunity to object’. 
123 Sparka supra note 42 at 193. 














predictability of commercial transactions, the clause is deemed 
presumptively valid, and the party seeking to bring proceedings in breach of 
the agreement will have the heavy burden of convincing the non-forum court 
that the clause should nevertheless not be enforced.125 Under this stricter, 
less flexible approach, it is believed that ‘discretion should be exercised in 
favour of a stay unless there are exceptional circumstances, such that it 
would be in the public interest not to do so.’126  
2.4.2  Forum Non Conveniens  versus Breach of Foreign 
Jurisdiction Clause 
At this point, it is perhaps fitting to comment on the difference in approaches 
taken by common law courts in their discretion, upon application by defence 
counsel, when ordering stays or dismissals of proceedings on the grounds of 
forum non conveniens127 or breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.128 
Though there is overlap between the two pproaches, and the relief sought 
                                            
125 However, in certain nations such as South Africa, China, and the Nordic Countries the 
legislature has stepped in to limit the scope of clauses, which attempt to circumvent 
jurisdiction (see Chapter 3). 
126 Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 227. According to Hare in 
Shipping law and admiralty supra note 16 at 97, in admiralty, courts generally have ‘a more 
sympathetic attitude towards forum shopping in light of the tenuous nature of executable 
maritime security and the facility with which a recalcitrant debtor can evade its debts.’ See 
Section 2.5 on forum shopping. 
127 Most civilian countries do not recognize the discretionary remedy of forum non 
conveniens as a result of constitutional restrictions (though it is interesting to note that 
according to Briggs in ‘Forum non conveniens and ideal Europeans’ supra note 119 at 381, 
the French courts are adopting a more liberal approach towards the recognition of 
international litispendence (or lis alibi pendens) under principles of French private 
international.) Furthermore, Tetley explains in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 2008, 
that in Europe: 
[T]he use of forum non conveniens to stay proceedings validly instituted in Brussels 
Convention States against parties domiciled in any such State… has been 
condemned and prohibited by the European Court of Justice as undermining the 
Brussels Convention (a ruling almost certainly applicable under EC Regulation 
44/2001 as well.) 
See Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-553, Case C-281-02. For an analysis of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens in the context of the EU, see Kruger supra note 49 at 276-307.  
128 For a concise yet comprehensive review of the distinction between these two main 
grounds for seeking a stay of proceedings under English common law, see generally Briggs 














is identical, ‘the principles which lead to [the stay or dismissal] are sharply 
distinct.’129 In both cases, the court seized has the jurisdiction to hear the 
case, but the defendant appeals to the judge to nevertheless stay or dismiss 
proceedings and direct the claimant to sue in a court of another country, 
either because the foreign court is situated in the natural or more convenient 
or appropriate forum, or because the parties have agreed to sue in the 
foreign court under an exclusive jurisdiction agreement.130 What differs in 
each case, however, is the test applied by the court seized to arrive at this 
conclusion.  
 
The common law forum non conveniens analysis comprises of two 
stages.131 At the first stage, a court seized must determine on a balance of 
probabilities whether the foreign court is clearly the natural or more 
appropriate forum for the resolution of the parties’ dispute, which it does by 
analyzing what “connecting factors”132 are present. Once the defendant ‒ 
who has the burden of proof ‒ discharges this onus, the claimant may, at the 
second stage, seek to oppose the stay or dismissal by convincing the court 
that notwithstanding the greater “convenience” of the foreign forum, it would 
be ‘unjust133 to confine him to his rights and remedies as the foreign court 
will see them.’134  
                                            
129 Ibid at 98.  
130 Ibid. 
131 The test is based on Scottish law and was enunciated for the first time in English law in 
The Spiliada [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 1 (HL). This test has been applied (and at times slightly 
modified) in other common law jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States, Australia, 
and South Africa. See generally Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 167-74. 
132 According to Briggs in The conflict of laws supra note 49 at 101, and Hare in Shipping 
law and admiralty supra note 16 at 96, examples of connecting factors include: location 
where the cause of action arose, location of witnesses, location of other parties involved in 
case, law governing the situation, security, extent of expenses or cost incurred. 
133 For instance, Briggs ibid says that it would be unjust to stay/dismiss proceedings in 
favour of a foreign jurisdiction if there were strong evidence that the claimant would not 















In contrast, in the context of foreign jurisdiction clauses, once the 
agreement has been examined, and found to apply to the particular dispute, 
and be valid, exclusive135 and enforceable under the applicable law, then it 
will usually be upheld and a stay or dismissal granted, unless the claimant ‒ 
who has the burden of proof ‒ can show strong reasons why the court 
should not do so.136 According to Davies:  
It is … a mistake (although a common one) to confuse the two types of 
cases, which are very different one from the other. In a forum non 
conveniens case, the court gives at least some deference to the plaintiff’s 
choice of … forum and should dismiss proceedings only if the defendant 
can show that the relevant factors strongly favour dismissal. In contrast, in a 
forum selection clause case, no deference is given the plaintiff’s choice of 
… forum, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the court why it 
should be allowed to proceed in the chosen … forum in breach of the 
agreement [emphasis added].137 
Mandaraka-Sheppard adds:  
There seems to be, in some respects, a great similarity between the two 
approaches, with regard to the factors taken into account. For this reason, 
the courts, in some cases, tend to conflate the principle and assimilate 
forum non-conveniens when considering a stay on the ground of foreign 
jurisdiction agreements. Such an approach, however, leads to inconsistent 
results given that, in other cases, the courts have distinguished the doctrine 
of forum non-conveniens per se from considerations applicable to a stay in 
favour of a foreign jurisdiction agreement and have approached the matter 
with caution in order to keep the parties to their bargain [emphasis 
added].138 
In short, despite their similarities, the two approaches are not to be 
confused. Though in both instances the court’s unfettered discretion is 
retained to stay or dismiss proceedings where it is deemed appropriate to do 
                                            
135 According to Fawcett in ‘Non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 102 at 250-
52, where a jurisdiction clause is found to be non-exclusive (permissive/optional), and 
therefore not enforceable, then a defendant may apply to the court for a stay or dismissal of 
proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens. In such instances, the non-exclusive 
clause may be regarded as an important connecting factor to be taken into account at the 
first stage of the aforementioned analysis. 
136 Briggs The conflict of laws supra note 49 at 103. In deciding whether to rebut the 
presumption in favour of enforcing the jurisdiction clause, the court seized will look at a 
number of “connecting factors” discussed above to determine if the clause is unreasonable.  
137 Supra note 120 at 368. See also Sparka supra note 42 at 136. 














so (based on its analysis of a number of “connecting factors”), the burden of 
proof and basis of each approach are different: whereas the burden of proof 
rests with the defendant under the doctrine of forum non conveniens to 
prove to the court that it should interfere with the claimant’s rightful and 
lawful choice of court because the other forum is clearly more appropriate, 
the burden of proof rests with the claimant to prove that despite the exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement, there are strong reasons why the court should 
nevertheless allow the party to litigate in the non-selected forum, in breach of 
the agreement. 
2.4.3  Enforcing Jurisdiction Clauses with Anti-suit Injunctions139 
An additional remedy designed to curtail “offensive forum-shopping”140 that is 
available to defendants seeking to prevent or put an end to proceedings 
brought in breach of a jurisdiction agreement is the anti-suit injunction, which 
is issued by common law courts141 at their discretion.142 In short, a defendant 
wishing to restrict a claimant’s right to bring suit to the contractually 
stipulated jurisdiction may apply to the forum court to seek an anti-suit 
injunction ordering the claimant not to commence or to discontinue a claim 
brought in a foreign court in breach of a jurisdiction agreement, or else face 
                                            
139 For a detailed analysis of anti-suit injunctions, see Mandaraka-Sheppard ibid at 243-71; 
Briggs Conflict of laws supra note 49 at 112-17; Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ 
supra note 48 at 203-12; N Meeson Comparative issues in anti-suit injunctions’ in M Davies 
(ed) Jurisdiction and forum selection in international maritime law: essays in honor of Robert 
Force (2005) 59-84; Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1998-2004; Baatz ‘The 
conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 30-31. 
140 Briggs ibid at 112.  
141 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1999: ‘England is perhaps the world capital 
of anti-suit injunctions, although some American and Canadian courts have also issued 
them or declared their willingness to do so in proper cases.’ The author also explains ibid 
that the anti-suit injunction is available in certain mixed jurisdictions, such as Scotland and 
Quebec. 
142 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 243: ‘The principal aim of the injunction is to 














contempt of court proceedings.143 Since the anti-suit injunction infringes 
upon the proper jurisdiction of foreign courts, which is hardly consistent with 
the principle of international comity,144 it is a discretionary remedy that 
should be issued “with caution”.145  
 
Under English law, where proceedings are brought in breach of a 
jurisdiction clause, a contractual anti-suit injunction will usually be granted at 
the discretion of the forum court if the agreement is exclusive and the 
application for an injunction is made promptly, unless there exists a good 
reason why the injunction should nevertheless be denied.146 However, if a 
jurisdiction clause is non-exclusive or otherwise unenforceable, then the 
applicant must show that there is a sufficient connection between the action 
and the selected forum to justify an intervention with the foreign court,147 and 
that the intervention is for the ends of justice,148 before the party can 
persuade a judge to issue an anti-suit injunction. 
                                            
143 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1998. Tetley explains ibid that the 
claimant/respondent must be ‘subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum court’ in order 
for the injunction to take effect. 
144 Ibid at 2004. For further discussion on the principle of comity of nations, see Section 
2.5.2.1. 
145 Ibid at 1999; Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 204. According to 
Briggs in The conflict of laws supra note 49 at 112-13:  
The order is not addressed to the foreign judge, who is manifestly neither subject to 
the personal jurisdiction of the English court nor on the receiving end of its order, but 
to the respondent, who is ordered to exercise self-restraint or suffer the 
consequences of prescribed law. Even so, a foreign judge may not appreciate the 
subtlety of the distinction [and decide that the injunction is unconstitutional and 
impeaches on the jurisdiction of its court’s sovereignty], and for this reason a 
concern for comity constrains the court in the exercise of its discretion.  
See M E Solimine ‘Forum-selection clauses and the privatization of procedure’ (1992) 25 
Cornell Int'l LJ 51 at 62-69. 
146 A/S D/S Svendborg v Wansa [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 559 at 570, affirmed [1997] 2 Lloyds 
Rep 87 (CA). Examples of good reasons to deny the anti-suit injunction include 
unreasonable delay and voluntary submission to a foreign court. 
147 In other words, the applicant must show that the selected forum is the natural or 
appropriate forum ‒ similar analysis to forum non conveniens. 
148 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 631 (HL). Where proceedings are 














Meeson states that ‘to the extent that forum selection issues are 
increasingly governed by international convention, the anti-suit injunction 
becomes both unnecessary and inappropriate.149 Indeed, in Europe, where 
nations have agreed to be governed by the EC Jurisdiction Regulation, the 
European Court of Justice has ruled that the issuance of anti-suit injunctions 
by courts of Member States is altogether prohibited.150 Rule 27 of the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation (re lis pendens conflicts to be resolved by court first 
seized)151 trumps Rule 23 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation (re jurisdiction 
clauses). Consequently, when faced with the conflict of multiple proceedings 
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties brought in 
the courts of different Member States, the court first seized will, at its 
discretion, determine whether or not to stay proceedings in favour of the 
other European forum, thereby eliminating the risk of “offensive forum 
shopping” and the need for anti-suit injunctions altogether in cases where 
Member States are involved.  
2.4.4  Jurisdiction Clauses and the Time-Bar Defence152  
What happens if a lawsuit is filed in a timely manner in the non-selected 
forum, and the foreign jurisdiction clause is successfully pleaded by the 
defendant, but not until after the claim has become time barred in the 
contractually selected forum,153 or until there is so little time remaining that a 
                                            
149 Supra note 139 at 84; concur Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 2004. 
150 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565, Case C-159/02. According to Mandaraka-Sheppard 
supra note 46 at 247, ‘the use of anti-suit injunctions runs counter to the mutual trust which 
the Member States gave to each other’s legal system and institutions.’ 
151 Sometimes described as the “first come first served” rule. See Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ 
supra note 56 at 8. See Chapter 4. 
152 For more on the time bar defence in cases involving jurisdiction clauses contained in 
contracts of carriage by sea, see Force and Davies supra note 101 at 11-27 (re the Thyssen 
Inc v M/V Markos N 1999 AMC 2515 (SDNY 1999) and the Thyssen Inc v Calypso Shipping 
Corp SA [2000] Lloyd’s Rep 243 (QBD Comm Ct 2000) saga) and at 45-48. See also 
Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 154-159; Hofmeyr supra note 11 at 33-36. 
153 Time bars under contracts of carriage to which the Hague, Hague/Visby, Hamburg or 














claim cannot, for all intents and purposes, be filed in a timely manner in the 
foreign court?154 Should the plaintiff lose his day in court and the right to 
recover altogether? Should the resulting time bar persuade a court not to 
enforce the jurisdiction clause against the parties’ express wishes? Should it 
make a difference if a party purposely delays the action by filing a claim or 
defence in the non-selected forum in an untimely manner in order to gain a 
procedural advantage? The answers to these questions and exercise of 
judicial discretion in this matter are far from clear and consistent across 
maritime jurisdictions. 
 
In the United States, it has been argued that to render a foreign 
jurisdiction clause unreasonable and therefore unenforceable as a result of a 
time bar lapse is tantamount to creating a loophole for plaintiffs seeking to 
avoid the clause’s application.155 According to Force and Davies, ‘[this 
attitude] evidences a punitive view towards plaintiffs who file actions in a 
non-selected forum’.156 This hard-line approach in dealing with the statute of 
limitations problem is not unfamiliar to other common law jurisdictions, where 
the argument has been made that a time bar does not in and of itself 
constitute a strong cause to negate the enforcement of a jurisdiction 
clause.157  
                                                                                                                           
legislation (the time bar for cargo claims (other than indemnity claims) under Hague and 
Hague/Visby is 1 year, and under the Hamburg and Rotterdam is 2 years). 
154 Force and Davies explain supra note 101 at 45 that where a claim is brought in the non-
selected forum after the claim is time-barred in the selected forum, then the claimant is 
generally not entitled to relief. In such instances, courts of the US and England have not 
hesitated to order a dismissal or stay of proceedings. Mandaraka-Sheppard adds supra note 
46 at 185 that this is especially true where it is found that the claimant has deliberately 
allowed a time bar to lapse in order to proceed in the other forum.  
155 New Moon Shipping Co Ltd v MAN B & W Diesel AG 121 F 3d 24 (2d Cir 1997) (CA).  
156 Supra note 102 at 48. 
157 The MC Pearl [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 566; The Achilleus 1992 (1) SA 324 (N). According to 
Peel in ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 198-99:  
[I]n cases involving a foreign jurisdiction agreement, they should also enforce the 














However, this strict approach is not embraced by all common law 
judges alike. Some believe that prescription does constitute a strong cause 
for staying or dismissing proceedings, and still others argue that it should be 
viewed as a neutral (rather than a balance-tipping) factor in the decision-
making process.158  
 
A possible solution to avoid the tolling of the time bar might be to seek 
a protective writ, which would have the effect of suspending the operation of 
the statutory limitation in the nominated forum.159 However, as Force and 
Davies remind their readers, initiating parallel proceedings is costly, 
impractical, and places an unnecessary burden on the judicial system by 
clogging court dockets.160 What is more, extensions of time are not always 
permissible under the law of certain countries.161  
2.4.5  Jurisdiction Clauses and Jurisdiction in Rem or in 
Personam   
Professor Hare states that ‘the choice of an execution forum is often driven 
by the availability of security against which a successful claimant can levy 
judgment.’162 Accordingly, cargo claimants may arrest or attach ships, 
depending on where the ship is located, to establish the jurisdiction of a 
                                                                                                                           
contrary to public policy. Even then, when assessing what public policy demands, 
they should take into account of the fact that the plaintiff agreed to abide by the 
relevant limitation period when agreeing to the foreign jurisdiction clause. If this 
approach is taken, it calls into question the practice of attempting to negate the 
effect of a foreign limitation period by making any stay of the English proceedings 
conditional on the defendant’s undertaking not to invoke the time bar. The defendant 
should be entitled to rely on this advantage, like others he may have bargained for, 
unless allowing him to do so conflicts with English public policy. 
158 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 184.  
159 Force and Davies supra note 101 at 46.  
160 Ibid.  
161 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 185. Another solution might be that, absent any 
deliberate delays, the court make the stay of proceedings in the non-selected forum 
conditional upon the defendant’s waiver of the time bar in the contractually stipulated forum, 
so as not to deprive the claimant of his/her day in court. 
162 J Hare ‘Shopping for the best admiralty bargain’ in M Davies (ed) Jurisdiction and forum 














court, perfect maritime claims in rem and/or in personam,163 and/or 
guarantee security against their claims.164 In the context of this present 
study, if the parties previously agreed under the contract of carriage to have 
the merits of any claims litigated elsewhere, then the defendant is free to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the court where the ship has been arrested or 
attached to found jurisdiction by arguing, inter alia, that it would be a breach 
of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement to allow the claim to carry on there. 
However, once again, the question arises: which of the two jurisdictions 
should prevail? Should the merits of the case be argued in the arrest or 
attachment jurisdiction, as prescribed by the Arrest Convention 1952,165 or 
should the court seized instead give recognition to the parties’ freedom to 
                                            
163 W Tetley ‘Arrest, attachment, and related maritime law procedures’ (1999) 73 Tul LR 
1895-1985. Available at http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-admiralty [Accessed 1 
February 2011]:  
In common law countries whose maritime law is primarily derived from the admiralty 
law of England, the action in rem is the basic procedure on which creditors rely for 
pre-judgment security and post-judgment enforcement. The arrest of the ship or 
other res (eg cargo or freight) in the action in rem places the res under judicial 
detention pending adjudication of the claim. It usually also secures the appearance 
in the action of the defendant shipowner and it establishes the jurisdiction of the 
court. If the court subsequently allows the claim, the judgment is then enforceable 
against the arrested res (by judicial sale) or the security given to take its place.  
 
In civil law jurisdictions, where no action in rem exists, the action in personam may 
be combined with a "saisie conservatoire", or conservatory attachment. The saisie 
permits a y property of the debtor (including ships) to be seized and detained under 
judicial authority pending judgment. The subsequent judgment, if favourable to the 
plaintiff, may then be enforced against the attached property or the security 
replacing it.  
 
The United States, in a sense, has the best of both worlds, because American 
maritime law affords the creditor both the arrest in rem and the maritime attachment 
[both of which can be pled concurrently or in the alternative].  
Note that both procedures are also available under South African maritime law (attachments 
as a result of the Roman-Dutch law, and arrests as a result of the English law), per the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act,1983.  
164 According to Tetley ibid, the ship is usually released upon issuance of security in the 
form of bail bonds, payment of money into court, bank guarantees or letters of indemnity. 
165 International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships, Brussels, 10 May 
1952, which applies to both arrest and attachment. (Note that as of 1 February 2011, the 
latest Arrest Convention, the International Convention on the Arrest of Ships, 1999, is not 
yet in force (it requires the consent of 10 states, but only has the consent of 9). See 














contract as they see fit by enforcing the jurisdiction agreement and referring 
the case to the selected forum?  
 
As expected, common law courts may choose to exercise their 
discretion to stay or dismiss proceedings where a ship is located and refer 
the case to the contractually stipulated forum, provided that the jurisdiction 
clause is valid, exclusive and enforceable under the law applicable, and that 
there exist no strong reasons or good cause to set aside the agreement. 
Some courts have held that the non-availability of arrest in rem in the 
contractually selected forum does not render the jurisdiction clause 
unreasonable or provide sufficient reason to set aside the agreement in 
favour of proceedings in the non-selected forum.166 To avoid the needless 
costs and complications associated with multiple proceedings, ‘the dominant 
trend appears to be restriction of parallel or successive litigation of the same 
dispute’167 and upholding valid and effective jurisdiction agreements. 
 
In Europe, any conflict between jurisdiction established under the 
Arrest Convention and exclusive jurisdiction agreements is resolved as 
follows:  
[W]hen there are proceedings brought in a court of a Member State, which 
is seised of the matter first under any of the specialised Conventions by 
virtue of Art 71 [of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation], and in the court of a 
Member State which the parties chose for their disputes, the court first 
seised will determine (by virtue of Art 27) issues as to the validity and scope 
of the agreement and, subject to that, it may decide to decline jurisdiction in 
favour of the agreed exclusive jurisdiction. Alternatively, it is always open to 
a party to the jurisdiction agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the other 
court.168   
                                            
166 Fireman’s Fund Ins Co v MV DSR Atlantic 131 F 3d 1336, 1337-38 (9th Cir 1997) (CA); 
The Spartan-Runner 1991 (3) SA 803 (N) at 807B-C. 
167 Y Shany Regulating jurisdictional relations between national and international courts 
(2007) 156. 
168 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 238. See also Tetley Marine cargo claims supra 














Thus, when a vessel is properly arrested or attached prior to suit 
being brought in the contractually stipulated forum, the conflict is to be 
resolved by the court first seized, that is, the arrest or attachment forum. 
Where the court seized finds that the jurisdiction clause is valid, exclusive 
and effective, then the arrest or attachment forum may decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction in favour of the other forum.169  
 
Recall that under Article 21(2) of the Hamburg Rules, when a ship or 
sistership is arrested in a port state that is subject to the Rules, an action 
may be instituted in that location, notwithstanding the fact that it is not one of 
the places enumerated in the first paragraph of the Article. The defendant 
may petition to have the action transferred from the forum arresti to the 
foreign jurisdiction, so long as sufficient security is provided to ensure 
payment of a subsequent judgment. And, under Article 70 of the Rotterdam 
Rules:  
Nothing in this Convention affects jurisdiction with regard to provisional or 
protective measures, including arrest. A court in a State in which a 
provisional or protective measure was taken does not have jurisdiction to 
determine the case upon its merits unless: (a) The requirements of this 
chapter are fulfilled; or (b) An international convention that applies in that 
State so provid s. 
It would seem therefore that arrest of a vessel, ‘wherever it may be 
found’170 is permitted for the purpose of obtaining security, even though the 
merits of the claim may very well be heard elsewhere in accordance with a 
foreign jurisdiction clause.171 As for arrest for the purpose of founding 
                                                                                                                           
the Regulation does not affect the applicability of the Arrest Convention where Member 
States are parties to it. See also Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 21-23. 
169 Mandaraka-Sheppard ibid at 240. According to Jackson supra note 49 at 414, a stay of 
proceedings in favour of a contractually selected forum may be made conditional upon the 
provision of security. 
170 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 34. 
171 A/CN9/591 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of 














jurisdiction, the ship must either be located within one of the permissible 
forums listed at articles 66 or 68 of the Rules, or it must be permitted under 
the national law implementing the Arrest Convention. Any conflicts between 
the Rotterdam Rules and the Arrest Convention should be resolved in 
accordance with the interpretation of principles contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, which is applicable to international 
sales contracts.172 
2 .5 Forum Shopping amidst  Compet ing Interests at  Mar i t ime 
Law 
[T]he differences that can occur in one jurisdiction rather than another, due 
to different maritime conventions which States are parties to… creates an 
incentive to forum shop…. If one jurisdiction is more advantageous to one 
party, the other party would probably prefer to litigate in the other available 
jurisdiction and this may create a race between the parties to commence 
proceedings first in the jurisdiction of choice.173 
2.5.1  Forum Shopping Under International Marit ime Carriage 
Contracts  
Forum shopping is generally permissible and encouraged in the maritime 
industry.174 It not only promotes party autonomy and self-determination in 
                                                                                                                           
There was support for the view that, whatever the treatment given to jurisdiction 
under the Arrest Conventions, it should not result in a broadening of the list of 
general bases for jurisdiction in actions against the carrier contained in draft article 
75 [Actions against the carrier ‒ art 66 in the final version]. It was suggested that the 
issue of jurisdiction regarding the merits of the arrest case should be considered as 
a matter of conflict of conventions…. 
172 Note that unlike the European Jurisdiction Regulation, the Rotterdam Rules do not 
contain provisions to deal with procedural matters such as lis pendens and concursus. 
According to Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 112, the inclusion of provisions on these 
procedural matters ‘would trespass into an area of national and international procedural law 
and would constitute a substantial difficulty for States that have promulgated well-
established rules on the above issues.’  
173 Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 1-2. 
174 Hare ‘Shopping for the best admiralty bargain’ supra note 162 at 174:  
[S]hopping for an advantageous limitation regime is only part of a much larger 
selection of jurisdictional “special offers”: litigants will always look for advantage in 
the many other facets of a suit that give or remove tactical advantage. And there is 
no philosophical or jurisprudential reason why they should not. Bar and bench 
reputations, punitive interest rates and damages, discovery and inspection 
procedures, contingency fees, jury trials, class actions, domestic consumer 














legal matters,175 but also generates litigation and competition between 
courts, compelling jurisdictions to improve the quality of their work and 
procedures to attract more business.176 That said, forum shopping must be 
kept in check: ‘while some forms of forum shopping should be tolerated, 
abusive forum shopping is prohibited under international law as it conflicts, 
by definition, with the general principle of law prohibiting abuse of rights 
(abus de droit).’177  
 
It has been said that the only way to curtail forum shopping ‘for the 
best bargain’ is through the harmonization of laws on jurisdiction to govern 
all international maritime contracts alike.178 And yet, the truth is that although 
such rules may indeed reduce the need to forum shop, they will never 
outright prevent it179 because ‘no unification or harmonization is able to avoid 
                                                                                                                           
unlevel playing field on which forum shoppers play court games. Fair play it all is, 
unless parties engage in “abusive forum shopping” [emphasis added].  
See also Solimine supra note 145 at 68. Compare to W Tetley International conflict of laws: 
common, civil and maritime (1994) 163 and 804:  
Forum shopping in order to obtain a higher limitation fund is common practice and 
should be opposed…. Forum shopping is the improper choice of jurisdiction by the 
manipulation of connecting factors, in order to prevent the court of the proper 
jurisdiction from hearing a claim.  
Some other reasons why lawyers may “shop around” for the forum that is most beneficial to 
their client’s interests include: availability of higher or lower limitation of liability, availability 
of recovery in rem and/or in personam, time bars, sister ship arrest provisions, costs of 
litigation, judicial efficacy and speed in dispute resolution, legal climate, differences in 
private international law rules, enforceability of desired decision. 
175 Sparka supra note 42 at 147 explains that ‘self-determination in legal matters is an 
important structural element of every free society and a prerequisite of individual freedom.’ 
176 Shany supra note 167 at 154. 
177 Ibid at 155. See generally R Shuz ‘Controlling forum shopping: the impact of 
MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd’ (1986) 35 ICLQ 374 for the English point of view. 
178 Hare ‘Shopping for the best admiralty bargain’ supra note 162 at 173; Tetley International 
conflict of laws supra note 174 at 804. 
179 See generally F Ferrari ‘Forum shopping despite international uniform contract law 














diverse jurisprudence, deriving from court decisions within individual and 
national̶if not regional̶jurisdictions....’180 
 
Thus, despite the creation of international conventions such as the 
Rotterdam Rules, shopping for the best forum to litigate disputes continues 
to be an important strategic matter, which most certainly has a bearing on 
the outcome of claims.181 Generally speaking, in the absence of a jurisdiction 
clause, maritime litigants are at liberty to shop around and commence 
proceedings in a reasonable forum of their choice. However, when they 
choose to negotiate or be bound by a contract of carriage containing an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, their freedom to forum shop may very well be 
restricted (if the clause is enforced), which ‘will greatly affect the commercial 
value of the transaction itself.’182  
2.5.2 Competing Interests Affecting the Enforcement of 
Jurisdiction Clauses  
2.5.2.1 National Self-Interest versus Comity of Nations 
It has been argued that if, as a result of foreign jurisdiction clauses, maritime 
claims worldwide are always brought before the same forums, such as the 
United Kingdom or the United States, then other less popular or powerful 
ones will consistently be short changed of adequate caseload to build their 
own reputable practice and develop their own body of maritime law.183 This 
                                            
180 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 87-88. Not to mention the fact that some of these 
conventions that contain provisions on jurisdiction permit contracting parties to make 
reservations, or opt out of certain rules (eg jurisdiction provisions in Rotterdam Rules), 
which further increases the divide. 
181 Shany supra note 167 at 152. 
182 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 88. According to Sparka supra note 42 at 150, ‘choice of 
forum clauses … help to ensure the application of the chosen law, curb ex-post opportunism 
in the form of forum shopping and thereby increase predictability. This in turn allows the 
parties properly to [sic] assess the risks and thus the true costs of the transaction.’ 
183 B Oland ‘The premature demise of section 46 or the law giveth and the lords taketh 














has prompted countries such as Australia and New Zealand to outlaw 
clauses restricting jurisdiction altogether, and other countries such as South 
Africa and Canada to enact legislation limiting their legal effect.184  
 
Yet, an important feature of private international law, which 
contributes to building stronger relations between nations, commercial and 
legal certainty in contracts, and potentially greater coherence in international 
law,185 is the contemporary principle of comity of nations: 
 “Comity” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is 
the recognition which one national allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.186  
In the context of choice of jurisdiction clauses, the principle of 
international comity implies that a court seized with a dispute ought to 
respect the parties’ choice to litigate in a particular forum by enforcing valid 
and exclusive jurisdiction clauses and declining to exercise its own 
jurisdiction. Per Longmore LJ: 
It goes without saying that any court should pay respect to another (foreign) 
court but, if the parties have actually agreed that a foreign court is to have 
sole jurisdiction over any dispute, the true role of comity is to ensure that 
the parties’ agreement is respected. Whatever country it is to the courts of 
which the parties have agreed to submit their disputes is the country to 
which comity is due. 
                                            
184 Whereas Australia and New Zealand outright ban foreign jurisdiction clauses that 
preclude or limit the jurisdiction of their national courts (rendering the purported ouster of 
jurisdiction null and void), South Africa does not. That said, under section 3 of the South 
African Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1986, any person carrying on a business in the 
Republic, as well as consignees or holders of contracts of carriage of goods inbound to 
South Africa, may bring suit before a competent court of the Republic notwithstanding the 
existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Canada’s statutory restriction, as it is currently 
interpreted, is less onerous. See Chapter 3. 
185 Y Shany supra note 167 at 166. 
186 Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 (1895) (US Supreme Ct) at 163-164. See Briggs Agreements 














The corollary of this is that a party who initiates proceedings in a court other 
than the court, which has been agreed with the other party as the court for 
resolution of any dispute, is acting in breach of contract [emphasis 
added].187  
This “dialogue” between courts by way of international comity, compelling 
nations to respect parties’ jurisdiction agreements, is ‘likely to improve the 
quality of judicial outcomes, and, in consequence, increase their 
legitimacy.’188 
2.5.2.2 Freedom of Contract versus Protectionism189  
As previously discussed, English carriers first introduced foreign jurisdiction 
clauses in contracts of carriage as a trade war tactic, to ensure that disputes 
were settled exclusively before British courts, which tended to favour 
shipowners’ interests. The main impetus behind the US Harter Act and 
International Hague Rules thereafter was to remedy the injustices and 
inequities arising out of the unequal bargaining power between UK carriers 
and shippers worldwide. In exchange for limitation of liability and exculpatory 
exemptions, carriers agreed to provide seaworthy ships and restrict their 
freedom of contract by adhering to mandatory liability provisions or minimum 
standards of conduct to protect cargo interests. However, the regulation of 
jurisdiction clauses contained in international contracts of carriage was left 
entirely to nations, and has yet to be effectively treated in a uniform manner 
(with perhaps the exception of the European Community): whereas some 
nations forbid or restrict their use, others deem these clauses presumptively 
valid. 
                                            
187 OT Africa Line v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] 2 Lloyds Rep 170 (CA) at paras 32-33. 
Sparka supra note 42 at 151:  
[J]udicial intervention diminishes the legal certainty offered by choice of forum 
agreements, and it lessens the incentive for shippers to shop around and thereby 
weakens the disciplining force of the market. Whenever a choice of forum 
agreement results from unwise business, the courts should refrain from stepping in 
and relieving a party from a bad bargain. 
188 Shany supra note 167 at 167. 














This raises the question: are mandatory rules outlawing or restricting 
the use of foreign jurisdiction clauses contained in standard form contracts of 
carriage justifiable in the modern age of transport, or should parties rather be 
permitted to benefit from the commercial and legal certainty of freely 
bargaining for jurisdiction clauses as they see fit? According to Withers: 
[T]he freedom to choose a forum for the resolution of disputes is a 
fundamental component of party autonomy…. It enables parties to 
formulate expectations not only as to the location of litigation in the event of 
a dispute, but as to the likely costs and associated juridical advantages and 
disadvantages which flow from proceedings in the chosen court .… Where 
the meaning and effect of a jurisdiction clause is clear from its wording, it is 
difficult to see how the consumer is not in a position where he can make an 
informed choice [emphasis added].190 
As Von Ziegler explains, it is no longer tenable in today’s commercial 
climate to argue that shippers have the weaker bargaining power and require 
special legislative protection against carriers.191 Even though it is the 
carriers, and not the shippers, who typically draft and issue bills of lading, 
which contain standard terms such as jurisdiction clauses that are said to 
favour carriers,192 that does not mean that shippers have weaker bargaining 
                                            
190 C Withers ‘Jurisdiction clauses and the unfair terms in consumer contracts regulations’ 
2002 LMCLQ 56 at 61. 
191 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 95:  
Even if one could establish that at the time of the confiscation of the Harter Act and 
the subsequent Hague Rules the commercial balance between shippers and 
shipowners was strongly in favour of the shipowners, the reality of trade has clearly 
shifted in modern times. Shippers nowadays are powerful multinational companies 
who have also gained substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis the shipping industry. 
Often, it is the shipper who dictates the terms for the shipments, and it is for the 
shipping industry to follow the demands of the customers. A small shipper can 
protect its interests by using a freight forwarder, who in turn acts as a big shipper in 
relation to the shipping industry and the carriers. To provide for customer/consumer 
protection in favour of shippers is not justified, particularly when one considers that 
the law of carriage of goods by sea is an element of commercial law, which should 
not rely on notions of consumer protection but rather on freedom of contract, on 
commercial negotiations between commercial entities, and on the laws of the 
markets [emphasis added]. 
192 Sparka supra note 42 at 13 and 149. According to Tetley in Marine cargo claims supra 
note 38 at 2006: 
The forum selection clause is usually a “boilerplate” term of the bill, seldom 














power. On the contrary, in the current competitive market, most maritime 
shippers gain the upper hand by shopping around for the best bargain, in 
other words by embarking in a joint venture with ‘a carrier who contracts on 
terms more favourable than others, for example by designating a neutral 
forum instead of a forum at the carrier’s principal place of business.’193  
 
Furthermore, as Laurent reminds her readers, it is important to keep 
in mind that even though it may be expensive to litigate overseas, it is 
usually the sophisticated and deep-pocketed insurance companies, not the 
individual cargo holders, who pursue these carriage claims.194 
 
Thus, it would seem that in the current commercial climate, where 
parties have freely bargained for and consented to the contractual terms, it 
would only be fair and reasonable that valid and exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses be enforced whether by way of a stay of proceedings or an anti-suit 
injunction, depending on the circumstances of the case.195  
                                                                                                                           
the designated jurisdiction frequently has little, if any, connection with the parties 
and their contract and is typically more convenient to the carrier than to cargo. 
But according to Sparka ibid at 150:  
[S]tandard clauses in bills of lading are a product of extended negotiations between 
the representatives of the commercial interests involved which have been adopted 
because they facilitate the conduct of trade. This is also true of choice of forum 
clauses, which help to ensure the application of the chosen law, curb ex-post 
opportunism in the form of forum shopping and thereby increase predictability. This 
in turn allows the parties properly to assess the risks and thus the true costs of the 
transaction [emphasis added]. 
193 Sparka ibid at 149. 
194 Supra note 119 at 160. The author also points out ibid that it is important to consider that 
in cases where there is a threat of multiple suits resulting from overly protectionist 
legislation, this may translate into higher expenses for the carrier defending those multiple 
claims, which in turn may indirectly lead to increased freight costs for the shipper. In other 
words, she believes that ‘[e]conomic interests of both the shipper and the carrier are best 
served by allowing choice, and enforcing foreign jurisdiction clauses.’ Concur Sparka ibid at 
13-14 and 150. 
195 According to Laurent ibid at 125, this is especially true in light of the fact that a contract’s 
price may very well have been adjusted to reflect the cost of litigation in particular 
jurisdiction. Judicial interference may lead to higher costs to parties, which ‘demonstrates 














But what about situations where the bill of lading is made to the order 
of a consignee, or where it is negotiable and eventually transferred to a third 
(or fourth) party? Should mandatory rules on jurisdiction protect these 
“innocent” parties against the effect of jurisdiction clauses?  
 
As Sparka explains, regardless of the terms of sale, ‘third parties are 
typically affected by the original contract of carriage when shipping 
documents are transferred to them, or when they are named as 
consignee….’196 It follows that a third party holder of a bill of lading will 
usually be bound by a valid and exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in the 
transport document or incorporated by reference in a charterparty bill, when 
litigating a claim,197 even though that third party may not have negotiated or 
necessarily been privy to the terms of the original contract of carriage198 
when concluding the contract of sale.  
 
That said, lack of negotiation between third parties and carriers in 
contracts of carriage is not normally viewed as an obstacle to the 
enforcement of valid jurisdiction clauses.199 Generally speaking, so long as 
third parties are ‘apprised of or consent to the jurisdiction clause in the bill of 
lading,’200 they will be treated as original parties to the agreement.201  
                                            
196 Sparka supra note 42 at 170.  
197 Ibid. 
198 Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 218. 
199 Sparka supra note 42 at 185-86: ‘What is important is not whether both parties 
negotiated over the terms of the contract, but whether they freely entered into the contract 
based on the expectation that the benefits of the transaction would exceed the cost.’ 
200 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1992. Sparka ibid at 186:  
The requirement of specific assent, which may be characterized as a pick and 
choose approach, contravenes fundamental doctrines of contract law and is likely to 
increase transaction costs…. In any case, requiring specific assent would defeat the 
contractual expectations of the carrier and encourage opportunistic behaviour. 














In terms of formal validity of clauses through adequate knowledge and 
consent, many common law nations believe, particularly in an age of modern 
technology, that it behoves third parties to inform themselves of the standard 
contract terms (or get the information from the seller) in order to make 
informed decisions, as any ordinary businessman would, before signing 
agreements.202  
 
Von Ziegler says that arguably the only “innocent” third parties in 
contracts of carriage that warrant protection are C-terms buyers under 
INCOTERMS 2000203, but even then, he says they are not so “innocent”:  
[The consignee] has contracted, as buyer, with the seller/shipper that apart 
from providing the purchased goods such seller shall provide for 
transportation at its own costs. Such a buyer ‒ for its own commercial 
reasons (which will normally affect the purchase price) ‒ preferred that the 
seller undertake such arrangements. The buyer allows the seller to be the 
shipper and to contract with the carrier of seller’s choice on terms agreed by 
the seller. This decision is taken as part of a negotiation of the sales 
contract and is independent from any negotiation with the carrier. It 
assumes that the buyer will get from the seller not only the goods as 
delivered at the port of shipment, but also the carriage to destination and ‒ 
depending on the terms of the sale agreement ‒ insurance cover. Such a 
buyer is far from innocent, and not even really a third person but a receiver 
of goods, who must expect to find contractual language and, therein, 
jurisdiction clause  [emphasis added].204 
Perhaps a useful indication of the future trend and attitude in maritime 
industry vis-à-vis the use of mandatory rules as a means to regulate 
international contracts is contained in the new and groundbreaking 
                                            
202 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 116-17; agree Sparka supra note 42 at 186. 
But see Force and Davies supra note 101 at 27ff (re ‘binding the plaintiff to an unseen forum 
selection clause’), where these authors explain (and Von Ziegler ibid would agree) that in 
cases where the bills are negotiable and endorsed by multiple buyers, the situation is less 
than straightforward and can lead to injustice, in particular where the jurisdiction clause is 
not clearly stipulated in the bill, but rather incorporated by reference. 
203 ‘Under the "C"-terms (CFR, CIF, CPT and CIP), the seller has to contract for carriage, 
but without assuming the risk of loss or damage to the goods or additional costs due to 
events occurring after shipment or dispatch’ (Available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/id3040/index.html [Accessed 1 February 2011]. 














Rotterdam Rules: these rules envisage a broad contractual freedom for all 
parties to certain contracts of carriage to negotiate their agreements, 
including jurisdiction clauses, as they see fit. Unlike the Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules before it, this latest maritime Convention empowers consenting 
parties negotiating volume contracts205 to ignore the minimum standard 
obligations set by the Rules206 and instead set their own standards, including 
their own minimum level of liability.207 We shall have to wait and see whether 
the Rules are adopted, and if so, how the international judiciaries react to 
these laissez-faire provisions, in order to fully assess their impact. 
2.5.3  Main Reasons For and Against the Enforcement of 
Jurisdiction Clauses  
In modern contracts of carriage by sea, forum selection clauses serve a 
broader, albeit no less contentious,208 purpose than they did during the time 
preceding the Harter Act, when the carriers ruled the shipping industry. 
Various scholars have advanced a number of reasons both for and against 
the judicial enforcement of these restrictive clauses.  
 
Reasons for the enforcement of such clauses include:209 to promote 
party autonomy in negotiating contracts of carriage, as is the common 
commercial practice in the maritime industry; to make contractual 
relationships, terms of contracts and outcomes of possible lawsuits more 
predictable; to benefit from a familiar forum applying familiar law, or to 
benefit from a neutral forum and ensure impartiality of judgment; to benefit 
from a convenient, competent and experienced forum; to tailor litigation to 
                                            
205 For more on volume contracts under the Rotterdam Rules, see Chapter 5. 
206 There are a few key exceptions, including the obligation to exercise due diligence to 
provide a seaworthy ship and the obligation to provide complete instructions and 
documentation for the carriage of goods are non-negotiable. 
207 Transport Canada International Marine Policy supra note 77 at 3. 
208 Sparka supra note 42 at 6. 














parties’ specific needs (whereby enhancing the commercial value of the 
dispute resolution procedure); to avoid multiplicity of proceedings over the 
same dispute, and minimize the risk of complicated and expensive litigation 
over the preliminary issue of jurisdiction; and to reduce difficulties often 
encountered in enforcing national court judgments abroad.  
 
Reasons for not enforcing such clauses include:210 to promote justice 
and equity by refusing to enforce one-sided or unreasonable clauses; to 
prevent abuses resulting from unequal bargaining power between carriers 
and shippers/third parties; to thwart defendant’s attempts to shirk legal 
obligations and deny claimant the right to a fair hearing on merits of the 
case;211 to protect economic interests of local traders; to avoid the 
inconvenience and the increased costs of litigation212 to plaintiffs forced to 
litigate in foreign jurisdictions (eventually resulting in lower settlement 
values); and to discourage judicial chauvinism of foreign̶typically British̶ 
fora and permit national development of maritime expertise.  
 
Given the many persuasive reasons both for and against the 
enforcement of jurisdiction agreements, there is unlikely to be any 
consistency in the approaches to enforcement amongst nations, as will be 
further elucidated in the following Chapter. 
                                            
210 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 95; Sparka ibid at 6-8. 
211 Force and Davies supra note 101 at 3:  
Forum selection clauses should not be construed as a surrender of the right to 
redress… [but rather] as an affirmation of their right to seek redress .... [They] 
should never be manipulated or applied so as to deny an allegedly aggrieved party a 
remedy otherwise provided by law or worse yet to deny any remedy whatsoever. 
212 R Herber ‘Jurisdiction and arbitration̶should the new Convention contain rules on these 
subjects?’ 2002 LMCLQ 405 at 409: ‘This is particularly true for claimants from civil law 
countries being forced to sue their debtor in common law jurisdictions where costs of court 














CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
JURISDICTION CLAUSES 
The treatment of jurisdiction clauses contained in international contracts of 
carriage by sea varies (at times significantly) from one maritime nation to the 
next, which hardly encourages international uniformity in the law, a highly 
desirable objective given the transnational nature of much of the shipping 
industry.  
 
The gamut of national responses range from a complete and 
automatic statutory ban of foreign jurisdiction clauses that restrict the 
jurisdiction of local courts and limit the substantive and procedural rights of 
cargo interests, at one end of the spectrum, to a legislation-free virtually 
hands-off approach prioritizing commercial negotiations, economic growth, 
and certainty and expediency in the resolution of cargo claims, at the other 
end of the spectrum.  
 
Other national responses fall somewhere in between these two 
extremes, where party autonomy, freedom of contract and comity between 
nations are balanced against the need to preserve and promote domestic 
judicial competence and authority, and protect cargo interests against 
possible abuses, especially in cases where cargo interests are third party 
consignees or bill of lading transferees with potentially weaker bargaining 
power and little or no choice in the matter. The balance is achieved, partly 
through statutory restrictions on the enforcement of foreign jurisdiction 
clauses imposed under national law, and partly through judicial interpretation 
(statutory and contractual), and/or the exercise of judicial discretion (in 














depending on the circumstances of the case.213 The following analysis aims 
to provide a summary of some of the principal national perspectives.  
3.1 Austra l ia ’s  Br ight  L ine Rule 
According to Section 11 of the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1991, as amended by the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Regulations 1998 (No.2),214 Australian State and Federal law is the 
proper law of the contract for all export shipments from Australia. Any 
agreement, such as an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, which attempts to 
restrict the jurisdiction of Australian courts in respect of outbound carriage, is 
of “no effect” by virtue of Subsection 11(2)(b).215  Conversely, Australian law 
is not mandatory for all import shipments to Australia. That said, any 
agreement that attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of Australian courts in 
respect of inbound carriage is also of “no effect” by virtue of Subsection 
                                            
213 See generally Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1915-1920; see also Oland 
supra note 183. 
214 Section 11 of the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 reads as follows: 
(1) All parties to: 
(a) A sea carriage document relating to the carriage of goods from any place in 
Australia to any place outside Australia [export]; or 
(b) A non negotiable document of a kind mentioned in subparagraph 
10(1)(b)(iii) relating to such a carriage of goods; 
are taken to have intended to contract according to the laws in force at the 
place of shipment [Australian law applies]. 
(2) An agreement (whether made in Australia or elsewhere) has no effect so far as it 
purports to: 
(a) Preclude or limit the effect of subsection (1) in respect of a bill of lading or 
document mentioned in that subsection; or 
(b) Preclude or limit the jurisdiction of a court of the Commonwealth or of a 
State or a Territory in respect of a bill of lading or document mentioned in 
subsection (1); or 
(c) Preclude or limit the jurisdiction of a court of the Commonwealth or of a State 
or Territory in respect of:  
i. A sea carriage document relating to the carriage of goods from any place 
outside Australia to any place in Australia [import]; or 
ii. A non-negotiable document of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph 
10(1)(b)(iii) relating to such a carriage of goods [emphasis added]. 
215 Laurent supra note 119 at 147 explains that: 
[C]ombining the relevant law and jurisdiction for outbound goods … ensures that 
Australian exporters are not exposed to carriers using a foreign law to contract out 
of their liability, [a] result that would probably be achieved anyway by virtue of the 














11(2)(c). In short, Section 11 outlaws exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses, 
regardless of the applicable law, when contained in contracts of carriage 
relating to the transport of goods to or from Australia.216 It is, however, 
noteworthy that ‘[a] foreign court will not be under the same mandatory 
obligation to apply the statute. It will depend on whether the party asserting 
the application of the Australian statute can convince the foreign court that it 
                                            
216 Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc (1998) 165 ALR 265 (Fed Ct) at 278. See 
eg Brazin Ltd v Transarea China Ltd [2007] FCA 610 (Fed CA): The first defendant in this 
case argued that the Australian courts lacked jurisdiction because of an exclusive Hong 
Kong jurisdiction clause. However, Allsop J of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed this 
argument, stating at para 3 of his judgment that ‘Section 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1991 plainly avoids such an exclusive jurisdiction clause and ensures that courts in 
Australia have authority to hear cargo claims of this kind if brought by the plaintiff in 
Australia.’ See also Incitec Ltd v Alkimos Shipping Corporation [2004] FCA 698 (another 
example where the Federal Court overruled the operation of an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause.)  
In New Zealand, in accordance with Section 210(1) of the New Zealand Maritime Transport 
Act 1994, jurisdiction clauses contained in bills of lading, similar documents of title, or non-
negotiable carriage documents that restrict the jurisdiction of New Zealand are also 
unenforceable. That said, as Laurent explains ibid at 137, the application of New Zealand 
law for international import and export contracts is not mandatory.  
In South Africa, the common law Eleftheria principles and discretionary “strong cause” test 
to override prima facie valid and exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses are generally followed 
(see eg The Dien Danielson 1982 (3) SA 534 (N); The Spartan-Runner 1991 (3) SA 803 (N); 
The Achilleus 1992 (1) SA 324)), unless a claim is brought in accordance with s 3 (1) of the 
South African Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986, which states as follows: 
3. Jurisdiction of courts  
(1) Notwithstanding any purported ouster of jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction clause 
or agreement to refer any dispute to arbitration, and notwithstanding the provisions 
of the Arbitration Act, 1965 (Act 42 of 1965), and of section 7 (1) (b) [regarding the 
discretionary power of the court to stay proceedings] of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act, 1983 (Act 105 of 1983), any person carrying on business in the 
Republic and the consignee under, or holder of, any bill of lading, waybill or like 
document for the carriage of goods to a destination in the Republic or to any port in 
the Republic, whether for final discharge or for discharge or for discharge for further 
carriage, may bring any action relating to the carriage of the said goods or any such 
bill of lading, waybill or document in a competent court in the Republic [emphasis 
added]. 
Thus, in cases where a cargo claimant (whether shipper, subrogated insurer, or otherwise) 
carries on business in the Republic, or where the claimant is a consignee or third party 
holder of a contract for the carriage of goods to a destination in the Republic, whether for 
final discharge or on-carriage, the foreign jurisdiction clause is of no effect. See generally 














should apply to the agreement.’217 Furthermore, Section 11 does not prohibit 
the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by Australian courts, 
which may grant a stay of proceedings at their discretion where it is proven 
that, on a balance of probabilities, the natural or more appropriate forum is 
elsewhere. 
 
Kirby P in The Krasnogrosk  218 presents a number of persuasive 
reasons for the inclusion of protective provisions such as Section 11 of the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991, which have been a part of Australian 
law ever since shortly after Federation, namely: considerations of national 
pride; the assertion of national jurisdiction, which had been a repeated 
phenomenon especially of United States jurisprudence for more than a 
century; the determination of the local legislature to protect the economic 
interests of local traders; a partial mistrust of overseas courts, tribunals and 
arbitrators and their laws; a reaction to the prevailing dominance of sea trade 
by certain foreign powers; and a recognition of the inconvenience and cost 
inherent in arbitrations [and by extension litigation] in distant places which 
might effectively put the determination of disputes on their merits beyond the 
pocket of local trad rs.219  
 
                                            
217 Laurent ibid at 145. A court in the contractually stipulated forum may choose to ignore 
Australian COGSA or parallel proceedings in an Australian court, and may even attempt to 
interfere indirectly with the jurisdiction of the Australian court by granting an anti-suit 
injunction. See eg Akai Pty Ltd v Peoples Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90, where 
Thomas J of the High Court of London ignored Australian COGSA and the decision 
rendered by Sheller JA of the High Court of Australia in Akai Pty Ltd v People's Insurance 
Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418 (High Ct Aus) (who held that the English law and jurisdiction 
clause were of no effect by virtue of s 11, and therefore the stay of Australian proceedings 
was declined), when he declined to stay a counterclaim in the English court (holding the 
parties to their bargain) and granted an anti-suit injunction. 
218 Bulk Chartering & Consultants Australia Pty Ltd v T&T Metal Trading Pty Ltd (1993) 31 
NSWLR 18. 














The question to ask, however, is whether these above-cited reasons 
continue to validate a nationalistic bright-line rule, especially given the 
current ‘fertile soil of active global commerce, in a prevailing framework of 
freedom of international trade.’220 Or perhaps more significantly, even if 
Section 11 has some merit (because it protects small Australian traders who 
have weaker bargaining power, for instance), can it not also be said that its 
hard-line approach will only incite parallel proceedings, anti-suit injunctions 
and the non-recognition and enforcement of Australian judgments in foreign 
forums? If that is indeed the case, one must examine who really benefits 
from the application of these protectionist provisions.221 Perhaps, as Laurent 
suggests, there is a more suitable (or less draconian) and commercially 
reasonable way of doing business.222 
3.2 Uni ted Kingdom’s Laissez-Faire At t i tude and Strong 
Cause Test   
When proceedings are brought in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause, in 
cases where the EC Jurisdiction Regulation does not apply,223 English courts 
have the discretion to hold the parties to their bargain and grant a stay of 
proceedings, and they will usually exercise their discretion in favour of a 
stay, unless the claimant can prove that there are strong reasons why the 
exclusive agreement should nevertheless not be given effect.224 In other 
                                            
220 J Allsop ‘International commercial law, maritime law and dispute resolution: the place of 
Australia, New Zealand and the Asia Pacific region in the coming years’ Frank Stuart 
Dethridge Memorial Address to the 33rd Annual MLAANZ Conference Sydney, 28 
September 2006 (2007) 21 A&NZ Mar LJ 1 at 9. 
221 G Farnsworth ‘Laws in conflict ‒ OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp’ MLAANZ 
Conference Paper, October 2006. Available at 
http://www.nortonwhite.com/adm/new/documents/laws%20in%20conflict.pdf. [Accessed 1 
February 2011]. 
222 Laurent supra note 119 at 158ff.  
223 For more on the regulation and enforcement of jurisdiction clauses under the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation, see Chapter 4. 
224 The Eleftheria [1969] 1 Lloyds Rep 237 at 242; El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyds Rep 119 (CA) at 














words, under English law, foreign jurisdiction clauses are presumptively valid 
and, more often than not, they tend to be enforced.225  
 
Interestingly enough, English courts have not always adopted a liberal 
pro-autonomy approach to the enforcement foreign jurisdiction clauses. The 
following oft-cited passage articulated by Lord Denning in The Atlantic 
Star226 bears witness to the “judicial chauvinism” of which the nationalistic 
English judiciary was often accused prior to its shift in attitude:  
This right to come here [before the English courts] is not confined to 
Englishmen. It extends to any friendly foreigner. He can seek the aid of our 
Courts if he desires to do so. You may call this “forum shopping” if you 
please, but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the 
quality of the goods and the speed of the service.227  
 
 But the decision of Brandon J (as he then was) in the ground breaking 
case The Eleftheria228 marked the beginning of a new way of thinking 
espoused by the English courts,229 and a new trend to stay English 
                                                                                                                           
there is an English forum selection clause, which the defendants seek to enforce by way of 
an anti-suit injunction in cases where there has been a breach of contract, there too the 
parties will usually be h ld to their bargain, unless the claimant proves a good or strong 
reason not to enforce the agreement. See A/S D/S Svendborg v Wansa [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 
559, affirmed [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep 87 (CA); OT Africa Line Ltd supra note 187: in both these 
English cases, an anti-suit injunction was granted. See generally Mandaraka-Sheppard 
supra note 46 at 260-63 (regarding the ‘breach of an English jurisdiction agreement falling 
outside the scope of the [EC Jurisdiction] Regulation’). 
225 Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 190. Examples of cases where 
clauses were enforced: Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyds Rep 425 (HL); The Chaparral 
[1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 158 (CA); The Eleftheria ibid; The Sennar (No 2) ibid; British 
Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard Co [1993] 1 Lloyds Rep 3; Continental Bank NA v Aeakos 
Compania Naviera SA and Others [1994] 1 WLR 588 (CA); The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 87 (CA); and Akai Pty [UK] supra note 217. 
226 The Atlantic Star [1972] 2 Lloyds Rep 446 (CA). 
227 Ibid at 451. 
228 Supra note 224.  
229 Per Lord Diplock in The Abidin Daver [1984] 1 Lloyds Rep 339 (HL) at 344:  
My Lords, the essential change in the attitude of the English Courts to pending or 
prospective litigation in foreign jurisdictions that has been achieved step-by-step 
during the last 10 years as a result of successive decisions of this House… is that 














proceedings in favour of foreign jurisdictions agreements.230 The principles 
laid down in this judgment, which now constitute ‘the basic statement on the 
question,’231 read as follows:  
(1) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer 
disputes to a foreign Court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the English 
Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within its jurisdiction, is not 
bound to grant a stay but has the discretion whether to do so or not. (2) The 
discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for 
not doing so is shown. (3) The burden of proving such strong cause is on 
the plaintiffs. (4) In exercising its discretion the Court should take into 
account all the circumstances of the particular case. (5) In particular, but 
without prejudice to (4), the following matters, where they arise, may 
properly be regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact 
is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative 
convenience and expense of trial as between the English and foreign 
courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it 
differs from English law in any material respects. (c) With what country 
either party is connected, and how closely. (d) Whether the defendants 
genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural 
advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue 
in the foreign court because they would: (i) be deprived of security for their 
claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a 
time-bar not applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or 
other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial [emphasis added].232 
                                            
230 Tetley explains in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1961, that ‘[a]t first this 
remarkable decision was not generally followed, but Brandon LJ himself repeated the 
principles in the Court of Appeal in The El Amria and his criteria laid down in that case have 
now been taken as the basic statement on the question.’ According to Fawcett in ‘Trial in 
England or abroad’ supra note 119 at 226: 
[I]t is good commercial practice to insert a choice of jurisdiction clause in a contract; 
it provides the certainty which businessmen require as a prerequisite for good 
international business relations. To consistently allow jurisdiction in defiance of a 
foreign choice of jurisdiction clause would undermine this. 
231 Tetley ibid. 
232 The Eleftheria supra note 224. In Singapore, the same “strong cause” test of The 
Eleftheria is applied (The Jian He [2000] 1 SLR 8 (CA)), and the same factors are taken into 
account by a court when deciding whether to override a jurisdiction agreement (Amerco 
Timbers Pte Ltd v Chatsworth Timber Corp Pte Ltd [1977] 2 MLJ 181 (CA); Golden Shore 
Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank [2004] 1 SLR 6 (CA)). For more on Singapore’s position 
regarding foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreements, see generally V Leow ‘Exclusively here 
to stay: the applicable principles to granting a stay on the basis of an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause’ 2004 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 569-583. This is also true of Hong Kong 
(eg Canavan v Battenfeld [2010] 4 HKLRD 513), which is not surprising since its courts 
continue to follow the English Common Law tradition and apply common law cases from 
other jurisdictions as precedent. Not so in Nigeria and Canada, where legislation has 
departed from the old law based on The Eleftheria. Re Canada’s current position, see B 














This list of factors taken into account by the courts is by no means 
exhaustive.233 Also, one of these factors alone may not be enough to 
constitute a strong cause tipping the balance in favour of an English court 
refusing to grant a stay.234 All the circumstances of the particular case must 
be taken into account. According to Mandaraka-Sheppard, generally 
speaking, to establish a strong cause or reason to refuse a stay of 
proceedings under English law, ‘there must be either expert evidence in the 
English jurisdiction,235 or multiplicity of proceedings,236 or [sufficient] 
connecting factors such as those [listed in subsection (5) of The Eleftheria 
principles above, and those] described in The Spiliada decision [emphasis 
added].’237 
                                                                                                                           
2006. Available at http://www.nsbs.org/librarydatabases [Accessed 1 February 2011]. See 
also section 3.3 directly below. Re Nigeria’s current position, see A A Olawoyin ‘Forum 
selection disputes under bills of lading in Nigeria: a historical and contemporary perspective’ 
(2004-2005) 29 Tul Mar LJ 257. 
233 Donohue v Armco supra note 225 at para 24; Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ 
supra note 48 at 189.  
234 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 178; Peel ibid at 191. The deprivation of security 
for one’s claim in the foreign court (eg The Havhelt [1993] 1 Lloyds Rep 523), the availability 
of factual evidence in England and inconvenience of having to take witnesses to the 
contractual forum (eg The Makefjell [1976] 2 Lloyds Rep 29), and a time bar in the 
contractual jurisdiction (eg The MC Pearl supra note 157) do not in themselves constitute 
strong causes to refuse a stay of proceedings. These are merely procedural advantages 
that an English court will take into account when deciding whether or not to override the 
jurisdiction agreement.  
235 See eg The El Amria supra note 224: the fact that the expert evidence, which was central 
to the dispute, was more readily available in England than in Egypt, and it would have been 
hard to convey this expert evidence of a highly technical nature to an Egyptian judge 
through the use of an interpreter, was enough to convince the English court that, on 
balance, there was a strong cause for refusing to stay proceedings. See also The Adolf 
Warski [1976] 2 Lloyds Rep 241 (CA) at 244. 
236 The El Amria ibid; Citi-March v Neptune [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 72; The MC Pearl supra 
note 157. 
237 Supra note 46 at 179. According to Peel, in ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra 
note 48 at 189: 
[O]ne striking feature of The Eleftheria principles is the similarity between the 
particular factors which are to be taken into account when considering an application 
for a stay based on a foreign jurisdiction agreement and those… [taken into account] 
to stay or set aside jurisdiction in “ordinary” cases on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens [as per The Spiliada supra note 131, decided 18 years later].  














Peel voices the following concerns regarding the presumptive validity 
of foreign jurisdiction clauses under English law and the court’s discretion to 
override agreements in cases of abuse or unfairness:  
[t]he negotiation of the jurisdiction clause, or lack of it [in the case of third 
party consignees for example], or the relative bargaining position of the 
parties has rarely seemed to concern the English courts….It could be 
argued that, in any case where the real concern of the courts is the lack of 
any negotiation between the parties, this problem should be considered in 
its own right by considering whether the clause is properly part of the 
contract or unenforceable. Instead, there is some evidence that it may 
occasionally influence the courts in the exercise of their discretion in 
accordance with The Eleftheria principles…. Since the argument against 
the courts retaining a discretion whether to stay their proceedings is based 
on the principle that the parties should be held to their agreement, it should 
be a relevant factor whether the jurisdiction clause reflects a genuine 
agreement between the parties…. Even if the courts are prepared to 
embark on an assessment of the fairness of a foreign jurisdiction clause, 
based on all the circumstances, including the other terms of the contract, it 
is difficult to envisage how such an assessment might sensibly be made. It 
seems hardly surprising, therefore, that the English courts are happy to 
proceed on the general presumption that foreign jurisdiction clauses are 
substantively fair [emphasis added]. 238 
 
Perhaps, in light of the above concerns, instead of leaving the 
question of enforceability of prima facie valid foreign jurisdiction clauses 
entirely at the English courts’ discretion in cases where the EC Jurisdiction 
does not apply, it might be more sensible to implement statutory safeguards 
which provide greater assurance of transparency in proceedings and 
fairness to cargo interests, without outright banning the use of these 
commercial clauses. It is unlikely, however, that such legislation will ever 
transpire since ‘English contract law still strongly adheres to the ideal of 
                                            
238 Ibid at 220-21. According to Sparka supra note 42 at 137, ‘there do not seem to be any 
judgments invalidating jurisdiction clauses for contractual reasons which are related to the 
lack of bargaining power of one party or the unfairness of the contractually chosen forum.’ 
He does, however, go on to explain that contractual grounds such as unconscionability and 















freedom of contract’239 and England remains a strong carrier nation and 
popular forum for dispute resolution in standard form maritime contracts. 
3.3 Canada’s Statutory Restr ic t ion on Party Autonomy and 
How the Federal  Court  has Muddied the Waters 
Canada is primarily a shippers’ nation. Therefore, it seems only fitting that its 
Federal Legislature should prioritize safeguarding the rights of cargo 
interests through protectionist legislation. Yet, ever since the elimination of 
Section 5 of the Water Carriage of Goods Act 1910,240 and up until the 
coming into force of the Marine Liability Act241 on August 8, 2001, no such 
statutory protection was in place. Even now, despite the Legislature’s best 
efforts, the statutory protection is rendered virtually toothless as a result of 
recent judgments handed down by the Federal Court of Appeal. A review of 
the current legislation and relevant case law is de rigueur. 
 
Until 2001, ‘the practice of the Canadian courts closely resemble[d] 
that of the English courts’:242 the common law Eleftheria principles and 
discretionary “strong cause” test was the legal standard to override prima 
facie valid and exclusive forum selection clauses contained in contracts of 
carriage by sea,243 ‘leading to an exodus of good Canadian maritime work to 
                                            
239 Ibid. 
240 Section 5 of the Water Carriage of Goods Act 1910 provided that ‘any stipulation or 
agreement purporting to oust or lessen the jurisdiction of any court having jurisdiction at the 
port of loading in Canada in respect of the bill of lading or document shall be illegal, null and 
void, and of no effect.’ This provision was not reinstated in the Water Carriage of Goods Act 
1936 or in any subsequent Canadian maritime legislation thereafter. 
241 SC 2001, c 6. This recent legislation re-enacts provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules (with 
some modifications), with a view that these may eventually be replaced with provisions of 
the Hamburg Rules. 
242 Peel ‘Exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ supra note 48 at 213. 
243 See eg ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV [2003] 1 SCR 450 (Supreme Court of 
Canada). The claim in this case arose prior to the effective date of the Marine Liability Act, 
2001, which the court decided did not have retroactive effect; therefore the Supreme Court 














other jurisdictions.’244 However, the enactment of the Marine Liability Act 
2001, and in particular Section 46, changed the law. 
 
Section 46 of the Marine Liabil i ty Act, 2001,245 which is based 
on but not identical to Articles 21 (on jurisdiction) and 22 (on arbitration) of 
the Hamburg Rules,246 gives cargo claimants the option to institute 
proceedings in Canada in a number of particular instances despite the 
foreign exclusive jurisdiction clause in the contract of carriage, where any 
one of the circumstances under subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c)) are met, and 
the tribunal in Canada would be competent,247 that is to say it ‘would have 
jurisdiction if the contract had referred the claim to Canada.’248  
                                            
244 Oland ‘Acceptance of jurisdiction’ supra note 232 at 1. 
245 Section 46 of the Marine Liability Act reads as follows: 
(1) If a contract for the carriage of goods by water to which the Hamburg Rules do 
not apply provides for the adjudication or arbitration of claims arising under the 
contract in a place other than Canada, a claimant may institute judicial or arbitral 
proceedings in a court or arbitral tribunal in Canada that would be competent to 
determine the claim if the contract had referred the claim to Canada, where 
(a) the actual port of loading or discharge, or the intended port of loading or 
discharge under the contract, is in Canada; 
(b) the person against whom the claim is made resides or has a place of 
business, branch or agency in Canada; or 
(c) the contract was made in Canada. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the parties to a contract referred to in that 
subsection may, after a claim arises under the contract, designate by agreement the 
place where the claimant may institute judicial or arbitral proceedings. 
246 OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2006] FCA 284 (Fed CA) at para 63 (per 
Evans JA):  
Section 46 is similar, but no identical, to Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules. For 
example, Article 21 permits a claimant to commence proceedings in a forum on the 
ground that the defendant has a place of business in the jurisdiction but, unlike 
section 46, only if that is the defendant’s principal place of business or, failing that, 
habitual residence. 
Note that the Hamburg Rules have been adopted under the Marine Liability Act, 2001, 
though they have not been proclaimed in force. Section 44 of the Act states: ‘The Minister 
shall, before January 1, 2005 and every five years afterwards, consider whether the Hague-
Visby Rules should be replaced by the Hamburg Rules and cause a report setting out the 
results of that consideration to be laid before each House of Parliament.’ Note too that, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 5, in situations where the Hamburg Rules apply to the contract 
of carriage, the cargo claimant will have the option to sue in any of the locations stipulated 
under Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules. 
247 OT Africa Line ibid at paras 26, 56 and 65; W Tetley ‘Jurisdiction and arbitration clauses 














It does not, however, prohibit the effect of jurisdiction clauses in all 
export and import situations, unlike the COGSA statutes of Australia and 
New Zealand (for jurisdiction clauses only),249 nor does it direct a court in 
Canada that it must exercise its jurisdiction once one of the enumerated 
connecting factors is present. It merely gives the litigant the choice to sue in 
Canada.250 
 
Parliament’s intent in enacting Section 46 of the Marine Liability Act, 
2001 was to provide a “long arm” statute allowing for Canadian litigation in 
particular circumstances, without the need for stay of proceedings 
applications.251 In other words, Section 46 was meant to override the Federal 
                                                                                                                           
Goods by Sea Committee of the U.S. Maritime Law Association, New York City, May 3, 
2006) at 2. Available at http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-admiralty/ [Accessed on 
1 February 2011]. 
248 OT Africa Line ibid at para 26. 
249 Tetley ‘Jurisdiction and arbitration clauses in carriage of goods’ supra note 247 at 16: 
It is interesting that the Nordic Countries [Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway ‒ 
all shipowning countries], Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and China have 
adopted more or less similar jurisdiction and arbitration provisions. The Canadian 
decisions in Magic Sportswear, in respect of sect 46(1), parallel the law as it is 
understood in those countries. 
250 Oland ‘Acceptance of jurisdiction’ supra note 232 at 7. 
251 Oland ‘The premature demise of section 46’ supra note 183 at 14-16. 
N Doyle ‘Marine Liability Act, second reading, Canadian parliamentary debates online, 
House Hansard, 37th Session’. Available at 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=37
&Ses=1&DocId=2332110#LINK198 [Accessed on 1 February 2011]: 
One change that sparked debate in committee was the provision of clause 46 that 
would extend Canada's legal jurisdiction to deal with the cargo claims of Canada's 
importers and exporters. Representatives of the shipping lines did not want 
Canadian jurisdiction specified, preferring instead to have clauses on arbitration and 
judicial proceedings in their contracts of carriage.  
 
Indeed a culture has grown up that sees most of these disputes resolved in British 
boardrooms and British courts. That suits the big shipping lines and the British legal 
profession just fine. However I would submit that a small Canadian exporter would 
be badly outclassed going up against the big boys in that kind of a setting, so we are 
supportive of asserting Canadian jurisdiction [emphasis added] 
According to Y Baatz in ‘An English jurisdiction clause does battle with Canadian legislation 
similar to the Hamburg Rules’ 2006 LMCLQ 143 at 145, ‘[t]he rationale for s 46 included 
giving Canadian importers and exporters the right to pursue cargo claims in Canada and an 














Court’s discretionary power under Section 50 of the Federal Courts 
Act252 to enforce foreign exclusive jurisdiction clauses and stay proceedings 
in cases where the claimant opted to commence action in Canada in 
accordance with this provision.253 
 
And yet, as Oland explains, it would appear that despite this clearly 
stated purpose and direction, a recent thread of Federal Court decisions254 
(rendered by Justices lacking maritime expertise according to the author) 
have watered down the effect of the protectionist provision and confused the 
situation by ‘tak[ing] us back to the old forum non-conveniens arguments and 
stay of proceedings applications that took up so much court time in prior 
cases,’255 in other words by incorrectly importing the law of forum non 




                                            
252 RSC 1985, c F-7. Section 50(1) of the Federal Courts Act reads as follows:  
The Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court may, in its discretion, stay 
proceedings in any cause or matter 
(a) on the ground that the claim is being proceeded with in another court or 
jurisdiction; or 
(b) where for any other reason it is in the interest of justice that the proceedings be 
stayed. 
253 ZI Pompey Industrie supra note 243 at paras 37 and 38: 
Section 46(1) of the Marine Liability Act, which entered into force on August 8, 2001, 
has the effect of removing from the Federal Court its discretion under s.50 of the 
Federal Court Act to stay proceedings because of a forum selection clause where 
the requirements of s.46 (1)(a), (b) or (c) are met…. Indeed, s.46 (1) would appear 
to establish that, in select circumstances, Parliament has deemed it appropriate to 
limit the scope of forum selection clauses by facilitating the litigation in Canada of 
claims related to the carriage of goods by water having a minimum level of 
connection with this country [emphasis added]. 
See also Incremona-Salerno Marmi Affini Siciliani snc v The Castor [2002] FCA 479 (Fed 
CA) at para 13; Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1977. 
254 Ford Aquitaine Industries SAS v The Canmar Pride [2005] FC 431 (Fed Ct);OT Africa 
Line supra note 246; Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd v Mazda Canada Inc (“The Cougar Ace”) [2008] 
FCA 219 (Fed CA). 














Indeed, in The Cougar Ace , the most recent case on topic 
delivered by the Federal Court of Appeal, Evans JA states: 
Subsection 46(1) merely gives Canadian litigants a chance to choose 
Canada initially, where heretofore they were automatically barred from 
doing so by the usual jurisdiction clauses employed in most shipping 
contracts. The wording of the legislation and the jurisprudence based on it 
make it clear that subsection 46(1) does not grant Canadian courts 
jurisdiction; it only allows Canadian courts, if chosen by the plaintiff 
pursuant to subsection 46(1), to consider whether Canada is the most 
appropriate forum employing the usual forum non conveniens factors 
[emphasis added].256 
 
In order to remedy this confusing state of affairs, he suggests 
rewriting Section 46 to make clear that where a claimant establishes one of 
the enumerated connecting factors, the court must exercise its statutory 
jurisdiction, and the foreign jurisdiction clause shall be declared null and void 
and of no effect. In the meantime, he expresses the hope that the next time 
the Federal Court has the occasion to re-interpret Section 46, it will do so 
correctly, that is to say in the way it was intended, by ‘mov[ing] away from 
the forum non conveniens catalogue of arguments.’257 Of course, this 
proposed legislative overhaul may do nothing more than continue to 
discourage international comity and encourage parallel proceedings, anti-suit 
injunctions and the non-recognition or enforcement of Canadian judgments 
in foreign forums.258 
                                            
256 The Cougar Ace supra note 254 at para 22. 
257 Oland ‘The premature demise of section 46’ supra note 183 at 11. 
258 One cannot help but wonder whether the Federal Court’s reluctance to overrule foreign 
exclusive jurisdiction clauses in cases such as OT Africa and The Cougar Ace intimates an 
attempt by the Court to remedy the international incongruence resulting from lack of comity 
given by foreign courts, in particular English ones, refusing to recognize protectionist 
provisions such as s 46 of the Marine Liability Act, 2001 in Canada and Section 11 of the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1991, in Australia, as they are deemed to go too far and 
discourage party autonomy in commercial contracts. See J Allsop in ‘International maritime 
arbitration: legal and policy issues’, Paper presented to World Maritime University Malmö 14 
May 2007 and to the Australian Maritime and Transport Arbitration Commission, Sydney 4 
December 2007 at 22. See eg Akai Pty Ltd [UK] supra note 217; OT Africa Line Ltd [UK] 














3.4 Domest ic  Discord in the Regulat ion and Enforcement of  
Jur isdict ion Clauses in the Uni ted States  
The United States has experienced an uneven history in its treatment of 
foreign jurisdiction clauses in contracts of carriage by sea.259 As the 
birthplace of the Harter Act, the first legislation to protect cargo interests by 
imposing minimum standards of conduct on carriers, it seems hardly 
surprising that ‘American hostility towards forum selection agreements was 
ubiquitous.’260 And yet, as Marcus explains: 
Admiralty courts from as early as the nineteenth century have enforced 
[jurisdiction] clauses in cases between aliens... as part of a doctrinal 
response to practical problems created by the intersection of a mobile 
litigant pool with an expansive jurisdictional grant.261 
 
Ever since 1967, and until 1995, most US admiralty courts have 
generally followed Judge Friendly’s ruling in the Indussa ,262 according to 
which choice of forum clauses contained in contracts of carriage are invalid 
and “of no effect” as contrary to Section 3(8) of the United States Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act.263 The learned Justice explained that:  
From a practical standpoint, to require an American plaintiff to assert his 
claim only in a distant court lessens the liability of the carrier quite 
                                                                                                                           
were granted in England to restrain proceedings in Australia (in Akai) and Canada (in OT 
Africa). 
259 M Sturley ‘Overruling Sky Reefer in the international arena: a preliminary assessment of 
forum selection and arbitration clauses in the new UNCITRAL transport law Convention’ 
(2006) 37 JMLC 1. See generally D Marcus ‘The perils of contract procedure: a revised 
history of forum selection clauses in the Federal Courts’ (2007-2008) 82 Tul LR 973; C 
Hooper ‘Choice of forum clauses and forum non conveniens’, 2006. Available at 
http://www.nsbs.org/librarydatabases [Accessed on 1 November 2010]; Tetley Marine cargo 
claims supra note 38 at 1935-58. 
260 PJ Borchers ‘Forum selection agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: a 
proposal for congressional reform’ (1992) 67 Wash L Rev 55 at 60.  
261 Marcus supra note 259 at 993-94. 
262 Indussa Corp v SS Ranborg 377 F 2d 200 (2d Cir 1967) (CA). 
263 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, Title 46 United States Code §1303(8): 
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or 
the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising 
from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties or obligations provided in this section, 
or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null 














substantially, particularly when the claim is small. Such a claim puts “a high 
hurdle” in the way of enforcing liability, and thus is an effective means for 
carriers to secure settlements lower than if cargo [owners] could sue in a 
convenient forum [citation omitted].264 
 
It is true that by its 1972 decision in The  Bremen ,265 the US 
Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction clauses ‘are prima facie valid and 
should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 
“unreasonable” under the circumstances.’266 But, that was a towing contract 
case, and as is commonly acknowledged, The Bremen ruling does not apply 
to cargo claims, that is to say to cases in which the US COGSA is 
applicable.267  
 
Then, the tides turned in the Sky Reefer ,268 when the Supreme 
Court overruled Indussa and held that in the absence of legislation 
specifically stipulating otherwise, foreign forum selection clauses are 
presumptively valid and enforceable.269 According to Judge Kennedy, the 
mere fact that the cargo claimant was American and the arbitration clause, 
Japanese was not enough to establish that the provision was unreasonable, 
                                            
264 Indussa supra note 262 at 203. 
265 The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co 407 US 1 (1972) (US Supreme Ct). 
266 Ibid at 10. 
267 Schoenbaum supra note 15 at 592; R Goldberg ‘Attempts to avoid foreign forum 
selection clauses post Vimar Seguros v M/V Sky Reefer’ in The Fourth International 
Conference on Maritime Law, Conference Papers, Session 6, October 24-26 2000, 
Shenzhen, China at 658. Contra Sparka supra note 42 at 128. The US COGSA apply ‘to all 
contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade 
[emphasis added]’(46 USC App § 1312) and according to Schoenbaum ibid ‘to contracts of 
carriage of goods between US ports if the parties expressly so stipulate in the bill of lading.’ 
268 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros SA v M/V Sky Reefer 515 US 528 (1995) (US Supreme 
Ct). 
269 In actual fact, the Sky Reefer case dealt with a foreign arbitration clause contained in a 
bill of lading, but because the Court declared ibid at 534 that ‘foreign arbitration clauses are 
but a subset of foreign forum selection clauses in general,’ this decision has consistently 
been upheld in cases involving forum selection clauses contained in bills of lading. See eg 
Mitsui & Co (USA) v M/V Mira 111 F 3d 33 (5th Cir 1997) (CA); Fireman’s Fund supra note 














and that it lessened or weakened the party’s ability to recover.270 
Furthermore, and most importantly, he found that COGSA 3(8) was never 
meant to be interpreted so as to apply to jurisdiction and arbitration clauses: 
The liability imposed on carriers under Cogsa §3 is defined by explicit 
standards of conduct, and it is designed to correct specific abuses by 
carriers…Nothing in [Section 3(8)] suggests that the statute prevents the 
parties from agreeing to enforce] substantive obligations, such as the 
obligation to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and 
properly man, equip, and supply the ship before and at the beginning of the 
voyage] in a particular forum. By its terms it establishes certain duties and 
obligations, separate and apart from the mechanisms for their enforcement 
[emphasis added].271 
Then, in a clear attempt to promote international comity and 
commercial practice, he went on to advise that:  
If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords 
and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts 
should be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such 
manner as to violate international agreements. That concern counsels 
against construing COGSA to nullify foreign arbitration clauses because of 
inconvenience to the plaintiff or insular distrust of the ability of foreign 
arbitrators to apply the law.272 
 
                                            
270 M/V Sky Reefer ibid at 536-37 and 540. 
271 M/V Sky Reefer ibid at 535. Judge Stevens, in his dissenting opinion at 543ff, reminds 
the Court that historically, jurisdiction clauses contained in bills of lading (which he calls 
contracts of adhesion) were one-sided clauses inserted by British shipowners to force 
shippers to settle disputes in London, in accordance with English law, which tended to 
uphold exemption of liability clauses. Eventually this imbalance led to the creation of the 
Harter Act, and COGSA 1936 thereafter. He then links the imbalance or unequal bargaining 
power to 3(8) Cogsa, citing precedent to support his position (including Indussa), and 
explains how forum clauses impose prohibitive costs on shippers, which in effect lessens or 
relieves the carrier’s liability. 
M Sturley ‘Proposed amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act’ (1996) 18 Hous J 
Int’l L 609 at 647:  
Although there is substantial support in COGSA’s legislative history for the view that 
subsection 3(8) was never intended to cover forum selection clauses, it is equally 
clear that the international convention does not require the enforcement of forum 
selection clauses. The delegates simply left the issue to national law. Some nations 
responded to this situation by enacting an explicit statute to prohibit forum selection 
clauses in bills of lading; other nations simply left the issue to be determined by 
general principles. Either course is consistent with the Hague Rules. 














Thus, as a result of this landmark decision, jurisdiction clauses in 
contracts of carriage are presumed valid and enforceable under US law, 
much like UK law, even if contained in boilerplate terms and conditions 
written on the back of bills of lading. And since the Sky Reefer, in many 
(though certainly not all)273 cargo claim disputes relating to foreign forum 
selection agreements, jurisdiction clauses have been upheld and motions to 
dismiss claims for improper venue274 have been granted.275  
 
This arguably one-sided outcome, bemoaned by American cargo 
advocates, influenced the US Maritime Law Association COGSA Committee 
in its crafting of draft provisions on jurisdiction, which formed part of the 
proposed amendments to COGSA, commonly referred to as COGSA 
1999.276  
 
For the most part, Section 7(i)(2) COGSA 1999277 mirrors the 
Hamburg Rules,278 in that it gives claimants to which COGSA apply279 the 
                                            
273 See eg Nippon Fire & Marine Ins Co v M/V Spring Wave 92 F Supp 2d 574 (EDLA 
2000). According to Tetley in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1948-49 and 1951: 
[T]he party challenging  the contractually agreed foreign venue has a heavy burden 
of proof to make in order to convince the American court not to enforce the clause 
because of its incompatibility with sect. 3(8) of U.S. COGSA (46 U.S.C. Appx. 
1303(8)). Although such efforts usually fail, they can still be successful on 
occasion.… One point is very clear in this regard, however: mere speculation that 
the foreign law as applied by the foreign court may reduce the carrier’s liability below 
what COGSA guarantees is inadequate; there must be proof positive that the foreign 
court, apply its law, will in fact lessen the carrier’s responsibility below the COGSA 
threshold. 
274 In accordance with Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2009. 
275 See eg B Brogen et al (eds) ‘Forum selection clause survey 2007-2008’ (2008) 33 Tul 
Mar LJ 661. In this survey alone, most forum selection agreement disputes were resolved in 
favour of enforcing the jurisdiction clauses. 
276 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1999, 106th Cong, 1999 - not in force. 
277 Section 7(i)(2) COGSA 1999 reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding a provision in a contract of carriage or other agreement to which 
this subsection applies that specifies a foreign forum for litigation or arbitration of a 
dispute to which this Act applies, a party to the contract or agreement, at its option, 
may commence such litigation or arbitration in any appropriate forum in the United 














option to commence suit in a number of appropriate and reasonable 
American locations, notwithstanding any foreign forum provision contained in 
the contract of carriage. Of course, nothing precludes parties from agreeing 
to resolve their dispute by litigation in a foreign forum if such agreement is 
executed after the claim has arisen.280  
 
Thus, it seems that this protective legislation may signal the way 
ahead for the United States. But, as Bursanescu explains, though the 
COGSA 1999 amendment proposal was adopted by the MLA in 1996, it has 
yet to receive universal support in American maritime industry.281 She adds 
that ‘even in legal circles, the project has received lukewarm reception both 
from US professionals and foreign ones.’282 In any case, this domestic bill 
has been put on hold, while the world shifts its focus towards the highly 
                                                                                                                           
A. The port of loading or the port of discharge is, or was intended to be, in 
the United States.  
B. The place where the goods are received by a carrier or the place where 
the goods are delivered to a person authorized to receive them is, or was 
intended to be, in the United States. 
C. The principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habitual 
residence of the defendant is in the United States.  
D. The place where the contract was made is in the United States.  
E. A forum specified for litigation or arbitration under a provision in the contract of 
carriage or other agreement is in the United States [emphasis added]. 
278 One noted difference is that whereas the Hamburg Rules apply “tackle to tackle”, the 
Cogsa 1999 apply “door to door” (to include circumstances of multimodal transport), which 
is also true of the Rotterdam Rules. This broadens the scope of optional jurisdictions to 
commence suit to include a place (versus merely a port) of receipt and delivery. 
279 As mentioned, US COGSA apply to all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from 
ports of the United States in foreign trade. 
280 Section 7(i)(3) COGSA 1999. 
281 Supra note 47 at 14. W Tetley ‘Professor Tetley's comments on Senate COGSA '99 
(sixth US Senate Staff Working Draft Bill of September 24, 1999)’ 1 February 2001. 
Available at http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-admiralty/tetley-cogsa [Accessed on 
1 February 2011]: 
[Cogsa 99 was] [p]repared by the MLA Committee on the Carriage of Goods … and 
approved at the AGM of the US MLA in New York on May 3, 1996. [It was then] 
presented by the MLA to the US Senate…The original Senate COGSA was 
subsequently amended several times by the US MLA, working in consultation with 
the staff of the US Senate. "Senate COGSA 1999" … is the sixth re-write by the 
Senate staff of the draft Carriage of Goods by Sea Bill, dated September 24, 1999.  














anticipated Rotterdam Rules, which have to date been signed by the United 
States and 22 other nations. 
3.5 France’s Protect ion Against  Unequal  Bargain ing Power 
and the “Specia l  Acceptance” of  Jur isdict ion Clauses by 
Third Part ies  
Bonassies and Scapel acknowledge that even though the uniform rules 
under the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules apply to all international contracts 
of carriage subject to the conventions alike, French courts tend to treat 
carriers much more harshly under the Rules than their English counterparts, 
which might explain a carrier’s incentive to send claims arising under the 
contract of carriage elsewhere.283 
 
In French cargo claims to which the European Jurisdiction Regulation 
does not apply,284 French internal law will govern the regulation and 
enforcement of jurisdiction clauses or “clauses attributive de jurisdiction” 
contained in contracts of carriage. Under the French law, and other civil law 
jurisdictions such as Germany, a court does not exercise judicial discretion 
to stay or dismiss proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens or 
breach of a jurisdiction clause. 285 Rather, a French court either has 
compétence (ie jurisdiction) under the codified rule or not.  
 
As is the case under the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules, neither the 
domestic Law of June 18, 1966 nor article 54 of the Decree of 
December 31, 1966, both of which comprise French rules on jurisdiction 
                                            
283 Supra note 99 at 794 para 1152. 
284 For example, where neither party to the contract is domiciled in a Member State, or 
where both parties to the contract are domiciled in France ‘even if there is an international 
element to the contract’ (Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1983). See Chapter 4. 
285 According to Sparka supra note 42 at 138, ‘even though introduction of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine or similar discretionary rules has occasionally been suggested [in 














applicable to contracts of carriage, expressly prohibit the use of foreign 
jurisdiction clauses. In the absence of specific rules, the common law rules 
(including rules of civil procedure) govern the validity and enforceability of 
jurisdiction clauses.286 
 
The general rule under French civil procedure is that a jurisdiction 
clause which infringes upon the territorial jurisdiction of French courts287 is 
deemed unwritten, with the exception that ‘a [foreign] jurisdiction clause 
validly agreed upon by two commerçants (merchants) will be recognized by 
a court which has jurisdiction to hear the case, in which case the [French] 
court will declare itself incompétente (without jurisdiction).’288 This rule is 
codified at Article 48 of France’s Nouveau code de procédure civi le 
(NCPC),289 which stipulates that: 
Any clause that infringes upon the rules of territorial jurisdiction, whether 
directly or indirectly, is deemed unwritten, unless the clause has been 
agreed upon by parties acting in a commercial capacity and has been 
clearly specified in the agreement (translation)[emphasis added]. 
 
Since contracts of carriage are typically concluded between 
commercial parties, issues of enforceability under French law generally 
                                            
286 Bonassies and Scapel supra note 99 at 794-95 para 1153. 
287 “Competent” territorial jurisdictions under French law include French courts located in 
any one of the following forums:  
(a) French port of loading or discharge (article 54 of the Decree of December 31, 
1966);  
(b) defendant’s domicile (article 42 NCPC); and 
(c) wherever merchandise is delivered (article 46 NCPC).  
See generally Bonassies and Scapel ibid at 790-92. 
288 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1978. 
289 The New Code of Civil Procedure (translation) established by Decree No 75-1123 of 














hinge on concerns over the formal or substantive validity of jurisdiction 
clauses contained in bills of lading or other transport documents.290 
 
Issues of form are pretty standard (as discussed in Chapter 2) and no 
longer present a particular issue under French law, especially now that the 
law conforms with internationally recognized customs and practice of 
maritime law,291 which undoubtedly has a lot to do with the influence of 
European law,292 and the fact that the Cour de Cassation has now decided 
that the requirements of Article 48 NCPC no longer apply to international 
contracts, including bills of lading.293  
 
The real issue under French law centres on substantive validity, that 
is to say the quality of consent and acceptance of jurisdiction agreements by 
shippers and, in particular, third party consignees or transferees of bills of 
lading. 
 
In France, the rule used to be relatively straightforward: once the 
shipper signed the bill of lading, it bound not only itself, but also the third 
party consignee or transferee to all rights and obligations arising under the 
bill, which included any stipulation restricting jurisdiction.294 That is no longer 
                                            
290 See generally M Remond-Gouilloud ‘Des clauses de connaissements maritimes 
attribuant compétence à une juridiction étrangère: essai de démystification’ (1995) 549 DMF 
339. 
291 Bonassies and Scapel supra note 99 at 796-97. Case in point, boilerplate clauses on the 
back of bills are no longer invalid simply because they are in small print. 
292 Remond-Gouilloud supra note 290 at 344-45.  
293 Cour de Cassation, 17 December, 1985 (1986) Revue critique de droit privé 537, note H 
Gaudemet-Tallon (re international contracts generally); Cour de Cassation, 25 November, 
1986 (1987) DMF 706 (re international bills of lading). See also Bonassies and Scapel supra 
note 99 at 797; Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1980. 
294 Bonassies and Scapel ibid at para 1157; Tetley ibid at 1986:  
It used to be held in France that the shipper, in concluding the bill of lading with the 














the case as a result of the decision rendered by the Cour de Cassation in 
The Nagasaki .295 Today, a jurisdiction clause will be enforceable against a 
shipper (but only a shipper) if accepted by that shipper no later than when 
the contract of carriage is concluded.296 In terms of enforceability against 
third parties, however, it is an altogether different story.297 
 
Under the English common law, and European Law,298 a third party 
holder of a bill of lading (whether consignee or transferee) continues to be 
vested in all the same rights and subject to all the same obligations as the 
shipper under the contract of carriage, including the forum selection clause, 
as soon as property in the goods passes or transfers to the third party, 
despite there being no privity of contract between carrier and third party, and 
despite the lack of express consent and acceptance of contractual terms. 
But under French law, the courts’ position vis-à-vis the enforceability of 
jurisdiction clauses against third parties is far more nuanced and 
uncertain.299 
 
                                                                                                                           
the latter was, or was deemed to be, bound by the terms of the bill, including the 
jurisdiction clause. 
295 (1995) DMF 209, Court de Cassation, 29 November 1994, note P Bonassies.  
296 Bonassies and Scapel supra note 99 at para 1158. Note that by the Decree of 12 
November 1987, the signature of a shipper is no longer required (which brings the French 
law in line with international commercially accepted practice).  
297 See generally E Du Pontavice ‘Sur la clause attributive de juridiction d’un connaissement 
venu de Chine’ (1994) 544 DMF 739; Y Tassel ‘La forme en laquelle doit être convenue, en 
matière internationale, une clause attributive de juridiction et la liberté d’interprétation des 
juges du fond s’agissant d’une clause rédigée en une langue étrangère’ (1995) 548 DMF 
289; Remond-Gouilloud supra note 290; Bonassies and Scapel ibid at 798-805; Tetley 
Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1986-87. 
298 See eg The Tilly Russ [1984] ECR I-2417, Case C-71/83; Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni 
Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA [1999] ECR I-1597, Case C-159/97. 
299 Note that this is not true in Germany, where, according to Sparka supra note 42 at 177, 
‘it is commonly held that a consignee is bound by a jurisdiction agreement contained in a bill 
of lading when he accepts the goods. That said ‘[a]greements between the carrier and 














The Commercial Court of the Cour de Cassation in The Nagasaki 
distinguished acceptance of consignees and transferees from that of 
shippers, holding that in order to be enforceable against third parties, 
jurisdiction clauses need to be expressly accepted by them no later than 
when they take delivery of the cargo, whereby adhering to the contract of 
carriage.300 A year later, in The Chang Ping ,301 the Court elaborated on its 
position in The Nagasaki by stating that the mere possession of the bill of 
lading did not in and of itself constitute proof of acceptance. And then again, 
in 1998, in the case The Silver Sky ,302 the Court further held that 
“accomplishment” of the bill (in other words presentation of the bill to the 
carrier in exchange for delivery of goods) also did not suffice to constitute the 
“special acceptance” required.303 Thus, it seemed settled that under French 
law, jurisdiction clauses required some form of “special acceptance” to be 
determined ‘by a case-by-case analysis of the facts in each suit,’ in order to 
be enforceable against third parties, whether consignee, transferee of 
subrogated insurer.304 
 
But then, in 2001, the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation in 
The Bonastar II305 adopted a different view, ruling that foreign jurisdiction 
clauses did in fact form part of the “economy” of international contracts of 
                                            
300 Supra note 295. Tetley explains in Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1987 that 
‘because [jurisdiction clauses] are “derogatory” of the general civil law and not an integral 
part of the “economy” of the contract of carriage, [they] must be expressly accepted by the 
consignee or endorsee’ to be enforceable.  
301 (1996) DMF 393, Cour de Cassation, 16 January 1996, note P Bonassies. 
302 (1999) DMF 1007, Cour de Cassation, 8 December 1998, note P Nicolas. 
303 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1987. 
304 Ibid; Bonassies and Scapel supra note 99 at 801 para 1162. 














carriage, and were ipso facto binding on third parties306 upon delivery of the 
goods, without the requirement of a “special acceptance”.307 
 
 Since The Bonastar II, the Commercial Chamber of the Court de 
Cassation has reiterated its position in The Nagasaki, on more than one 
occasion.308 Meanwhile other French courts have applied The Bonastar II 
doctrine.309 Thus, as it stands, it appears that in cases where the French 
internal law applies, the High court’s opinion regarding the enforceability of 
jurisdiction clauses against third parties remains somewhat unclear. From a 
carrier standpoint, it is perhaps advisable to insist, where possible, that 
shippers, or other parties negotiating with consignees or transferees of bills 
of lading, bring jurisdiction clauses contained in carriage contracxt to their 
particular attention upon concluding contracts for the sale of goods or shortly 
thereafter, so as to minimize the risk of unenforceable foreign jurisdiction 
clauses down the road.  
3.6 Nordic Countr ies ’  Hamburg Hybr id of  L imi ted Appl icat ion 
As is the case under the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules, the old Nordic 
Maritime Codes made no mention of jurisdiction or arbitration clauses.310 But 
                                            
306 In The Bonastar II ibid, it was the consignee’s subrogated insurer who brought the claim 
against carrier as third party to the claim.  
307 For criticism on the First Civil Chamber’s position, see Bonassies and Scapel supra note 
99 at 800-801 para 1162. 
308 The Apt Mariner 2003 DMF 41, Cour de Cassation, 25 June 2002, note Ph Delebecque; 
The Jerba (2005) DMF 133, Cour de Cassation, 7 December 2004, note JP Remery. 
309 See eg The M/V Johnny (2006) DMF 1, Cour de Rouen, 23 June 2005, note Ph 
Delebecque cited in Bonassies and Scapel supra note 99 at 801 footnote 111. 
310 Note that though the Nordic countries are party to the Hague/Visby Rules, and though 
the new Nordic Codes (updated in 1994) adhere to those Rules, A Philip explains in ‘Scope 
of application, choice of law and jurisdiction in the new Nordic law of carriage of goods by 
sea’ in G Melander (ed) Modern issues in European law: Nordic perspectives: essays in 
honour of Lennart Palsson (1997) 173, that ‘the provisions in the Codes on carriage of 
general cargo are strongly influenced by the Hamburg Rules,’ as are the rules on choice of 
law and jurisdiction. Iceland has not participated in the new legislative initiative, and retains 














in time, provisions corresponding to Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules were 
introduced into the new Nordic Maritime Codes, revised in 1994,311 which 
have restricted commercial parties’ freedom of contract by providing cargo 
claimants with “options” for suit, and arguably, have made ‘[t]he regulation 
concerning jurisdiction clauses … very complicated.’312 
 
The provision on jurisdiction can be found at Chapter 13, Section 
60 of the Swedish/Finnish Marit ime Code, and Section 310 of the 
Norwegian/Danish Marit ime Code.313 As is the case under Article 21 of 
                                            
311 W Tetley ‘The Demise of the Demise Clause?’ (1999) 44 McGill LJ 807 at 845 footnote 
193:  
The structure of the Finnish and Swedish versions of the Code are identical, with the 
provisions divided into chapters and sections. The carriage of goods by sea is 
treated in Chapter 13, ss 1-61. The Danish and Norwegian versions of the Code are 
identical, with the provisions divided into sections. The carriage of goods by sea is 
treated at ss 251-311 inclusive. 
Despite the difference in numbering, the Codes are essentially the same in substance, and 
may be referred to collectively as the “Nordic Maritime Code.”  
312 I Kuusniemi ‘Nordic maritime codes’, Neptun Juridica, 22 September, 1994. Available at 
http://www.neptunjuridica.com/arc_nmc.html [Accessed on 1 February 2011]. 
313 Section 60 of the Swedish/Finnish Maritime Code and Section 310 of the 
Norwegian/Danish Maritime Code read as follows: 
Any agreement in advance which limits the right of the plaintiff to have a 
legal dispute relating to the carriage of general cargo according to the 
present Chapter settled by legal proceedings, is invalid in so far as it limits 
the right of the plaintiff at his own discretion to bring an action before the 
Court at the place where: 
a) the defendant’s principal place of business is situated, or 
place of residence if the defendant has no principal place of 
business; 
b) the contract of carriage was concluded, provided the 
defendant has a place of business or an agent there 
through whom the contract was concluded: 
c) the place of receipt for carriage according to the contract of 
carriage is situated; or 
d) the agreed or actual place of delivery according to the 
contract of carriage is situated. The provisions in paragraph 
one does not prevent an action from being brought before 
the Court of the place designated in the contract of carriage 
with a view to legal proceedings. After a dispute has arisen, 
the parties may agree on how to settle it. 
If a bill of lading is issued pursuant to a charter party which contains a 














the Hamburg Rules, claimants are given the option to commence suit in any 
one of a number of locations.314 However, unlike the Hamburg Rules, which 
clearly prioritize cargo interests, the practical application of this provision is 
much more restricted and uncertain. According to Philip, this protectionist 
provision is ‘of limited interest’ for a number of important reasons: 
• It does not apply unless the agreed port of loading or the agreed or actual port 
of discharge is in one of the Nordic countries; 
• It does not apply if it would be contrary to the [Brussels] Convention or, with 
respect to Sweden, Finland and Norway, to the Lugano Convention [in other 
words, these Conventions trump national legislation]; 
• It applies only if the defendant is a shipowner or cargo owner living outside [EU 
or EFTA] countries and jurisdiction has not been conferred upon a court in one 
of [those countries]. In such cases it makes it possible for a Nordic cargo owner 
who receives cargo in a Nordic port or ships cargo from such a port to sue the 
shipowner there, even if the transport document contains a jurisdiction clause; 
• [It] only applies to the carriage of general cargo; and 
• If carriage is governed by a charterparty which contains jurisdiction clauses and 
bills of lading are issued and sold, [this section only] applies if the purchaser 
does not know nor ought to know the charterparty and the bill of lading contains 
no express incorporation of the jurisdiction clause.315 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
arbitration, but the bill of lading does not expressly state that the provision is 
binding on the holder of the bill of lading, the carrier cannot invoke the 
provision against a holder of the bill of lading who has acquired it in good 
faith. 
 
In this Kingdom an action concerning a contract for the carriage of general 
cargo in trade between two States can in any case be brought at the place 
or at one of the places to which the case has such a nexus as mentioned in 
paragraph one or at another place in this Kingdom agreed on by the parties. 
 
The provisions of paragraphs one and four do not apply if neither the 
agreed place of delivery nor the agreed or actual place of delivery … is 
located in Norway, Denmark, Finland or Sweden, or if the Lugano 
Convention of 2007 provides otherwise. The provisions of this Section do 
not preclude that decisions on provisional or protective measures are made 
in this Kingdom.  
Note that an English translation of the Norwegian Maritime Code is available at 
www.lovdata.no/info/lawdata.html.  
314 Note, however, that after a dispute has arisen, under both the Nordic Maritime Code and 
Hamburg Rules, parties are free to restrict jurisdiction by agreement, and bring suit in a 
jurisdiction of their mutual choice (Philip supra note 310 at 178.) 














3.7 China’s Rule on Reciproci ty  L imi t ing Party Autonomy 
According to Kong and Minfei, 'the principle of party autonomy gives parties 
the right to choose which court exercises jurisdiction over disputes between 
them. Both Chinese law and practice acknowledge this autonomy as a 
general rule.’316 In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), forum selection 
agreements (sometimes referred to as “agreed selection jurisdiction” in 
English)317 are regulated by Article 244 of the new Civil  Procedure Law 
(CPL).318 From this provision, one gleans that forum selection agreements 
between parties to a dispute are enforceable under the CPL where they 
pertain to foreign contracts or foreign property rights and interests; both 
parties agree to resolve their dispute in a particular forum, and this 
agreement is made in writing; and the court selected is a place with an 
actual connection to the dispute. 
 
 Whereas the old law of civil procedure in the PRC apparently 
permitted foreign parties to conclude such forum selection agreements in 
cases involving a dispute over “economic relations, trade, transportation and 
maritime matters”, the new law of 1991 now restricts such agreements to 
                                            
316 Q Kong et al ‘The Chinese practice of private international law’ (2002) 3(2) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law Section C (page number unknown). Available at 
http://mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/issues/issue-archive/volume-3-2 [Accessed on 1 February 
2011]. 
317 See H Du ‘An overview of choice of jurisdiction and law of foreign-related cases in China’ 
(2009) 4(4) Journal of Cambridge Studies 72 at 77. 
318 Article 244 of the PRC’s CPL reads as follows: 
Parties to a dispute over a contract involving a foreign element or over property 
rights and interests involving a foreign element may, through written agreement, 
choose the court of the place which has [an actual] connection with the dispute to 
exercise jurisdiction. If a People's Court of the People's Republic of China is chosen 
to exercise jurisdiction, the provisions of this Law on jurisdiction by forum level and 
on exclusive jurisdiction shall not be violated. 
English Translation of Article 244 provided in P Murray ‘China: an emerging jurisdiction’ in M 
Davies (ed) Jurisdiction and forum selection in international maritime law: essays in honor of 
















disputes involving foreign contracts or property rights, which includes 
maritime contract disputes,319 but is unlikely to include maritime torts.320 
 
 Furthermore, the CPL does not define “actual connection” in the 
context of forum selection agreements, leaving it to the courts to determine. 
Tang does, however, offer the following clarification: 
[T]o satisfy the “actual connection” requirement, a valid PRC or foreign 
forum choice may include a place where either the plaintiff or the defendant 
is domiciled or incorporated, or has a regular place of abode, or where the 
contract is signed or performed … or where the subject matter of the action 
is located, or where either the plaintiff or the defendant has a business 
establishment or office.321 
 
 Tetley suggests that the word “court” in the first sentence of Article 
244 may actually be referring to a court of the People’s Republic of China 
having a real connection to the case, and not a foreign court. That said, he 
argues that ‘the article does not expressly preclude selection of a foreign 
forum.’322 But Wang takes a different stance: 
[T]he Civil Procedure Law contains no article that authorizes parties to a 
dispute, domestic or foreign-related, to select a non-Chinese forum for 
litigation. Nor has the Supreme Court issued any Opinions or Interpretations 
to elucidate the matter. The very silence of the law on this subject may 
tempt parties to include a contractual dispute resolution clause agreeing to 
litigation in a non-Chinese court of law. Unfortunately, … in the absence of 
an explicit provision legitimizing such a selection, a Chinese court will likely 
find the clause invalid and simply look to the relevant sections of the Civil 
Procedure Law to assess its potential jurisdiction. 
… 
In the final analysis, unless enforcement is to take place entirely outside of 
China, drafting a dispute resolution clause explicitly calling for litigation in a 
non-Chinese forum will ultimately prove to be a fruitless and frustrating 
exercise [emphasis added].323 
                                            
319 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1918 footnote 40. 
320 Z Tang ‘Maritime jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China: legal framework, recent 
developments, and future prospects’ (1994) 25(2) JMLC 251 at 273. 
321 Ibid at 274.  
322 Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1918 footnote 40. 














 Another important factor that maritime courts of the PRC will take into 
account in deciding whether to enforce a foreign jurisdiction clause 
contained in a carriage contract is whether there is reciprocity between 
China and the foreign nation concerned, that is to say only ‘where the 
foreign jurisdiction concerned recognizes Chinese (PRC) jurisdiction clauses 
in bills of lading.’324 In the absence of such reciprocity, foreign jurisdiction 
clauses will simply not be enforced. 
 
 Thus, it would seem that courts of the PRC are reluctant to enforce 
foreign forum selection clauses.325 That said it does not seem to be 
altogether out of the question. For instance, in 1996, the Higher People’s 
Court of Fujian Province overruled a decision rendered by the lower Maritime 
Court of Xiamen and held that a Hong Kong jurisdiction clause contained in 
the freight payment agreement had the effect of excluding jurisdiction of any 
courts other than the agreed upon court, that is to say, the Hong Kong High 
Court.326  
 
 Wang warns parties against litigating in China. He says that 
‘[a]lthough the government has taken measures to address issues, 
inefficiency, corruption and local protectionism continue to plague China’s 
court system.’327 On the contrary, Murray says that because of the low cost 
of litigation in China and its increasingly proficient and professional maritime 
                                                                                                                           
when drafting a contractual dispute resolution clause’ (2009) 29 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 309 at 323. 
324 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1918 footnote 40. 
325 Tang supra note 320 at 274: ‘Forum selection clauses in bills of lading have proven to be 
the most vulnerable to jurisdictional attacks.’ The same is not true of the treatment of foreign 
arbitration agreements in the PRC. According to Tetley ibid, article 257 CPL, which 
regulates foreign arbitration clauses, is far more liberal. 
326 Supreme People’s Court, Selected Cases of People’s Courts (1996) 2015-19 (Higher 
People’s Court of Fujian Province, 1994) in Kong supra note 316. 














bench and bar, parties should in fact consider litigating cargo claims in 
China, and think twice before fighting to avoid its provisions in favour of 
litigating elsewhere.328 
3.8 Conclusion 
In the absence of a harmonized approach to the treatment of jurisdiction 
clauses contained in international maritime carriage contracts, it is not 
surprising that their regulation under national law and judicial interference 
with commercial parties’ freedom of contract varies, at times significantly, 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
 
 Australia and New Zealand are categorical: they simply refuse to 
enforce forum clauses in carriage contracts that restrict their jurisdiction. 
That is also the case in South Africa, but only where the cargo claimant 
carries on business in the Republic, or the claimant is a named consignee or 
third party holder of a contract for the carriage of goods to a destination in 
the Republic.  
 
 In England, on the other hand, commercial freedom prevails. A 
jurisdiction agreement is presumptively valid and enforced unless a party 
resisting the clause, guided by the Eleftheria principles, shows strong cause 
why it should nevertheless not take effect.  
 
 In Canada, claimants are given the option to sue in the jurisdiction 
where the port or intended port of loading or discharge is in Canada, the 
defendant resides or has a place of business in Canada, or the contract is 
made in Canada. But because recent Federal Court of Appeal decisions 
                                            
328 Murray supra note 318 at 130-32. Concur J Allsop ‘Maritime law - the nature and 














rendered by judges without a maritime background have watered down the 
effect of this protectionist provision by importing the discretionary doctrine of 
forum non conveniens into their analysis, the state of the law is now unclear.  
 
 The current position in the United States is that in the absence of 
legislation specifically stipulating otherwise, foreign jurisdiction clauses are 
presumptively valid and enforceable, and in many (but not all) cargo claims 
relating to these agreements, jurisdiction clauses have been upheld and 
claims have been dismissed for improper venue. Displeased pro-cargo 
lobbyists of the US MLA have reacted by including jurisdiction provisions 
similar to those of the Hamburg Rules in their proposed draft of the COGSA 
1999. But these provisions have not received universal support in the 
American maritime industry.  
 
 Jurisdiction clauses restricting French jurisdiction are deemed 
unwritten unless they are agreed upon by parties acting in a commercial 
capacity and specified in the agreement. The French are particularly 
concerned with protecting third-party cargo interests and have at times 
required express agreement on their part before allowing a jurisdiction 
agreement to take effect.  
 
 The jurisdiction provisions under the Nordic Codes are similar to 
those of the Hamburg Rules, in that they give claimants the option to 
commence suit in any one of a number of locations. However, unlike the 
Hamburg Rules, which clearly prioritize cargo interests, the application of the 
Nordic jurisdiction rule is much more restricted and uncertain. For example, it 
only applies where the port of loading or discharge is located in one of the 
Nordic countries, if it does not conflict with the Lugano Convention or EC 














in the PRC, though the law does not specifically prohibit foreign jurisdiction 
agreements, it does not allow them either. Furthermore, there must be a 
reciprocity agreement between the PRC and the foreign jurisdiction 
concerned for the forum clause to take effect; that is to say, the foreign 
jurisdiction must recognize PRC jurisdiction clauses in its bills of lading 
before China will be willing to reciprocate. Historically the PRC has not 
enforced these restrictive clauses, which send cargo claims elsewhere. 
 
In all nations except England, it seems that legislatures aim to 
give importers/exporters and/or third party interests who have not 
consented to jurisdiction agreements the option to pursue cargo 
claims in their jurisdiction notwithstanding the foreign forum clause 
where there is a real link to the jurisdiction, which is interpreted quite 
differently from nation to nation. They also seek to develop their own 
body of maritime law, and fight back against the monopoly of the 
(predominantly) English courts, typically selected as the forum of 
choice for cargo claims in standard form bills of lading.  
 
The English and American courts favour holding parties to their 
agreement, and will only disturb party autonomy in extreme cases. 
The cargo-friendly French are preoccupied with third party interests, 
and tend not to enforce clauses without clear and formal consent of 
the “weaker bargaining power”. The treatment of foreign jurisdiction 
clauses in Canadian, Chinese and Nordic courts is highly incoherent 
and unpredictable, mostly as a result of poorly drafted or incomplete 
protective provisions, which only confuse matters. 
 
This incongruous treatment of foreign jurisdiction clauses is 














parties to engage in offensive forum shopping tactics, and commence 
parallel proceedings leading to conflicts of jurisdiction problems, which is not 
a cost-effective and efficient means of resolving commercial disputes. 
Europe, meanwhile, has made great headway with its regional 
harmonization of rules on jurisdiction, in the form of the EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation, which combines procedural and substantive rules, and is 














CHAPTER 4: EUROPEAN REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF JURISDICTION CLAUSES 
The EC Jurisdiction Regulation, which contains substantive rules on 
jurisdiction and forum selection agreements, and procedural rules to deal 
with problems of conflicts of jurisdiction, provides a pre-eminent example of 
the supranational harmonization of rules on jurisdiction. It replaces the 
Brussels Convention 1968329 and applies to all proceedings commenced on 
or after March 1, 2002 that are brought before any court of a European 
Union Member State.330 The Regulation does not require implementing 
national legislation to come into force, as ‘it is automatically part of national 
law in each Member State.’331 
 
                                            
329 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters of 27 September 1968. 
330 There are currently 27 Member States of the European Union (Source: The official 
website of the European Union, available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-
countries/index_en.htm) [Accessed on 1 February 2011]. Note that until recently, Denmark 
continued to apply the Brussels Convention but on 19 October 2005, it entered into a 
separate agreement with the European Community extending the application of the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation to it (Agreement between the European Community and the 
Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters). Thus, as of 1 July 2007 (date the agreement between EC and 
Denmark entered into force), the Regulation now applies to all cases between all Member 
States of the European Union commenced after March 1, 2002, and the Brussels 
Convention only applies to old cases before March 1, 2002 (Sparka supra note 42 at 25). 
Note too that Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (members of the European Free Trade 
Association, but not the European Community) apply the Lugano Convention, 2007 (with the 
exception of Iceland, which continues to apply the older Lugano Convention of 1988 since it 
has yet to ratify the newer Convention as of the date of submission of this dissertation). That 
said, according to Honka supra note 50 at 268, ‘[t]he substance in Regulation 44/2001, the 
Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention[s] is largely the same, but not to some 
details.’ The following analysis deals solely with rules under the EC Jurisdiction Regulation. 
For more on the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, see Jackson supra note 49 at 102-05 
and Chapter 8; Briggs The conflict of laws supra note 49 at 56-58. 














Baatz sheds some light on the main aim of the EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation, which applies to both “civil and commercial matters,”332 including 
cargo claims:333  
The EC Jurisdiction Regulation seeks to determine the international 
jurisdiction of the courts of the EC Member States so that all Member 
States are bound by the same rules and will therefore recognize and 
enforce each other’s judgments speedily. It provides for certain and 
predictable rules with very little discretion [emphasis added].334 
Recital 2 in the Preamble to the Regulation further clarifies that: 
Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and 
recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal 
market. Provisions to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters and to simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and 
simple recognition and enforcement of judgments from Member States 
bound by this Regulation are essential [emphasis added]. 
 
Thus, the EC Jurisdiction Regulation has been enacted in an effort to 
promote the sound operation of the internal European market, which it seeks 
to facilitate through a harmonized system of rules governing conflicts of 
jurisdiction (in civil and commercial matters) that strive to be straightforward 
and easy to apply, certain and predictable (hence the limited discretion), and 
encourage rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments 
amongst Member States.  
 
Recitals 16 and 17 to the Preamble of the Regulation intimate that this 
system of uniform rules is based on the principle of “mutual trust”, which 
implies that no one contracting State is in a better position to rule on issues 
of jurisdiction (including the validity of jurisdiction clauses), and therefore it is 
not open to the courts of other contracting States to call into question, review 
                                            
332 Per Article 1 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation. 
333 Honka supra note 50 at 268. That is not true of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 
(the ‘Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 30 June 2005’), which does not apply to 
disputes over the carriage of goods by virtue of Article 2(2)(f) of the Convention. 














or ignore a decision rendered by a European court seized with such a 
dispute on preliminary issues.335  
 
Whether this system of uniform rules achieves these stated purposes 
with satisfactory results, in particular in terms of regulating jurisdiction 
agreements, is open for debate. Baatz says that ‘the application of the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation among EC Member States has not been all plain 
sailing’336 and has sometimes led to complex, protracted and costly litigation 
over preliminary issues.337 The European Commission reports that though 
generally speaking, ‘the Regulation is considered to be a highly successful 
instrument, which has facilitated cross-border litigation through an efficient 
system of judicial cooperation based on comprehensive jurisdiction rules, 
coordination of parallel proceedings, and circulation of judgments,’338 there is 
room for improvement in the functioning of the Regulation.339 The following 
                                            
335 Turner v Grovit supra note 150 at paras 24 and 25: 
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the Convention [and by extension the 
Regulation] is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to 
one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has 
enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts 
within the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the 
waiver by those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments  
 
It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that, within the scope of the Convention, 
the rules on jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the 
Contracting States, may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each 
of them [case citation omitted].  
336 Baatz ‘Jurisdiction and arbitration’ supra note 78 at 276. 
337 Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 11. 
338 Commission of the European Communities ‘Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee of 21 
April 2009 on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’ at 3. Available at 
http://www.ipex.eu/ipex/cms/home/Documents/doc_COM20090174FIN [Accessed on 1 
February 2011]. See also Green Paper accompanying Commission’s Report. Available at 
http://www.ipex.eu/ipex/cms/home/Documents/doc_COM20090175FIN. See also Green 
















analysis provides an overview of the rules relating to jurisdiction agreements 
and resolving conflicts of jurisdiction under the EC Jurisdiction Regulation, 
and follows with a brief criticism on some of their shortcomings. 
4.1 Rules on Jur isdict ion Clauses under the EC Jur isdict ion 
Regulat ion  
In accordance with the basic rule, stated at Article 2 of the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation, defendants domiciled in a Member State340 
shall, regardless of their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member 
State, unless of course one of the special subject-matter regimes,341 specific 
exceptions,342 or other provisions343 applies. The claimant, on the other 
hand, need not be domiciled in a Member State for the EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation to take effect.344  
                                            
340 Mandaraka-Sheppard explains supra note 46 at 200 that ‘[t]he domicile of an individual is 
to be determined at the time the proceedings are issued by the law of the Member State 
whose court is seised of the matter.’  
Jackson supra note 49 at 179:  
[N]either in the Convention nor Regulation is there a Community concept of domicile 
of an individual. The internal law of the forum is to determine whether an individual 
is domiciled in the forum, and the law of any other State to determine if there is a 
domicile there. National laws may not be at one as to the concept or any one law 
may provide for domicile in more than one state. In such circumstances the plaintiff 
would have a choice [emphasis added]. 
In accordance with Article 60(1) of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation, ‘a company or other legal 
person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its: 
(a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or (c) principal place of business’ [emphasis 
added]. See generally Jackson ibid at 147-51. 
341 Relating to insurance, consumer or individual employment contracts. 
342 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 200: 
The Regulation is not limited to claims against defendants domiciled in a Member 
State; for example, a court of a Member State may have exclusive jurisdiction, 
regardless of domicile, by virtue of Art 22, which allocates jurisdiction to the court of 
a Member State where the property is situated with regard to proceedings whose 
object is rights in immovable property. 
343 Honka supra note 50 at 265 at 271 explains that cargo claimants might instead choose to 
bring a claim before the courts for the place of performance of the obligation (under Article 
5.1 of the Regulation) or the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur (under 
Article 5.3 of the Regulation), amongst other alternatives. See generally Jackson supra note 
49 at 187ff. 















One of the exceptions to the basic rule arises when parties conclude 
a jurisdiction agreement, conferring exclusive jurisdiction (unless the parties 
stipulate otherwise) upon the court or courts of a Member State to settle 
disputes. In accordance with Article 23(1) of the EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation,345 where at least one of the parties to a contract of carriage is 
domiciled in a Member State (whether defendant or claimant), and the 
parties select the court or courts of a Member State to settle their disputes 
arising out of the contract, and where the agreement is valid (that is to say, 
the claimant establishes that there is a “good arguable case” that the 
jurisdiction clause satisfies certain formalities),346 then it must be enforced, 
and jurisdiction may not be declined.347 
                                            
345 Article 23(1) of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation provides that: 
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court 
or courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen 
or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts 
shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either: 
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing; or  
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between 
themselves; or  
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which 
the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is 
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in 
the particular trade or commerce concerned. 
Note that Article 23 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation corresponds to Article 17 under the EC 
Jurisdiction Convention. 
346 Bols Distilleries BV v Superior Yacht Services Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 12 (Privy 
Council) at para 28:  
[I]f the standard of “a good arguable case” is properly understood and applied, there 
is no risk that the effectiveness of the Regulation will be impaired. The rule is that 
the court must be satisfied, or as satisfied as it can be having regard to the 
limitations which an interlocutory process imposes, that factors exist which allow the 
court to take jurisdiction [emphasis added]. 
 
According to Jackson supra note 49 at 133-34: 
The concept of an agreement conferring jurisdiction is a rule of Community law and 
that which is required to constitute it and its scope are matters for that law and not 
for the private international law of member States … But the standard of proof 
required for each aspect of the validity, scope and enforceability of the agreement 
appears to be the national law [emphasis added]. 
 
Put simply by L Merrett in ‘Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: a comprehensive code for 














Baatz explains that the formalities under Article 23(1) are imposed as 
a means to ensure real consent between parties.348 That said, as per Article 
23(1)(c) of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation, consent will be presumed in 
international trade or commerce when it ‘accords with a usage of which the 
parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or 
commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to 
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce 
concerned.’ She goes on to explain that the validity of a jurisdiction clause 
contained in a bill of lading must be assessed by reference to the original 
parties to the contract of carriage, that is to say, the shipper and carrier.349 It 
follows that the consent of third party bill of lading holders will be presumed 
in cases where the rights and obligations of shippers have succeeded to 
them under the applicable national law.350 
                                                                                                                          
and therefore the scope of the jurisdiction agreement, remain a question of national law, 
namely the applicable law.’ 
347 Jackson ibid at 135.  
Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 238-39: 
There are certain circumstances in which, according to the Regulation, the 
agreement will not be effective to produce this result. Where a court in a Member 
State has exclusive jurisdiction regardless of domicile [art 22], an agreement on 
jurisdiction may not contradict it. Where the defendant is willing to appear before a 
court to which he has been summoned by the claimant, that court has jurisdiction 
and the agreement is disregarded. Where the agreement is made in the context of 
an insurance contract, a consumer contract or an employment contract, it will have 
to satisfy further conditions to be effective. And where the same cause of action, 
between the same parties, is already pending before the court of another Member 
State, the agreement will not confer jurisdiction. Otherwise, the jurisdiction 
agreement must be given effect…. 
348 Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 8. According to Jackson supra note 49 at 
134, ‘[w]hether or not there is agreement will be adjudged on the intention of the parties on 
the basis of the contents of the provision, the sole purpose of the formal requirements being 
to ensure that the consensus of the parties is established.’ 
349 Castelletti v Trumpy supra note 298 at para 42. 
350 Coreck Maritime GMbH v Handelsveem BV C-387/98 [2000] ECR 1-09337 at para 27: 
[A] jurisdiction clause agreed between a carrier and a shipper which appears in a bill 
of lading is enforceable against a third party bearer of the bill of lading if he 
succeeded to the rights and obligations of the shipper under the applicable national 
law when he acquired the bill of lading. If he did not, it must be ascertained whether 
he accepted that clause having regard to the requirements laid down in the first 














Additionally, in accordance with Article 23(3) of the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation,351 where neither party to the contract is 
domiciled in a Member State and they select the court or courts of a 
Member State to settle their disputes, the courts of other Member 
States shall have no jurisdiction unless the chosen jurisdiction, under 
its own national procedural law and case law, declines to exercise its 
jurisdiction.352 In English courts, for example, the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement will be enforced unless there are strong reasons for 
staying proceedings, in which case it may exercise its discretion 
(contrary to the rule under 23(1) of the Regulation, in cases where at 
least one of the parties is domiciled in a Member State).353  
 
In cases of lis pendens, where multiple proceedings brought before 
courts of different Member States involve the same cause of action354 
                                                                                                                           
In France, for example, where the succession of rights and obligations does not 
occur merely upon the delivery of goods and the bill of lading, it used to be that the 
consent of third party bill of lading holders subject to the EC Jurisdiction Regulation 
was not presumed. Rather, consent to a jurisdiction clause needed to be explicit; 
some form of special acceptance was required (as per procedural rules under 
internal French law – see Chapter 3, Section 3.5.) But in light of recent decisions 
rendered by the Cour de Cassation, the succession of rights and obligations is now 
to be determined in accordance with the law applicable to the contract of carriage, 
the determination of which can be difficult to make even at the best of times 
according to Bonassies and Scapel supra note 99 at 801-05, who clearly regret 
these latest confusing decisions. 
351 Article 23(3) of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation reads as follows: 
Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is domiciled in a 
Member State, the courts of other Member States shall have no jurisdiction over 
their disputes unless the court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction. 
352 See generally Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 23-30.  
353 Whereas it is not open to the court of a Member State to exercise discretion and stay 
proceedings notwithstanding the jurisdiction clause once it finds the agreement to be valid 
and effective under 23(1) of the Regulation, that is not necessarily true under 23(3), in cases 
where neither party to the dispute is domiciled in a Member State, and the validity and 
enforcement of jurisdiction clauses depends entirely on the chosen State’s procedural laws 
and policies. 
354 According to Baatz in ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 8 and 12, the courts will look 
at the substance of the matter and not just the form, in order to determine whether 
proceedings involve the “same cause of action”. Note, for example, that whereas an action 
for a declaration of non-liability and an action for asserting contractual liability over a 














between the same parties,355 then the “first come first served” rule of Article 
27 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation356 will apply, whereby minimizing 
the risk of conflicting judgments, and preventing the use of offensive forum-
shopping tactics, such as the grant anti-suit injunctions, which are deemed 
incompatible with the system of the Regulation based on mutual trust.357 
 
According to this rule ‘based clearly and solely on the chronological 
order in which the courts involved are seized,’358 it is up to the court first 
seized to establish its jurisdiction. It does not matter if proceedings brought 
by a defendant before the court second seized were commenced pursuant 
to an exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in the bill of lading.359 In those 
circumstances, it is not open to the second court to examine the jurisdiction 
of the first. Rather, the court second seized must, of its own motion, stay 
                                                                                                                           
action” under Article 27, that would not be the case in an action asserting contractual liability 
on the one hand, and an action seeking to limit liability under a Limitation Convention on the 
other (see Baatz ibid). Jackson supra note 49 at 311: ‘Whether or not proceedings are 
based on the same cause of action is a matter for European and not national law.’ 
355 The Rule will only apply where the parties in the different proceedings are identical. See 
Baatz ibid at 12; Jackson ibid at 313-14. Note that where a subrogated insurer brings a 
claim against carrier X for contractual damages in the name of the insured, on the one hand, 
and carrier X brings an action against insured for a declaration of non-liability, on the other, 
the identity of interest of the insurer and insured are considered the same, and therefore the 
requirement is met (Jackson ibid). 
356 Article 27 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation states as follows:  
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. 
 
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established, any court other than 
the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
357 See Turner v Grovit supra note 150 at paras 19-31. But, as Mandaraka-
Sheppard explains supra note 46 at 225, ‘ironically forum shopping is 
unintentionally encouraged, and litigants will make an even more careful note of 
dates for invoking jurisdiction in a Member State of their preference.’  
Note that Article 27 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation corresponds to Article 21 
under the EC Jurisdiction Convention. 
358 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-4693, Case C-116/02 at para 47. 














proceedings notwithstanding the “agreement conferring jurisdiction”,360 and 
allow the court first seized to verify the existence and validity of the exclusive 
agreement, and only then decline jurisdiction if such an agreement is 
established.361 Thus, Article 23 is subject to Article 27 of the EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation.362 
 
But what of the situation where a claim is brought first under the 
Arrest Convention, pursuant to Article 71 of the EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation,363 and second under an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, 
pursuant to Article 23 of the Regulation? There again, the court first seized 
would determine if the jurisdiction agreement is valid and effective, and if it 
                                            
360 The second court must stay proceedings even if the plaintiff in the court first seised ‘is 
acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings’ (Turner v Grovit supra 
note 150 at para 31). This tactic is also referred to as an “Italian torpedo” in the European 
Community (where a party domiciled in a Member State, acting in bad faith, in breach of an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement, runs to a court of a jurisdiction, such as Italy, which is 
known for its sluggish legal process, in an attempt to delay proceedings to the other party’s 
detriment. 
The “first come first served” rule will also apply even though ‘the duration of proceedings 
before … the court first seised… is excessively long’ (Erich Gasser GmbH supra note 358 at 
para 73). 
361 Erich Gasser GmbH ibid at para 49. For a brief review and criticism of the decision, see 
Y Baatz ‘Who decides on jurisdiction clauses’ [2004] LMCLQ 25. Note that in cases where 
the Rule under Article 27 does not apply because, for example, the proceedings are not 
over the same cause of action, or the parties to the actions are not identical, then the court 
second seised may nevertheless stay its proceedings where the actions are related (per 
Article 28 EC Jurisdiction Regulation). 
362 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 202.  
363 According to Article 71(1) of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation:  
This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are 
parties and which in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the 
recognition or enforcement of judgments.  
On a separate but related note, as per Article 71 of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation, in cases 
where Member States ratified the Hamburg Rules prior to 1 March 2002 (date when the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation came into force), the Hamburg Rules on jurisdiction (article 21 ‒ 
providing claimants with options for suit and overruling pre-emptive jurisdiction clauses ‒ 
see Chapter 5) trump the EC Jurisdiction Regulation (article 23 ‒ enforcing jurisdiction 
clauses where valid). Sparka explains supra note 42 at 191 that this particularity applies to 














was, it would have to decline its jurisdiction under the Arrest Convention in 
favour of the chosen forum.364  
4.2 Cr i t ic ism of  the European Regulat ion of  Jur isdict ion 
Clauses  
Without question, the European Union has made significant inroads into 
achieving greater harmonization of rules on jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters with the enactment of the EC Jurisdiction Regulation, 
and the Brussels Convention before it. But, as the European Commission 
and numerous others have acknowledged, there is definitely room for 
improvement and future development of the law. Most relevantly for our 
present purposes, certain rules pertaining to jurisdiction clauses under the 
Regulation need to be fine-tuned to make their application more consistent, 
just, and in line with international commercial practice.  
4.2.1 The Validity of Jurisdiction Clauses under Article 23 of the 
Regulation 
In his judgment in Castellett i,365 the Advocate General P Leger had the 
following to say about the aim of the provision on exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements: 
[The aim of Article 17 of the Convention, now Article 23 of the Regulation, 
is] to ensure that there [is] real consent on the part of the persons 
concerned so as to protect the weaker party to the contract by avoiding 
jurisdiction clauses, incorporated in a contract by one party, going 
unnoticed. 
Article 23 has been criticized, inter alia, for its lack of clarity in 
regulating the validity of jurisdiction clauses, in particular material validity.366 
In fact, it has been suggested that once the alleged agreement meets the 
                                            
364 Mandaraka-Sheppard supra note 46 at 238-40.  
365 Castelletti v Trumpy supra note 298 at para 19. 
366 See generally Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at Chapter 7; Merrett supra 














requirements of form at paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of Article 23(1),367 then the 
inquiry ends there, and the exclusive jurisdiction clause must be enforced.368 
In other words, ‘the formal requirements guarantee consensus and may not 
be supplemented or contradicted by other legal tests of validity.’369 
 
 Briggs explains that the problem stems from a concern that if it were 
open to a party to argue, for example, that an agreement in writing or 
evidenced in writing (thus meeting the formal validity requirement) should 
nevertheless not be binding on him for want of consent, he would need to 
rely on rules of national law to support this contention.370 The risk then would 
be that the validity of the agreement would depend entirely on the national 
law of the court seized, or seized first,371 whereby missing the point of a 
uniform approach to the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses, which is what 
Article 23 aims to achieve. In its study of 2009, the European Commission 
reported that:   
[I]n some instances, besides the uniform conditions laid down in the 
Regulation, the consent between the parties is made subject, on a residual 
basis, to national law, determined either by reference to the lex fori or to the 
lex causae. This leads to undesirable consequences, in that a choice of 
court agreement may be considered valid in one Member State and invalid 
in another.372 
Yet, at the same time, a plain reading of Article 23 would seem to 
reveal that the agreement to litigate in a particular Member State and the 
requirement that certain formalities be met are indeed two separate notions 
                                            
367 According to Merrett ibid at 546, ‘national laws may not supplement the provisions of 
Article 23…. For example, there is no scope for an additional formal requirement, derived 
from national law, that the jurisdiction agreement must be expressed in a particular 
language.’ But see Jackson and Merrett comments supra note 346. 
368 Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 245-46; Merrett ibid at 545 at 546. 
369 Briggs ibid at 246. 
370 Briggs ibid at 246 and 248. 
371 In cases of lis pendens, as previously discussed. 
372 Commission of the European Communities ‘Report from the Commission to the 














and conditions.373 To subsume one requirement into the other, or reduce 
consensus to form alone, falls short of the common legal understanding of 
agreement under contract law, regardless of the jurisdiction. And, as Briggs 
rightfully contends, unless a party actually admits to the agreement, ‘a court 
has to have some basis for dealing with a submission, credibly advanced, 
that, whether there is writing or otherwise, there was no agreement to the 
jurisdiction in question’ [emphasis added].374 The difficult question remains: 
how may a party raise this argument without relying on a national court’s 
individual notion of what constitutes an agreement? Put differently, in the 
absence of uniform rules of contract to govern jurisdiction clauses,375 what 
legal basis may a European Court rely upon to confirm the material validity 
of these agreements under European law? 
 
The European Commission suggests prescribing a standard choice of 
court clause as a starting point. It also proposes combining this option with 
other solutions, such as permitting parallel actions to proceed, or reversing 
the priority rule under Article 27, but only in situations where jurisdiction 
agreements take the aforementioned standard form prescribed by the 
Regulation.376 The Commission also presents the idea of ‘a harmonized 
conflict rule to ensure uniform application of the rules of the Regulation’.377 
  
                                            
373 Agree Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 248; Compare Merrett supra 
note 346 at 550:  
[T]he correct approach is that there is simply one question and that the requirements 
of Article 23 are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the enforceability of the 
jurisdiction agreement. There is simply no role for national law or indeed any 
additional Community idea of ‘consensus’ separate from that set out in the Article 23 
requirements themselves. 
374 Briggs ibid. 
375 Note that ‘choice of court agreements is excluded from the scope of Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)’ (Green Paper on the 
review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 supra note 338 at 5 footnote 8). 
376 Green Paper ibid at 6.  














In addition, Briggs and Merrett propose incorporating the notion of 
bad faith (or breach of good faith) in cases where there is a written 
agreement, but lack of consent: 
If a court is presented with facts which would otherwise satisfy the 
requirement of an agreement in writing or evidenced in writing, but there is 
a credible basis for the contradictory submission that it is contrary to the 
requirements of good faith for this to be asserted, it ought to be open to the 
court to resolve the jurisdictional challenge on this basis…. [I]t will 
acknowledge that the validity of an agreement on jurisdiction, and the 
permissible contradictory arguments, are located within the proper 
interpretation of Article 23.378 
Merrett specifies that ‘a Community notion of good faith is the appropriate 
way to deal with such cases’ [emphasis added].379 
4.2.2 Jurisdiction Clauses and Lis Pendens 
The simple and inflexible “first come first served” rule of Article 27, designed 
to promote legal certainty and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction in parallel 
proceedings, is by no means perfect, but it is definitely a good start. It is 
premised on the notion that no Member State is in a better position to 
determine jurisdiction, since the Regulation is common to all contracting 
states alike and ‘may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by 
each of them.’380  
 
This rule, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice in Erich 
Gasser v MISAT Srl381 and Turner v Grovit ,382 has been criticized, 
mostly by the English, for a number of reasons, namely that it: encourages 
parties to engage in offensive forum shopping; risks slowing down 
proceedings, sometimes for years, costing parties time and money (and 
                                            
378 Briggs Agreements on jurisdiction supra note 9 at 252; Merrett supra note 346 at 546. 
379 Merrett ibid at 564 (see generally 559-64.) 
380 Erich Gasser GmbH supra note 358 at para 48. 
381 Ibid. 














even at times leading to the spoliation of evidence); fails to adequately 
protect exclusive jurisdiction agreements as it requires the court second 
seized to suspend proceedings until the court first seized establishes or 
declines jurisdiction (unlike where neither party is domiciled in a Member 
State under 23(3)), in which case the reverse is true, and the court chosen 
will apply its discretionary common law rules to determine whether the 
jurisdiction clause is valid and enforceable);383 tolerates “Italian torpedoes” 
(where a party wishing to buy itself time runs first to the court, in bad faith, 
contrary to a jurisdiction agreement, in order to benefit from the sluggish 
procedure of the court first seized); leaves no room for the operation of 
judicial discretion, precluding the grant of anti-suit injunctions, as well as the 
application of forum non conveniens doctrine, even in cases where a non-
contracting forum is the natural/more appropriate forum. 
 
The European Commission has proposed a number of possible 
solutions to “improve” the rule,384 so as to afford greater protection to 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements. First it proposes releasing the chosen 
court from its obligation to stay proceedings under the lis pendens rule, the 
downside to this solution of course being that it may lead to parallel 
proceedings and conflicting judgments, contrary to the underlying intention 
of the Regulation.  
 
Second it proposes reversing the priority rule in cases where 
                                            
383 Baatz ‘The conflict of laws’ supra note 56 at 27: 
[W]here the English courts apply their common law rules, a litigant will usually be 
able to rely on an exclusive English jurisdiction clause, even if proceedings have 
already been commenced in a non-Member State. 
… 
If the EC Jurisdiction Regulation applies, however, the litigant can only rely on the 
exclusive English jurisdiction clause or indeed an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
choosing the courts of any Member State, if the court chosen is also first seised, or 
once the court first seised, but not chosen, declines jurisdiction. 














jurisdiction clauses are concerned. This would allow the designated 
jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the jurisdiction agreement, and the 
other court seized would stay proceedings until the former decided whether 
to enforce the clause or decline jurisdiction in favour of the latter. This 
reverse priority rule would have the effect of standardizing the rule, which 
already applies in cases where neither party is domiciled in a Member State, 
and ‘align[ing] to a large extent the internal Community rules with the 
international rules.’ On the downside, where agreements are invalid, the 
party wishing to deny the agreement would first have to prove its invalidity in 
the designated forum before being able to proceed in the otherwise 
competent court.  
 
Third it proposes maintaining the existing “first come first served” rule, 
but improving communications and cooperation between the two courts by 
incorporating such notions as deadlines to decide questions on jurisdiction, 
regular reporting obligations to the court second seized, and damages for 
breach of jurisdiction agreement arising for instance in cases where 
proceedings are unduly delayed by “Italian torpedoes”.  
 
 Fourth it proposes excluding the rule altogether ‘in situations where the 
parallel proceedings are proceedings on the merits on the one hand and 
proceedings for (negative) declaratory relief on the other hand or at least to 
ensure a suspension of the running of limitation periods with respect to the 




                                            
385 Green Paper ibid at 6. The purpose of this exclusion would be to prevent from 















The European Jurisdiction Regulation has made significant inroads in 
standardizing the treatment of jurisdiction clauses contained in commercial 
carriage contracts by including not only substantive rules on jurisdiction, but 
also procedural ones, in the hopes of minimizing conflicts of jurisdiction 
problems, and protracted and costly litigation on preliminary matters. It 
strives to be fair, straightforward and easy to apply, certain and predictable, 
and encourage the rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of 
judgments amongst Member States. It is a system of rules based on mutual 
trust and international comity, and unlike the Hamburg Rules, it generally 
encourages freedom of contract and holding parties to their bargains, and 
therefore recognizes validly formed exclusive jurisdiction agreements.  
 
Despite the many advances achieved by this contemporary regional 
Regulation, some of its jurisdiction provisions are criticized for being overly 
simplistic, inadequately drafted, and containing loopholes, which allow 
offensive forum shoppers̶at times bad faith claimants̶ to bend the rules, 
and the application of national law to infiltrate where it should not, whereby 
somewhat defeating the purpose of creating a fair, predictable and certain 
system of rules. It was hoped that the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules would 
learn from these mistakes and shortcomings, by creating a greater and more 
coherent system of international rules on jurisdiction to govern all 
international maritime contracts alike, but alas, in light of Chapter 14’s 
voluntary nature, it is unlikely to have much of an impact or contribute 















CHAPTER 5: REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
JURISDICTION CLAUSES UNDER THE HAMBURG AND 
ROTTERDAM RULES 
Historically, the regulation of forum clauses contained in international 
maritime carriage contracts was deliberately left out of maritime carriage 
regimes, to be regulated and enforced by national jurisdictions. This often 
meant that cargo interests, which had the weaker bargaining power at the 
time, were either required to bring their claims in distant forums under 
standard form bills of lading, or forced to abandon claims or underbid 
settlements. Thus, to protect cargo interests against the carrier’s abuse of 
market power, the drafters of the Hamburg Rules included provisions on 
jurisdiction, and became the first international regime to regulate jurisdiction 
in the maritime context. But these provisions and the Hamburg Rules as a 
whole were too one-sided to be commercially realistic and embraced by 
seafaring nations.  
 
 In any case, it is no longer tenable in today’s commercial climate to 
view the average shipper, and indeed the average third party consignee or 
transferee bill of lading holder, as a weaker bargaining power without any 
say in the matter. The Rotterdam Rules recognizes this reality, and aims to 
achieve greater commercial relevance and certainty by encouraging party 
autonomy and the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses under specific 
circumstances. The Convention’s innovative rules on jurisdiction are 
influenced both by the Hamburg regime and the EC Jurisdiction Regulation 
(minus Europe’s procedural rules governing conflict of jurisdiction problems), 

















5.1 Hamburg Rules 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Hague Rules and Visby amendment were 
meant to address the imbalance between carriers and cargo interests by 
imposing, inter alia, minimum standards of liability for carriers in exchange 
for certain exemptions. However, many felt that these Conventions did not 
go far enough to protect cargo interests, especially in view of the ‘large 
number of exceptions [carriers are able to raise,] which either defeat or 
considerably delay the settlement of cargo claims.’386  
 
 In time, the maritime community responded with the Hamburg Rules, 
which undertook to bring about significant changes to the existing maritime 
regime, and propel the “pendulum of liability” for cargo loss and damage 
hard over towards carriers.387 One such groundbreaking change was to 
include, for the very first time, provisions on jurisdiction and arbitration,388 in 
an effort to harmonize the application of jurisdictional rules in the 
international context of maritime transportation.389 Article 21(1) of the 
Hamburg Rules states that: 
                                            
386 Hare Shipping law and admiralty supra note ??? at 489. 
387 Ibid. The initiative leading to the Hamburg Rules was not aiming to reach a compromise 
position between carriers and shippers, unlike the Hague and Hague/Visby initiatives. 
Rather its main objective was to level out the playing field. This clear shift to protection of 
cargo interests perhaps explains why the Hamburg Rules did not achieve widespread 
acceptance.  
388 Von Ziegler explains supra note 4 at 90 that ‘[t]hose provisions are very much inspired by 
the respective provisions regulating other transport modes.’ 
389 Some of the other important changes include increase in per kilo/package limitation, 
rules applying “inwards” and “outwards” (as per US Cogsa, but contrary to Hague and 
Hague/Visby Rules, which only apply outwards), rules applying “port to port” (versus “tackle 
to tackle” under Hague and Hague/Visby Rules), 2-year prescription (versus 1-year under 
Hague and Hague/Visby Rules), presumption of liability against the carrier, claims in delict 
and tort against the carrier permitted (whereas they are avoided under Hague and 
Hague/Visby Rules), distinction made between carrier and “actual carrier”, provisions not 
applicable to charterparties unless specifically stipulated in bill of lading, stipulation that first 
carrier responsible for complete carriage (through-carriage provision), removal of exclusion 
of liability for nautical fault, broader definition of contract of carriage (to include sea waybills, 














In judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods under this Convention the 
plaintiff, at his option, may institute an action in a court which according to the law of 
the State where the court is situated, is competent and within the jurisdiction of 
which is situated one of the following places: 
(a) the principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence 
of the defendant; or 
(b) the place where the contract was made, provided that the defendant has there a 
place of business, branch or agency through which the contract was made; or 
(c) the port of loading or the port of discharge; or 
(d) any additional place designated for that purpose in the contract of carriage by 
sea390 [emphasis added.] 
Thus, under Article 21(1), the claimant has the option to sue in any one of a 
finite list of reasonable forums,391 all of which have ‘a significant connection 
with the transaction or the carrier.’392 This provision does not, however, allow 
parties to agree to limit their choice of forum in advance. So even if a 
contract of carriage contains a jurisdiction clause, the plaintiff is free to 
override the contractual provision and select one of the aforementioned 
forums, provided of course that the court selected is competent under the 
national law applicable.  
 
 This rule restricting the autonomy of parties to stipulate an exclusive 
choice of forum in contracts of carriage stems from a preoccupation with 
unequal bargaining power and the imposition of adhesion contracts. 
According to Sparka: 
The purpose of this provision is to avoid the imposition of exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses by carriers who were presumed to be in a better 
bargaining position than the shipper. Furthermore, this provision constitutes 
a compromise between those countries who would have liked to ban 
                                                                                                                           
generally Hare Shipping law and supra note 16 at 490-93; Tetley ‘The Hamburg Rules ‒ a 
commentary’ [1979] LMCQ 1-20. 
390 Article 21(1)(d) essentially allows parties to include non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in 
their contracts of carriage, providing claimants with yet another optional forum for suit. 
391 William Tetley Marine cargo claims 4ed (2008) 1913: ‘The Hamburg Rules at art. 21(1) 
set out rules governing where suit may be taken and limiting the right of contracting parties 
or of the court to agree to other jurisdictions.’ Article 21(3) limits proceedings to places 
specified in 21(1) and (2). 
392 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 4. Note that this wide 
choice of jurisdiction applies not only to claims by cargo claimants against carriers, but also 














jurisdiction agreements altogether and others who would have preferred no 
regulation of jurisdiction agreements at all.393 
This so-called “compromise” has the effect of removing legal certainty and 
quantifiable exposure to risk, ostensibly in the name of promoting procedural 
fairness. That said, defendants may seek recourse under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, since it would appear that this discretionary remedy 
is not forbidden under the Hamburg Rules ‘so long as the doctrine is part of 
the national legal system.’394 Thus, a party seeking to apply this common law 
doctrine would need to convince the court seized with the dispute that 
notwithstanding the choice of forum per Article 21 of the Rules, the forum 
selected in the carriage agreement is in fact the more convenient, 
appropriate or natural forum.  
 
 Article 21(2) of the Hamburg Rules provides that when a ship or 
sistership is arrested in a port state subject to the Hamburg Rules, an action 
may be commenced in this location, notwithstanding the fact that it is not one 
of the places enumerated at paragraph 1. However, a defendant may 
petition to have the action removed from this jurisdiction, and so long as 
sufficient security is provided, the claimant must then relocate the 
proceedings to one of the places enumerated at paragraph 1. 
 
 Article 21(4) of the Hamburg Rules bars parallel proceedings 
‘between the same parties on the same grounds unless the judgment of the 
court before which the first action was instituted is not enforceable in the 
country in which the new proceedings are instituted.’ 
 
                                            
393 Sparka supra note 42 at 192. 














 Article 21(5) of the Hamburg rules provides that ‘notwithstanding 
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, an agreement made by the 
parties, after a claim under the contract of carriage by sea has arisen, which 
designates the place where the claimant may institute an actions, is effective 
[emphasis added].’ 
 
 These and other new provisions under the Hamburg Rules have been 
highly criticized by maritime experts and scholars alike for being too radical 
and/or poorly drafted. Tetley sums up the problem best: 
The Hamburg Rules in many respects are an improvement over the Hague 
Rules and the Hague-Visby rules but in other respects they are retrograde. 
They are an advance in respect to defining some responsibility and in 
clarifying certain problems of past law but they are at other times retrograde 
in the placing of responsibility, in the creation of new complicated technical 
procedures and in confusing drafting. Most important of all, if they come into 
force, they will not be universal but will create a third carriage of goods by 
sea convention existing simultaneously with the Hague Rules and Hague-
Visby Rules on the shipping lanes of the world. The ensuing contradictions 
and disputes will frustrate carriers and shippers, confound Admiralty 
lawyers, ensnarl the courts of the world and only please the occasional 
professor of conflicts of law.395 
In essence, the shift in risk allocation ‘squarely onto the shoulders of the 
carrier’396 is considered too drastic to be acceptable to major shipping 
nations, which probably explains why none of them have ratified the 
Hamburg Rules to date. Though the Rules have not been widely ratified, 
they are significant, as they have inspired national jurisdictions such as 
Canada and the Nordic countries to incorporate the notion of optional 
jurisdictions for suit under their rules, with certain national modifications, and 
                                            
395 ‘The Hamburg Rules’ supra note 389. See also J Sweeney ‘UNCITRAL and the 
Hamburg Rules ‒ the risk allocation problem in the maritime transport of goods’ (1991) 22 
JMLC 529-30. 














have served as a starting point for jurisdiction provisions under the 
Rotterdam Rules.397 
5.2 Rot terdam Rules 
Unlike the Hamburg Rules or the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules before 
them, ‘[the] UNCITRAL Convention is neither in favour of the [ship]owners 
nor in favour of the shippers: … [it] does not seek to protect any socio-
professional category.398 It aims to realise a balance between both 
interests.’399 However, much like the EC Jurisdiction Regulation and 
Hamburg Rules, its rules on jurisdiction (at Chapter 14) incorporate the 
notion of optional forums for suit by plaintiffs, at the same time recognizing 
commercial parties’ freedom to contract as they see fit, under particular 
circumstances.400  
                                            
397 Tetley Marine cargo claims supra note 38 at 1914 and 1919-20. 
398 P Mukherjee et al ‘A legal and economic analysis of the volume contract concept under 
the Rotterdam Rules: selected issues in perspective’ (2009) 40(4) JMLC 579 at 581-82: 
Since the time of the Harter Act the debate on contractual imbalance has revolved 
around the need to protect cargo interests by certain mandatory minimum liability 
rules for the carrier. The contractual imbalance, it is alleged, is attributable to the 
philosophy underlying the Hague Rules or the Hague-Visby Rules which dominate 
current carriage transactions. With the demise of colonialism and the emergence of 
independent sovereign states which were at the time referred to as the third world 
states, the Hamburg Rules were developed to accommodate their interests. From a 
macro perspective, the imbalance is recognized as a function of the conflict between 
states whose international trade is based on cargo owning interests, namely shipper 
or consignee, and states whose international trade is based on carrier interests, i.e., 
shipowners, charterers and the like. 
… 
It is also to be noted that states which identify themselves primarily with cargo 
owning interests may also be major flag states regardless of whether they operate in 
an open or closed registry system or any other alternative type of registry. 
Therefore, the assumption that there is an irreconcilable divide between traditional 
maritime states as representing carrier interests and developing countries with 
primarily cargo owning interests is no longer valid. The advent of multiple registry 
types leading to varieties of flag states has in practical terms obliterated the original 
polarized characteristics of states opting for the Hague/Hague-Visby regimes or the 
Hamburg regime. 
399 Delebeque supra note 71 at 276. 
400 Some of the key changes under the Rotterdam Rules include “door to door” application 
of the rules; 2-year prescription; removal of the exemption for nautical fault; liability of 
maritime performing parties (bringing them essentially into the same regime as contracting 














As a general rule, cargo claimants may choose to litigate in a 
competent401 court located in any one of the following forums: 
• The domicile of the carrier; 
• The place of receipt agreed in the contract of carriage; 
• The place of delivery agreed in the contract of carriage; or  
• The port where the goods are initially loaded on a ship or the port 
where the goods are finally discharged from a ship.402 
 
Alternatively, a claimant may opt to bring suit in a court of competent 
jurisdiction designated by an agreement between the shipper and the 
carrier.403 Furthermore, instead of filing suit against the contractual carrier, a 
                                                                                                                           
volume contracts; e-commerce rules; ongoing duty to make vessel seaworthy; increased 
limitation of liability. See generally F Berlingieri ‘Multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules’ 
Colloquium of the Rotterdam Rules 2009, De Doelen, Rotterdam, 21 September 2009. 
Available at http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php?page=text-speakers-
rotterdam-rules-2009 [Accessed 1 February 2011]; Report to Industry by Australian 
Government Delegation ‘Summary for Australian industry of United Nations convention on 
contracts for the international carriage of goods wholly or partly by sea’ [2009] 23 Austl & NZ 
Mar LJ 116. 
401 Per Article 1(30) of the Rotterdam Rules: “Competent court” means a court in a 
Contracting State that, according to the rules on the internal allocation of jurisdiction among 
the courts of that State, may exercise jurisdiction over the dispute [emphasis added]. 
402 Article 66(a) Rotterdam Rules. For an excellent overview on each of these permissible 
forums, see generally Sturley ‘Jurisdiction under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 11-
20. Article 66 makes it clear that the plaintiff that has “the option” under this provision is a 
cargo claimant/shipper/subrogated cargo insurer, not a carrier seeking a declaration of non-
liability (unlike the Hamburg Rules and EEC Jurisdiction Regulation, which do not make this 
specification).  
A/CN9/WG III/WP34 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the 
work of its twelfth session, Proposal by the United States at para 31:  
[The list at Article 66(a)] differs from the Hamburg Rules list in two principal 
respects. It uses the places of receipt and delivery in addition to the ports of loading 
and discharge. This change simply recognizes the Instrument’s potential door-to-
door application (in contrast with the Hamburg Rules’ port-to-port application). The 
place of contracting is also omitted from the list. In today’s era of electronic 
contracting, the place of contracting is often difficult to determine, and is generally 
irrelevant to the transaction even when it can be determined. Furthermore, it can 
easily be manipulated if there is any advantage to doing so. 
403 Article 66(b) Rotterdam Rules. The fact that the plaintiff is at liberty to ignore the 
agreement and choose any of the other places listed at Article 66(a) suggests that unless 
the agreement fulfils the requirements of Article 67 (see below), the agreement envisioned 
under Article 66(b) will be non-exclusive; it is but an additional jurisdictional basis amongst 














claimant may file suit against the maritime performing party;404 however, the 
claimant is limited to filing in a competent court situated within one of the 
following places: the domicile of the maritime performing party, the port 
where the goods were received or delivered by the maritime performing 
party, or the port in which the maritime performing party performs its 
activities with respect to the goods.405 
 
Thus, the basic rule is that cargo claimants may choose to litigate in 
any one of the locations from the list of permissible forums.406 An exception 
exists when parties to a volume contract include an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement in their contract of carriage. Article 67(1) of the Rotterdam 
Rules states that: 
The jurisdiction of a court chosen in accordance with article 66, subparagraph b), is 
exclusive for disputes between the parties to the contract only if the parties so agree 
and the agreement conferring jurisdiction: 
(a) Is contained in a volume contract that clearly states the names and addresses of 
the parties and either  
(i) is individually negotiated or  
                                                                                                                           
UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session at para 
132.) See Section 2.3 on the construction of jurisdiction clauses.  
404 Eg stevedore, terminal operator or ocean carrier ‒ see Article 1(6) and 1(7) Rotterdam 
Rules. 
405 Per Article 68 Rotterdam Rules. Bursanescu supra note 47 at 70 explains that ‘[t]his 
article ensures that a maritime performing party who is not otherwise a party to the contract 
of carriage will only be sued either at its domicile, at the port of loading or discharge (if it is 
an ocean carrier), or at the port where it performs its activities (if it is a stevedore, terminal 
operator, etc.)’ 
406 The list of permissible forums at Article 66 forms a numerus clausus; it is exhaustive and 
cargo claimants may not bring suit against carriers in any other jurisdictions (see Article 69 
Rotterdam Rules), unless one of the following exceptions applies: there is an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement contained in a volume contract (Article 67, discussed below); the 
claimant has arrested the vessel in rem (Article 70); the parties conclude a jurisdiction 
agreement after the dispute has arisen (Article 72 ‒ same as Hamburg Rules); the carrier is 
a charterer, and therefore the Rotterdam Rules do not apply to it (Article 6), which means 
that parties to charterparty agreement or bill of lading may litigate wherever they choose. 
Note too that Chapter 14 ‘shall not affect the application of the rules of a regional economic 
integration organization that is a party to this Convention…whether adopted before or after 
this Convention’ per Article 73(3) Rotterdam Rules. Thus, in cases of conflict, the EC 














(ii) contains a prominent statement that there is an exclusive choice of court 
agreement and specifies the sections of the volume contract containing that 
agreement; and 
(b) Clearly designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific 
courts of one Contracting State [emphasis added]. 
Therefore, the first important limitation is that a jurisdiction clause is only 
exclusive and binding under the Rotterdam Rules if it is contained in a 
volume contract407 (otherwise known as a “service contract” in the United 
States),408 defined at Article 1(2) of the Rotterdam Rules as ‘a contract 
of carriage that provides for the carriage of a specified quantity of goods in a 
series of shipments during an agreed period of time.’409 
 
A unique feature of the Rotterdam Rules is the introduction of ‘wide 
contractual freedom for shippers and carriers to negotiate shipping contracts 
outside the Convention’.410 In particular, parties are given a certain level of 
contractual freedom when customizing “volume contracts” to negotiate terms 
                                            
407 This is a clear departure from the definition of jurisdiction clauses under the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation. 
408 C Hooper ‘Forum selection and arbitration in the draft convention on contracts for the 
international carriage of goods wholly or partly by sea, or the definition of fora conveniens 
set forth in the Rotterdam Rules’ (2009) 44(3) Texas international law journal 417 at 420-21. 
409 M H Carlson ‘US participation in the international unification of private law: the making of 
the UNCITRAL draft carriage of goods by sea convention’ (2007) 31 Tul Mar LJ 617 at 634-
35: 
For the United States, a forum selection provision that incorporates these two 
points̶one favouring the shipper, and one the carrier̶is a “deal-breaker” issue. It 
is unlikely that the United States would become a party to the new convention if it 
does not include these two rules 
 
In UNCITRAL, it was clear from the beginning that delegations had irreconcilably 
different views. Many preferred that forum selection clauses be enforced in all 
cases, even if they appeared in the boilerplate clauses of a liner bill of lading. Others 
preferred that exclusive choice-of-forum clauses never be enforced, thus 
guaranteeing that cargo interests would have access to convenient forums to 
resolve their claims against carriers. 
… 
The text that the Working Group eventually accepted in principle was the result of a 
joint proposal of the United States and the European Commission. 
… 
The Joint Proposal was a compromise that harmonized the law to the extent 
possible, but offered optional choice to the extent necessary to reach an agreement. 














and conditions as they see fit, providing for ‘greater or lesser rights, 
obligations and liabilities than those imposed by [the] Convention.’411 
However, they may not derogate from two important obligations: the carrier’s 
continued obligation to exercise due diligence in making the ship seaworthy, 
and the shipper’s obligation to provide complete instructions and 
documentation on carriage of goods.412 Unsurprisingly, many maritime 
industry experts are critical of the rather vague concept of volume 
contracts,413 which allows parties to operate outside the framework of the 
Convention, and empowers ‘carriers to offer volume deals at a set rate, 
covering a certain volume of shipments per year, on the basis that the 
shipper effectively opts out of the provisions of the rules.’414  
                                            
411 Article 80 Rotterdam Rules, re special rules for volum  contracts. In order for the 
derogation from the Rules to be binding, the shipper must be given an opportunity and 
notice of the opportunity to conclude a contract of carriage on terms and conditions that 
comply with the Rules’ standard without any derogation. 
412 Other obligations that may not be amended or omitted under volume contracts: 
obligations regarding crewing and equipping the ship, obligations regarding dangerous 
goods, liability in relation to any of these above issues, and the loss of the right to limit 
liability, generally speaking (Article 80(4) Rotterdam Rules.) 
413 See Mukherjee et al supra note 398; Report to Industry by Australian Government 
Delegation supra note 399 at 9: 
Critics have argued that if one of the objects of the Rotterdam Rules is to bring back 
legal uniformity to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, such an exemption, 
enabling them to be derogated from almost entirely, should not be allowed. 
Additionally, the definition that has been adopted for such contracts is so wide that it 
could potentially include small contracts, in which equal bargaining power is unlikely 
to exist - even with the limitations provided for. 
 
The impact of this provision could be significant. It is estimated that currently 90% of 
containerised cargo in the world moves under 'service contracts'. It could therefore 
be estimated that a similar percentage of cargo will be moved under volume 
contracts, which could mean that the vast majority of the world's cargo could be 
shipped in a completely unregulated fashion for the first time since the early 20th 
century, prior to the introduction of any internationally agreed regulation. 
414 N Smith ‘Rotterdammerung, or twilight of the COGSA (and the Hague-Visby Rules).’ 
Available at https://www.bimco.org/Members/News/2009/2009.aspx [Accessed on 1 
February 2011]. But see D Amodeo ‘Le contrat de volume des règles de Rotterdam peut-il 
être un piège pour les chargeurs?’ Newsletter du Centre de Droit Maritime et des 
Transports, May 2010. Available at http://www.droitmaritime.com/article.php3?id_article=528 
[Accessed on 1 February 2011]: 
It is doubtful that the concept of volume contracts under the Rotterdam Rules was 
meant to apply to smaller shippers, and even if it did, it would seem that they are 














Thus, in keeping with the broad contractual freedom bestowed upon 
parties to volume contracts, these commercial entities are free to agree to 
litigate wherever they choose, so long as (1) they agree to the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause; (2) the agreement contained in the volume contract 
(which clearly states the names and addresses of the parties) is either 
individually negotiated (in other words, is not contained in a contract of 
adhesion), or contains a prominent statement that there is an exclusive 
choice of court agreement and specifies the sections of the volume contract 
containing that agreement; and (3) the court or courts of a contracting state 
are clearly designated. 
 
Third parties to volume contracts, such as consignees and transferee 
bill of lading holders (but not maritime performing parties), are also bound by 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements that fulfil the requirements of Article 67(1), 
but only if certain additional conditions are met, which are designed to 
provide a higher protective standard and prevent third parties from suffering 
hardship.415 
 
The exclusiv  jurisdiction agreement must respect the form 
requirements of Article 3 of the Rotterdam Rules, that is to say the 
agreement must be in writing, in order to bind a third party to the volume 
contract. Also, in accordance with Article 67(2) of the Rotterdam Rules:  
A person that is not a party to the volume contract is bound by an exclusive choice 
of court agreement concluded in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article only if: 
(a) The court is in one of the places designated in article 66, subparagraph (a); 
(b) That agreement is contained in the transport document or electronic transport 
record; 
                                                                                                                           
maritime professionals intend to make use of volume contracts; but for now, it would 
seem that these contracts are primarily geared towards larger shippers, which have 
equal bargaining power to carriers, and hope to escape the mandatory provisions of 
international conventions in order to contract as they see fit [translation]. 
415 See generally A/CN9/576 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on 














(c) That person is given timely and adequate notice of the court where the action 
shall be brought and that the jurisdiction of that court is exclusive; and 
(d) The law of the court seized recognizes that that person may be bound by the 
exclusive choice of court agreement. 
Thus, third parties to volume contracts may only be bound to an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement if the place designated is one of the permissible 
forums at Article 66(a), which, ‘[a]s a practical matter, [is] most likely [to be] 
… the carrier’s domicile’ according to Sturley, since ‘only the carrier’s 
domicile would be the same in each transaction.’416 Furthermore, the 
jurisdiction agreement must be repeated in the transport document or 
electronic record, and not merely incorporated by reference.417 What is 
more, notice of the court and of its exclusive jurisdiction must be given to the 
third party in a timely and adequate manner. Finally, the court seized must 
apply its own national law (including choice-of-law rules), and not the law of 
the court named in the volume contract, to determine whether the third party 
may be bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause.418 In the end, therefore, 
the enforceability of exclusive jurisdiction clauses against third parties to 
volume contracts will essentially depend on national law.419 
                                            
416 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction Under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 25. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid at 27. 
419 Ibid at 27 and 28 footnote 128: 
As a practical matter, article 67(2)(d) essentially gives a country the ability to opt out 
of article 67(2). A nation whose national law does not allow a third party to be bound 
by an exclusive choice-of-court agreement̶or a nation that amends its national law 
so as not to allow a third party to be bound by an exclusive choice-of-court 
agreement in this situation̶can choose to be bound by the rest of the jurisdiction 
chapter and limit article 67 to its effect on the immediate parties to a volume 
contract. 
J Alcántara et al ‘Particular concerns with regard to the Rotterdam Rules’ (2010) 2(1) 
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 5 at 11: 
For third parties … Article 67 adds even further complexity where the court seized 
must recognise that the third party may be bound by the exclusive choice of court 
agreement. Obviously, the law will differ from state to state as to whether such a 
third party is bound by such a clause (Article 67.2(d)) leading to further disputes and 
litigation. Potentially there will be different results in different contracting states, 
depending on whether they regard the question as one of procedural law or 
substantive contract law, leading to potential problems of enforcement. The third 














As one would expect, jurisdiction clauses agreed upon after a dispute 
has arisen420 are enforceable, whether oral or written, implicit (through 
conduct) or explicit,421 so long as the selected court is competent in 
accordance with Article 1(30) of the Rotterdam Rules.422 Furthermore, 
‘[n]othing in the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules affects jurisdiction with 
regard to provisional or protective measures, including arrest in rem as per 
the Arrest Convention’.423  
 
But as already mentioned, there is an important caveat to Chapter 14: 
Article 74 of the Rotterdam Rules (dubbed the “opt in” provision) states 
that ‘[t]he provisions of this chapter shall bind only Contracting States that 
declare in accordance with article 91 that they will be bound by them.’ In 
other words, ratifying states may choose not to opt into the chapter on 
jurisdiction, and instead leave the question of jurisdiction to be determined 
by their national law or otherwise.424 Thus, whereas some contracting 
                                                                                                                          
choice of agreement which will depend on which law is applicable. This may, in turn, 
depend upon whether the procedural or substantive law of the contract is applicable. 
420 That is, in ‘the period following a voyage when the damage ha[s] already occurred, but a 
court ha[s] not yet been seized with the claim’ (A/CN9/591 Report of the UNCITRAL 
Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its sixteenth session at para 63). 
421 A/CN9/591 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of 
its sixteenth session at para 62.  
422 Whereas a jurisdiction agreement concluded before a dispute has arisen must be 
contained in a validly formed volume contract in order to be effective and override the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum, arguably (upon a textual reading of Article 72) that is not the case 
for jurisdiction agreements concluded after a dispute has arisen. However, Articles 66 and 
71 suggest otherwise. These provisions refer to ‘an exclusive choice of court agreement that 
complies with/is binding pursuant to article 67 or 72.’ Therefore, it would seem that a 
jurisdiction agreement reached after a dispute has arisen must also be contained in a 
“volume contract” to be binding. 
423 Article 70 Rotterdam Rules.  
424 A/CN9/616 Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of 
its eighteenth session at para 246: 
There was strong support for allowing for a reservation or ‘opt in’ clause to be 
provided for Contracting States in the draft convention with respect to the entire 
chapter on jurisdiction. A number of delegations that had originally expressed an 
interest during the sixteenth session in deleting the entire chapter on jurisdiction 
expressed their satisfaction with respect to this proposal and for the flexibility that it 














nations may choose to declare themselves bound by these provisions, 
others will likely ignore them.425  
 
The “opt in” provision was basically added at the eleventh hour 
because national opinions on the subject of jurisdiction were quite divergent, 
and therefore the inclusion of Chapter 14 (and Chapter 15 on Arbitration for 
that matter) was seen as a major obstacle to wide ratification of the 
Rotterdam Rules. As matters stand, it is unlikely that nations such as 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and China, which would argue that the 
provisions on jurisdiction go too far, and others such as the United Kingdom 
and many Members of the European Union, which would argue that the 
provisions do not go far enough, will opt into Chapter 14. It is also debatable 
whether nations such as France, predominantly preoccupied with the 
interests of smaller shippers and third parties with weaker bargaining power, 
will ever agree to be bound by these uncertain broadly stipulated provisions. 
Indeed, upon reflection and review of the predominant maritime opinion, it 
seems rather unlikely that the Rotterdam Rules will be widely accepted and 
become “the” Convention to finally harmonize the treatment of jurisdiction 
agreements contained in international maritime carriage contracts.  
                                                                                                                           
According to Bursanescu supra note 47 at 72, ‘[t]his is hardly an acceptable disposition, as it 
essentially overrides all the work that was put in balancing the different interests under 
Chapter [14].’ 
425 Sturley ‘Jurisdiction Under the Rotterdam Rules’ supra note 44 at 8-9: 
A nation choosing to be bound must make a formal declaration to that effect under 
article 91. A nation that simply ratifies the Convention without taking any further 
action, therefore, will not be bound by the chapter. A court in that nation will instead 
address these issues under the law that it would otherwise apply, which might be its 
own national law, the proper law of the contract, another international instrument, or 
even some combination of those sources. 
 
Most nations making declarations under article 74 will presumably do so at the time 
they ratify the Convention, but article 91(1) permits the declaration to be made “at 
any time” and article 91(5) similarly permits a nation to withdraw its declaration “at 
any time”. Thus a nation could ratify the Convention immediately while postponing 
its decision on the jurisdiction chapter. Moreover, it may revisit its decision at any 
time, either accepting rules that it had previously rejected or withdrawing from the 















Despite the general lack of success of the Hamburg Rules, its pro-cargo 
jurisdiction provisions have served a significant purpose insofar as they have 
influenced the drafting of national provisions on jurisdiction, and have laid 
the foundation for the default rule on jurisdiction under the Rotterdam Rules. 
As for these latest Rules, it is generally believed that, despite the gargantuan 
effort that went behind drafting the carefully considered substantive rules on 
jurisdiction, in practice, carriers will continue to dictate jurisdiction in most 
instances, and the panoply of differing national opinions and laws will 
continue to govern the enforceability of jurisdiction clauses. But, as Sturley 
sensibly reminds his readers, all was not for naught: 
[T]he jurisdiction chapter, like the Rotterdam Rules as a whole, achieved a 
broadly acceptable compromise that advanced international uniformity on 
some important (albeit not all) aspects of the subject. Ratifying the 
convention will be an important step toward restoring international 








                                            














CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In many ways, the maritime industry has come full circle in terms of 
regulating jurisdiction clauses contained in international maritime contracts 
with the advent of the Rotterdam Rules. Under this Convention, if 
commercial parties transport goods under service contracts or volume 
contracts, which apparently account for the majority of the worldwide cargo 
trade, then they are at liberty to contract as they see fit, ‘in a completely 
unregulated fashion,’427 with only very limited restrictions. This shift in 
paradigm towards greater contractual freedom and market self-regulation 
appears to be sanctioned by most seafaring nations, particularly in light of 
the fact that it is no longer tenable to view the average shipper or third party 
as a weaker bargaining power warranting special protection.  
 
Consistent with this trend, there is a growing international consensus 
that jurisdiction clauses contained in carriers’ bills or other contracts of 
carriage should, as a general rule, be enforced. These standard form 
clauses are no longer considered an ‘abuse of market power’, but rather as 
‘an important element in international commercial transactions, allowing the 
parties to better calculate the risks of the transaction and helping to lower the 
overall costs of legal proceedings.’428 And yet, in spite of all that, a complete 
absence in regulation of jurisdiction clauses contained in contracts of 
carriage does not appear to be the answer, since it plays a crucial role, over 
and above ordinary principles of contract law, in protecting commercial 
parties against procedural and substantive abuses in this industry without 
borders. But, the question is, how best to regulate these jurisdiction clauses 
at maritime law? 
                                            
427 ‘SITPRO’s Guide to the Rotterdam Rules’ at 9. Available at 
www.sitpro.org.uk/rotterdamrules [Accessed on 1 February 2011]. 














Some nations question the need for a unifying instrument to regulate 
jurisdiction issues and/or argue in favour of maintaining the status quo, that 
is to say leaving it ‘up to national law to determine whether and under what 
conditions exclusive jurisdiction clauses would be upheld or held null and 
void.’429 To be sure, should states not take enough interest, national views 
remain too divergent, and/or there be an overwhelming ‘persistence of 
nationalism’,430 harmonization of jurisdiction rules may be altogether 
impossible. The solution to “do nothing” hardly seems satisfactory given the 
potential for lack of recognition and enforcement of national legislation and 
judgments on forum selection clauses by foreign jurisdictions (and 
concomitantly the risk of costly parallel proceedings),431 and, most of all, 
given the international character of the general maritime law. Tetley reminds 
us of the importance of uniformity in this branch of international law, ‘which 
knows no national boundaries’:432 
Uniformity of law enables the shipper who ships goods anywhere in the 
world to know the risks he is taking and the rights he possesses. Uniformity 
of law enables the carrier to know his rights and responsibilities no matter 
which port his vessel enters. The bill of lading, being a receipt for cargo, a 
contract of carriage and a document of title, and therefore an instrument of 
integrity, should have the same meaning no matter where it is issued. 
… 
[M]aritime law, being international law, is based on the lex mercatoria and 
lex maritima ‒ laws which [know] no national boundaries. Maritime law and 
the law of carriage of goods by sea should be international and uniform, 
because goods and ships travel from one jurisdiction to another. Merchants, 
shippers, consignees and carriers (and their underwriters) can only have 
                                            
429 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 107. 
430 Tetley ‘Uniformity and international private maritime’ supra note 51 at 810. 
431 According to P Myburgh in ‘Uniformity or unilateralism in the law of carriage of goods by 
sea?’ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington LR 355, without uniformity in jurisdiction 
rules parties face the risk of multiple proceedings, which ‘raises the spectre of multiple 
conflicting [remedies] in different jurisdictions, multiple anti-suit injunctions, and further 
conflicts of recognition and enforcement of awards; carriage claims will inevitably become 
even more complicated than they already are, as they become overlaid with increasingly 
complex conflicts of laws issues.’ 
432 W Tetley ‘Interpretation and construction of the Hague, Hague/Visby and Hamburg 














complete confidence in a contract if they are certain as to which law will 
apply and how it will be interpreted, no matter in what jurisdiction their claim 
or defence is heard.433 
 
As previously stated, the harmonization of rules on jurisdiction at 
maritime law has the advantage of promoting legal certainty, coherency and 
fairness in the treatment of rules in this area of international law. This may 
be achieved at a regional and international level. The EC Jurisdiction 
Regulation is an example of a successful, albeit imperfect, regional initiative 
seeking to uniformize rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. 
But, as Paul Myburg cautions, ‘regional initiatives are … a double-edged 
sword, in the sense that, while harmonising the carriage liability regime in 
one region, they might exacerbate divergence and conflict of laws in relation 
to others.’434 
 
At the international level, harmonization of rules on jurisdiction may be 
achieved in a number of different ways. One possibility is through the 
creation of international maritime conventions, such as the Hamburg Rules 
and Rotterdam Rules. Despite the tremendous amount of time, effort, and 
money spent by national delegations and various other maritime interests in 
drafting these elaborate rules to govern contracts of carriage, including the 
regulation of jurisdiction clauses, it is debatable whether these conventions 
will ever be effective, that is to say, whether they will be ratified or acceded 
to by a sufficient number of nations over the years to come so as to achieve 
international harmonization in this area of the law. There are a number of 
reasons standing in the way of attaining uniformity through these 
                                            
433 Ibid at 41 and 55. 














conventions, including:435 over elaboration of the rules, creating endless 
opportunities for arguments and varying interpretations (and therefore 
uncertainty in the law); 436 differences in political and social objectives;437 
different standards resulting from differences in national wealth;438 refusal of 
some states to give up their legislative sovereignty;439 diverging transnational 
interests; indifference of certain governments: international private maritime 
law is rarely a ‘top priority’ of national lawmakers;440 and the fact that nations 
are simply all “conventioned out.”441 However, even if international 
conventions do not come into force, they may nevertheless contribute to the 
progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law by 
serving as ‘a guide for the future.’442 
                                            
435 See generally P Griggs ‘Obstacles to uniformity of maritime law ‒ the Nicholas J Healy 
lecture’ (2003) 34(2) JMLC 191 at 198-208; Tetley ‘Uniformity and international private 
maritime law’ supra note 51 at 801-11. 
G Bayraktaroglu ‘Harmonization of private international law at different levels: 
communitarization v international harmonization’ (2003) 5(1) European Journal of Law 
Reform 127 at 154: 
Conventions are very much questioned since they become stumbling-blocks for new 
developments. This is not only caused by the slowness of the ratification or 
modification procedures of conventions, but also by the difficultly to obtain 
agreement on the new ules by all the members of an organization.  
Also, and more importantly, it is very difficult to obtain not only unification in law but 
also in practice. However, uniform application requires uniform interpretation of the 
conventions. It has been emphasized by many authors that even if uniformity is 
achieved following adoption of a single text, uniform application is by no means 
guaranteed, since in practice many countries interpret the same words differently. 
436 Griggs ibid at 203. 
437 Tetley ‘Uniformity and international private maritime’ supra note 51 at 807. 
438 Ibid at 808. 
439 Ibid at 810. 
440 Ibid; Griggs supra note 435 at 205. 
441 Griggs ibid at 208: 
I definitely sense a certain inertia amongst national governments when it comes to 
ratifying or acceding to international conventions. This is probably due to a 
combination of many factors: availability of legislative time, availability of lawyers 
capable of drafting the necessary national legislation, discovery of national 
opposition to a particular instrument, etc. It may also be that, in certain respects, 
states relish the diversities of law. For example, I cannot see the South African 
government ratifying the 1999 Arrest Convention since it would require them to 
change their law and would circumscribe the current freedom of arrest in that 
country. There is no doubt that a beneficial legal regime can attract foreign business 
and therefore foreign currency. 














Another possible means of achieving harmonization of rules on 
jurisdiction at the international level is through the amendment of existing 
contract of carriage regulations, which would take far less time to draft than a 
convention from scratch. The Hague and Hague/Visby Rules already enjoy 
wide ratification. It has been suggested that ‘a small number of very 
necessary amendments to the Hague regime would have been more 
acceptable and more likely to succeed.’443 Perhaps this solution might be 
combined with the “tacit acceptance procedure,”444 which would “fast track” 
the implementation of the new rules and prevent the delays usually 
associated with traditional methods of incorporating international rules into 
national law.  
 
Another solution, arguably ‘more feasible than international 
conventions in terms of their negotiation and preparation,’445 is to harmonize 
rules on jurisdiction through the use of non-binding instruments such as 
rules, model laws, guidelines and general principles, often referred to as 
“soft” law.446  
[T]he mandatory status of international conventions can raise the political 
stakes to the point where all that the parties can agree on is a mediocre 
instrument hedged about with problematic compromises. By contrast, the 
use of model laws or voluntary principles, industry clauses or guidelines can 
be considerably less threatening and achieve more effective harmonisation 
in the long term [emphasis added].447 
                                            
443 D R Thomas ‘Editorial of the Journal of International Maritime Law’ (2008) 14 JIML at 
190. Perhaps the only downside to this option is that the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules are 
in serious need of an overhaul (especially in view of the arrival of multi-modal transport and 
e-commerce) and therefore tacking on amendments or protocols to this outdated convention 
may prove to be exceedingly complicated and more trouble than its actually worth. 
444 Tacit acceptance procedure: where an amendment to a given convention or protocol 
automatically comes into force on specified date, unless contracting state specifically 
objects to it by a specified date (see Tetley ‘Uniformity and international private maritime 
law’ supra note 51 at 818). 
445 Bayraktaroglu supra note 435 at 154-55. 
446 Ibid at 154-55; Allsop ‘International maritime arbitration’ supra note 258 at 10. 














Of course, the downside to “soft law” is that it does not have force of 
law, and therefore it may be totally ignored by the very persons it was 
intended to regulate.448  
 
Finally, a further solution to the lack of uniformity of international rules 
of maritime law, and jurisdiction clauses contained in contracts of carriage in 
particular, is to rely on uniform conflict of law rules. ‘Since a complete 
harmonization of substantive law is utopian, harmonization of conflict rules is 
a very good way of solving legal divergences and bringing decisional 
harmony.’449 Uniform conflict of law rules already exist in Europe, with such 
conventions as the Rome Convention (applicable to contractual obligations), 
the Brussels Convention and Regulation (as seen in Chapter 5), and the 
Hague Choice of Court Convention (not applicable to contracts of carriage), 
and elsewhere, with the New York Convention (for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitration), for example.450 According to Tetley, ‘[a] 
consistent international methodology to solve conflicts problems would be 
helpful to solve maritime law problems where international private maritime 
law is not uniform.’451 Indeed, there is no reason why international rules 
similar to those in Europe should not be created to achieve a greater degree 
of certainty in dealing with conflicts problems relating to contracts of 
carriage, with a view of eliminating parallel proceedings through a strict lis 
pendens rule based on comity of nations, enforcing foreign exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements where reasonable, and recognizing and enforcing 
foreign judgments. 
 
                                            
448 Griggs supra note 435 at 204. 
449 Bayraktaroglu supra note 435 at 170. 
450 Tetley ‘Uniformity and international private maritime law’ supra note 51 at 821-22. 














At the end of the day, even with the existence of harmonized 
jurisdictional rules, whatever form they may take, it is not possible to 
completely avoid disharmony resulting from conflicting national jurisprudence 
and legislation, or get rid of opportunistic and aggressive forum shopping for 
the “best offer”.452 And yet perhaps, as Burke-White suggests, international 
legal pluralism is not such a bad thing after all:453  
[T]he pluralist conception of the international legal system recognizes̶and 
possibly thrives on̶the diversity of the system. A wide range of courts will 
interpret, apply, and develop the corpus of international law. States will face 
differing sets of obligations that may even be interpreted differently by 
various tribunals and may at times conflict. Possibly most significantly, 
national and international legal processes will interact and influence one 
another, resulting in new hybrid procedures, rules, and courts. Yet, these 
developments will occur within a common system of international law 
engaged in a constructive and self-referential dialogue that consciously 
seeks to maintain the coherence of the overall system. 
 
The respect of legitimate difference inherent in such a pluralist conception  
may actually enhance the effectiveness of international law by increasing 
the legitimacy and political acceptability of international legal rules. 
… 
Admittedly, such a pluralist conception of the international legal system is 
not a cure-all for the dangers of fragmentation. The difficulties of conflicting 
obligations … remain; further efforts at legal development will be needed to 
resolve them. Nonetheless, this pluralist vision does provide an alternative 
and potentially powerful means of conceptualizing the future development 
of international law. By ensuring uniformity while embracing legitimate 
difference, the international legal system can be made both more legitimate 
and more effective [emphasis added].454 
 
 
                                            
452 Von Ziegler supra note 4 at 86-87. 
453 W Burke-White ‘International legal pluralism’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International 















ANNEXURE A: Examples of  Standard Form Jur isdict ion 
Clauses in Internat ional  Mar i t ime Carr iage Contracts  
 
I. Bill of Lading  
Mediterranean Shipping Company Bill of Lading. Accessed at 
http://www.mscgva.ch/bl_terms/bl.html. 
 
10.3 Jurisdiction - It is hereby specifically agreed that any suit by the Merchant, and save 
as additionally provided below any suit by the Carrier, shall be filed exclusively in the High 
Court of London and English Law shall exclusively apply, unless the carriage contracted for 
hereunder was to or from the United States of America, in which case suit shall be filed 
exclusively in the United States District Court, for the Southern District of New York and 
U.S. law shall exclusively apply. The Merchant agrees that it shall not institute suit in any 
other court and agrees to be responsible for the reasonable legal expenses and costs of the 
Carrier in removing a suit filed in another forum. The Merchant waives any objection to the 
personal jurisdiction over the Merchant of the above agreed fora.  
 
In the case of any dispute relating to Freight or other sums due from the Merchant to the 
Carrier, the Carrier may, at its sole option, bring suit against the Merchant in the fora agreed 
above, or in the countries of the Port of Loading, Port of Discharge, Place of Delivery or in 
any jurisdiction where the Merchant has a place of business [emphasis added]. 
 
APL Standard Bill of Lading. Accessed at 
http://www.apl.com/help_center/html/bl_terms.html 
28. Law and Jurisdiction  
i. Governing Law 
Insofar as anything has not been dealt with by the terms and conditions of this Bill of 
Lading, Singapore law shall apply. Singapore law shall in any event apply in 
interpreting the terms and conditions hereof.  
ii. Jurisdiction 
All disputes relating to this Bill of Lading shall be determined by the Courts of 
Singapore to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of any other country 
provided always that the Carrier may in its absolute and sole discretion invoke or 
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of any other country which, but for 
the terms of this Bill of Lading, could properly assume jurisdiction to hear and 
determine such disputes, but shall not constitute a waiver of the terms of this 
provision in any other instance.  
iii. Notwithstanding Clause 28 i) and ii), if Carriage includes Carriage to, from or 
through a port in the United States of America, the Merchant may refer any claim or 
dispute to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 















COGENBILL 2007 (Bill of Lading issued by BIMCO to be used by Charterparties). Accessed 
at http://editor.bimco.org/Corporate/Documents/BIMCO_Documents/Bill_of_Ladings.aspx 
 
(1) All terms and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter Party, dated as overleaf, 
including the Law and Arbitration Clause/Dispute Resolution Clause, are herewith 
incorporated. 
 
CONLINEBILL 2000 (Bill of Lading issued by BIMCO). Accessed at 
http://editor.bimco.org/Corporate/Documents/BIMCO_Documents/Bill_of_Ladings.aspx 
 
4. Law and Jurisdiction. 
Disputes arising out of or in connection with this Bill of Lading shall be exclusively 
determined by the courts and in accordance with the law of the place where the Carrier has 
his principal place of business, as stated on Page 1, except as provided elsewhere herein. 
 
II. Sea Waybill 
LINEWAYBILL (Issued by BIMCO – non-negotiable sea waybill). Accessed at 
www.infomarine.gr/bulletins/chartering_forms/linewaybill.pdf 
 
3. Law and Jurisdiction 
Disputes arising under this Sea Waybill shall be determined by the courts and in accordance 
with the law at the place where the Carrier has his principal place of business. 
 
III. Charterparty Agreement 
Shelltime 4 Charterparty (Time Charter Party) 
 
Law and Litigation 
41(a) This charter shall be construed and the relations between he parties determined in 
accordance with the laws of England. 
(b) Any dispute arising under this charter shall be decided by the English Courts to whose 
jurisdiction the parties hereby agree. 
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, but without prejudice to any party’s right to arrest or 
maintain the arrest of any maritime property, either party may, by giving written notice of 
election to the other party, elect to have any such dispute referred to the arbitration of a 
single arbitrator in London in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1950, or 
any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force. 
 
 
 
